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Abstract
Businesses and society alike have been heavily dependent on Internet-based ser-
vices, albeit with experiences of constant and annoying disruptions caused by the
adversary class. A malicious attack that can prevent establishment of Internet
connections to web servers, initiated from legitimate client machines, is termed as
a Denial of Service (DoS) attack; volume and intensity of which is rapidly grow-
ing thanks to the readily available attack tools and the ever-increasing network
bandwidths. A majority of contemporary web servers are built on the HTTP/1.1
communication protocol. As a consequence, all literature found on DoS attack
modelling and appertaining detection techniques, addresses only HTTP/1.x net-
work traffic. This thesis presents a model of DoS attack traffic against servers
employing the new communication protocol, namely HTTP/2.
The HTTP/2 protocol significantly differs from its predecessor and introduces
new messaging formats and data exchange mechanisms. This creates an urgent
need to understand how malicious attacks including Denial of Service, can be
launched against HTTP/2 services. Moreover, the ability of attackers to vary the
network traffic models to stealthy affects web services, thereby requires extensive
research and modelling.
This research work not only provides a novel model for DoS attacks against
HTTP/2 services, but also provides a model of stealthy variants of such attacks,
that can disrupt routine web services. Specifically, HTTP/2 traffic patterns that
consume computing resources of a server, such as CPU utilisation and mem-
ory consumption, were thoroughly explored and examined. The study presents
four HTTP/2 attack models. The first being a flooding-based attack model, the
second being a distributed model, the third and fourth are variant DoS attack
models. The attack traffic analysis conducted in this study employed four ma-
chine learning techniques, namely Naïve Bayes, Decision Tree, JRip and Support
Vector Machines.
The HTTP/2 normal traffic model portrays online activities of human users.
The model thus formulated was employed to also generate flash-crowd traffic, i.e.
a large volume of normal traffic that incapacitates a web server, similar in fashion
iii
to a DoS attack, albeit with non-malicious intent. Flash-crowd traffic generated
based on the defined model was used to populate the dataset of legitimate network
traffic, to fuzz the machine learning-based attack detection process. The two
variants of DoS attack traffic differed in terms of the traffic intensities and the
inter-packet arrival delays introduced to better analyse the type and quality of
DoS attacks that can be launched against HTTP/2 services.
A detailed analysis of HTTP/2 features is also presented to rank relevant
network traffic features for all four traffic models presented. These features were
ranked based on legitimate as well as attack traffic observations conducted in
this study. The study shows that machine learning-based analysis yields better
classification performance, i.e. lower percentage of incorrectly classified instances,
when the proposed HTTP/2 features are employed compared to when HTTP/1.1
features alone are used.
The study shows how HTTP/2 DoS attack can be modelled, and how future
work can extend the proposed model to create variant attack traffic models that
can bypass intrusion-detection systems. Likewise, as the Internet traffic and the
heterogeneity of Internet-connected devices are projected to increase significantly,
legitimate traffic can yield varying traffic patterns, demanding further analysis.
The significance of having current legitimate traffic datasets, together with the
scope to extend the DoS attack models presented herewith, suggest that research
in the DoS attack analysis and detection area will benefit from the work presented
in this thesis.
Keywords: HTTP/2, Denial of Service attack, traffic analysis, machine learning
techniques.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
The Internet has been a significant catalyst for the world economy, with businesses
and society relying on it for their communication and information needs. Ensuring
the availability of these services is a challenging task due to the growing volume
of Internet traffic and the various communication standards that it supports.
HTTP/2 has emerged as a web communication standard over the past few years.
Through this thesis, novel techniques are proposed and evaluated for detecting
malicious network traffic that targets HTTP/2 services, as part of a Denial of
Service (DoS) attack. In addition, various techniques are proposed to differentiate
legitimate from malicious network traffic.
It is estimated that the number of Internet-connected devices in 2020 will be 50
billion (“The Internet of Things”, 2014), as detailed in Table1.1. This implies that
there will be more computer-connected devices per person. The ubiquity of these
devices creates many convenient benefits for society. For instance, online banking
speeds up purchases; mobile technology eliminates the distances between doctor-
patient and teacher-students (“The Third Great Wave”, 2014); and innovative
applications facilitate ordering a taxi and monitoring its arrival. Consequently,
an increasing number of services and devices will be connected to the Internet
(“The Internet of Things”, 2014), and the modern society will become more reliant
1
Table 1.1: The number of connected devices over the past 14 years
# devices (billion) world population (billion)
2003 0.5 6.3
2010 12.5 6.8
2015 25 7.2
2020 50 7.6
on the availability of Internet-based services.
Internet-connected devices have increased the demand for content. For in-
stance, instead of displaying text as web servers were originally designed to ren-
der, contemporary web communication exchange richer content such as audio
and video. Due to the multimedia content that these devices transfer and down-
load, the current web browsing standard (HTTP/1.1) is reaching its full capacity
(Grigorik, 2013b), as it was designed to exchange text. Web users often experi-
ence slow Internet speed; hence, a new standard (HTTP/2) has been designed to
support communication at higher speed (Belshe, Peon, & Thomson, May 2015).
HTTP/2 was published in May 2015. While the web programming software used
to build websites remains unchanged, the HTTP/2 data communication tech-
niques differ from those of HTTP/1.1. HTTP/2 architecture introduces binary
framing, multiplexing, message interleaving, and application-layer flow control
(Belshe et al., May 2015). As such, the traffic it sustains over the Internet me-
dia shows different patterns than what has been observed and reported in the
literature, for HTTP/1.1.
The introduction of a new application-layer communication standard prompts
a critical analysis of its security implications. One important security considera-
tion is availability of web-based services. The availability of the Internet creates a
healthy ecosystem: society can access the conveniences offered by businesses, and
businesses make use of the growing size of the Internet to offer ever expanding
services to end users/clients. Unfortunately, parasites do exist in the ecosys-
tem. For monetary gain, adversaries threaten the availability of businesses by
attempting to bring down web servers and corresponding services (Heron, 2010;
Mansfield-Devine, 2011). Such a threat can translate into a Denial of Service
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(DoS) attack, which is defined as, "an explicit attempt by attackers to prevent
legitimate users of a service from using that service" (CERT, 1997). Other moti-
vations for launching DoS attacks include ideological beliefs to uphold one’s views
while attempting to suppress the opposition’s ability to publicise through web-
sites; intellectual challenge to learn how to launch attacks; and cyber warfare, i.e.
attacks supported by military or terrorist organizations (Zargar, Joshi, & Tipper,
2013).
DoS attacks can be launched either by suffocating an Internet-connected ma-
chine by sending it a large volume of traffic (flooding technique), or by exploiting
a bug (vulnerability) in the target system’s software that incapacitates the service
(Mirkovic & Reiher, 2004). In flooding attack techniques, adversaries send more
packets than the target computer can process during a frame of time. This forces
the victim to either constantly use its processing capability to handle incoming
packets, or to face consequences due to depletion of its memory through packet
buffering. When the victim is a web server, the connected remote users experi-
ence either slow web responses, interrupted services, or no services at all. Similar
service disruption symptoms can be caused through exploiting a vulnerability of
the target. Web servers run software that parses and executes HTTP commands
that it receives. Attackers can exploit the software vulnerability of a web server
to cause the program to run undesirably. This could include running an infinite
loop, causing the web server to stop responding to legitimate client requests. As
illustrated in Figure 1-1, the attacks can be amplified using a group of compro-
mised computers in order to launch a large storm of traffic (Chang, 2002). This
variant is called a Distributed Denial-of-Service attack (DDoS).
DoS attacks pose a serious threat to businesses as they involve overwhelming
of the communication channel with malicious traffic. In the year 2000, major
websites (CNN.com, ZDNet, Yahoo) and businesses (Amazon.com, E*Trade, and
eBay) were targeted as part of DoS attacks that incapacitated web servers and
caused considerable monetary loss (Garber, 2000). In 2007, vital web servers in
Estonia including those belonging to banks, ministries, newspapers and broad-
casters were brought down through an organized DoS attack perpetrated by an
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Figure 1-1: DDoS attack
adversary (Estonian Attacks Raise Concern over Cyber ’Nuclear Winter’ , 2007).
The attack crippled the Estonian government’s paperless IT infrastructure and
led to severe financial losses. In 2010, web servers belonging to MasterCard, Visa,
and PayPal were subjected to a DDoS attack (Addley & Halliday, 2010). The
attacks were launched as an act of revenge on companies that froze all payments
to WikiLeaks – a website that publishes sensitive, classified information. In 2012,
nine major online banking sites in the USA were made unavailable (Kitten, 2013).
It was believed that the attack was launched by an adversary residing in an enemy
state.
Detecting and bearing the ability to prevent DoS attacks against a web server
are therefore crucial in order to provide uninterrupted services to legitimate
clients. For network and web hosting operators, the ability to detect DoS traffic
prevents unwanted operational costs, helps to plan future infrastructure, and al-
lows operators to provide services that otherwise would have been disrupted by
illegitimate traffic.
Unfortunately, DoS attacks are increasing in their volume, ubiquity, com-
plexity, and use of novel techniques (Mansfield-Devine, 2011). Flood-based DoS
attack volume is usually expressed in terms of bandwidth usage. In 2002, the vol-
ume of DDoS attack traffic against large carriers and content providers around
the world was found to be 400 Mbps (Labovitz, 2010). In 2013, the volume was
increased to 60 Gbps (Paganini, 2013). Recently the total worldwide attack traffic
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volume has been increasingly difficult to collect as the number has grown expo-
nentially. To illustrate, in the second quarter of 2015 alone, DDoS attack volume
touched a staggering 1,000 Gbps (Keane, 2015). In the beginning of 2016, the
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) website was flooded with a 600 Gbps
attack (Khandelwal, 2016). These threats are not to be underestimated due to
the fact that all web servers can become inaccessible when flooded with more
traffic than what can be processed.
Currently detection techniques for DoS attacks against web services have been
based on HTTP/1.1 traffic patterns. HTTP/2 as a new protocol is vulnerable
to DDoS attacks as is presented in this thesis. The new standard is no longer
regarded as experimental, but rather has been formalised and deployed for pub-
lic access. Although some semantics of the original protocol are preserved, the
information exchange and implementation mechanism of the protocol demand
memory consumption. The introduction of HTTP/2 opens up a new channel for
adversaries to interrupt the availability of web servers. This means that exper-
imentation, observation, and analysis of how HTTP/2-packet-based attacks can
be launched and be detected are important new areas of research.
This research studies how HTTP/2 consumes the computing and networking
resources of web servers. It develops attack models, differentiates between legiti-
mate and malicious attack traffic, and shows how cyber attacks intended to deny
access to HTTP/2 servers could be detected.
1.2 Purpose of the Study
The introduction of a new web browsing standard HTTP/2 poses a novel challenge
for DoS attack detection. Hence, the objectives of this study are:
∙ to develop attacker models for DoS attacks against HTTP/2 servers;
∙ to generate traffic representing DoS attacks against HTTP/2 servers;
∙ to identify features and produce datasets that best represent DoS attacks
against HTTP/2 servers; and
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∙ to demonstrate how stealthy HTTP/2 DoS attacks can be analysed using
machine learning techniques.
The challenge to generate HTTP/2 traffic stemmed from the unavailability of
HTTP/2 implementation. Few programming libraries were available to support
the development of the traffic generator. This thesis work selected the most
appropriate library that could apply the model previously developed, and aimed
to generate HTTP/2 attack traffic. The study also examined how the generated
attack traffic consumed CPU and memory resources of an HTTP/2 web server.
In order to analyse the characteristics of the attack traffic, this study also
evaluated and examined the instances of the traffic. A large number of instances
that made up a dataset were required to extensively include the variations of the
instances. Currently there is no publicly available dataset representing HTTP/2
traffic. Instead, the datasets used in the literature describe normal and attack
traffic under HTTP/1.1 conditions. Through this work, datasets representing
DoS attacks against HTTP/2 were generated to best represent live network traffic.
Each data sample was characterised by a series of features. One of the ob-
jectives of this study was to identify features that characterised HTTP/2 traffic.
The study generated anomalous and legitimate HTTP/2 traffic patterns. Among
detection methods discussed in the literature, machine learning techniques are
suitable approaches to detect network traffic anomalies. The study explored the
use of machine learning techniques for efficient and effective detection of DoS at-
tacks. Machine learning techniques were used as a means to measure how attack
traffic differs from normal traffic in this study. Building upon these investigations,
the study aimed to demonstrate a stealthy HTTP/2 attack and showed how it
could be modelled to bring down a web server.
1.3 Significance of the Study
There are three significant aspects of this research. These are:
∙ to explore the design within HTTP/2 servers that can be exploited to con-
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sume computing resources through a DDoS attack;
∙ to provide an extension of researchers’ understanding on DoS attacks
against web servers; and
∙ to develop knowledge on how machine learning can be used to detect DoS
attacks for HTTP/2 traffic.
First, the study explored how attacks against HTTP/2 services consumed
computing resources. Little was known about how much memory and CPU time
were utilised for handling HTTP/2 Requests and Responses. This study set up
a test bed that launched HTTP/2 packets towards an HTTP/2 server and moni-
tored the CPU utilisation, memory consumption, network throughput, and packet
loss. The results obtained from this experiment allow researchers to understand
how HTTP/2 servers can become unavailable when subjected to DoS attacks.
Second, the study extended the current understanding of detecting DoS at-
tacks against web servers. Existing studies in the area observed attacks against
HTTP/1.1 servers. Only a few of the deployed servers in the Internet implement
HTTP/2 and no dataset described HTTP/2 traffic. Moreover, no study was con-
ducted for detecting DoS attacks against HTTP/2 servers. This study extends
the knowledge in the area through testing and analysing different features relevant
to detecting DoS attacks against HTTP/2 servers. The study initially observed
whether the existing solutions (i.e. the detection methods on DoS attacks against
HTTP/1.1 servers) could be used effectively. Subsequently, the study observed
DoS attack traffic against an HTTP/2 server, generated a set of new features
based on these observations, and evaluated the effectiveness of the new features
in distinguishing DoS from normal traffic. The results provided new insights for
researchers on how HTTP/2 can influence effective approaches to detecting DoS
attacks.
Third, the study developed knowledge on how machine learning can be used
to characterise HTTP/2 traffic. Existing techniques learned patterns and built
classification rules from HTTP/1.1 data. In contrast, this research introduced
new traffic patterns and features. In addition, this study exhibited different
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accuracy with distinguishing attacks from normal traffic. The investigation of
the data involved investigations using machine learning techniques. Therefore,
this study developed knowledge on how machine learning techniques can help
accurately differentiate legitimate traffic from malicious.
1.4 Thesis Contribution
The main contributions of this thesis are: HTTP/2 traffic models and datasets –
each with normal and attack class; HTTP/2 traffic features, and a stealthy attack
model. These are detailed as follows.
∙ HTTP/2 normal traffic model creation and dataset generation.
To differentiate anomalous traffic signifying DoS attacks, normal HTTP/2
traffic was generated to serve as the standard. Such synthetic traffic was
crucial not only for its use in this thesis but also for research at large that
could be conducted in the area. The traffic was generated as a result of
simulating a model that was proposed in this study. The evaluation of the
model showed how the generated normal HTTP/2 traffic can be justified
by its internal validity, and that initialising the model with another sample
showed how it closely represented the sample. Hence, a wider audience can
repeat the model to generate different traffic patterns. In this study, the
generated model was used to produce network traffic as the ground truth
to create a dataset representing normal online user behaviours.
∙ HTTP/2 attack traffic model creation and dataset generation. At-
tack traffic consumes the CPU utilisation of the target computer. HTTP/2
introduces new message exchange mechanisms that differ to its predeces-
sors. This study investigated the computing resources of an HTTP/2 server
when subjected to different traffic parameters. It observed the CPU con-
sumption and memory of a server, and proposed a range of HTTP/2 traffic
parameter values that can incapacitate the server. These parameters served
as the attack model that researchers can replicate and benefit from. Fur-
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thermore, the study created attack datasets from the generated HTTP/2
traffic that the model simulated. To our knowledge, there is currently no
such publicly available dataset.
∙ Examination and ranking of HTTP/2 traffic features. Examining
datasets includes selecting and identifying features when the datasets are
applied to different evaluation purposes. Evaluating large data can be com-
plex and time consuming when dealing with many features. This study
proposed a set of features to characterise HTTP/2 traffic for both normal
and attack class, and identified a set of the most relevant features.
∙ HTTP/2 stealthy attack model definition. Having classified attack
and normal traffic, one of the important results was to present models that
generate HTTP/2 traffic of both classes. This model produced stealthy at-
tack traffic that represented similar characteristics to normal traffic. The
thesis presented model parameters which give wide opportunities to re-
searchers in the area to explore further attack traffic patterns.
1.5 Thesis Structure
HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 protocols are discussed in the next chapter. It details
how a pair of client-server can exchange information using the protocol and shows
the distinction between both protocols. Having firstly discussed how HTTP/1.1
protocol works, Chapter 2 discusses how DoS attacks can be launched in com-
puter networks running HTTP/1.1 protocol, and how they can be detected. The
chapter shows the gaps that exist in the literature on DoS detection methods
when applied to HTTP/2.
To study how HTTP/2 DoS attack traffic can be detected, this thesis modelled
and generated both normal and attack traffic. A computer lab was setup for the
purpose of generating the traffic, extracting the features, and creating datasets
for analysis. These are discussed in Chapter 3.
Methodology for normal traffic modelling and generation is discussed in Chap-
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ter 4. Similarly, the discussion on how attack traffic was modelled and generated
is presented in Chapter 5. Analyses of these traffic patterns led this study to
model and generate stealthy attack traffic that degraded the performance of the
detection techniques previously presented. Two stealthy attack traffic models
were proposed in Chapter 6. Furthermore, the chapter showed how the stealthy
traffic detection analysis performed when the analysis were based on features
commonly used by HTTP/1.1 DoS detection methods.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section is a techni-
cal review of HTTP/1.1 which is the current protocol for web communications.
It provides details on how the HTTP/1.1 protocol facilitates communication of
messages across the Internet. The second section is a technical review of DoS
attack, explaining its types and variants such as DDoS. It also illustrates how the
attacks can be carried out by the adversary. The third section reviews the liter-
ature on how anomalous traffic such as DoS/DDoS attacks can be detected. It
further discusses machine learning techniques focusing on how they are deployed
for anomaly detection and traffic analysis. The fourth section is a technical re-
view of HTTP/2 covering: how HTTP/2 has a different information exchange
mechanism from HTTP/1.1; what the relevant security implications are; how it
is exposed to DoS attacks; and which techniques were proposed in this study to
detect DoS attacks against HTTP/2 servers.
2.1 HTTP/1.1 Protocol
The web traffic uses the Internet to connect the user and the information resources
hosted on web servers. The standard protocol for supporting web activity is the
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP). This section provides a thorough review
on how HTTP operates on the Internet.
The World Wide Web is a term coined by Tim Berners Lee in 1989 to denote
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Figure 2-1: A client-server communication model
the universal world of information accessible through networked computers. It
was designed with simplicity in mind for users to search and view information. A
typical web communication exchange involves a search requested by a user from
a client computer from a remote computer server. This is illustrated in Figure
2-1. In response to the request, the web server processes and returns data to the
client machine.
In 1991, Berners-Lee initiated a high-level design of a computer commu-
nication protocol to implement the above client-server communication mecha-
nism (Berners-Lee, Fischetti, & Foreword By-Dertouzos, 2000). This protocol
was named Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and it was unofficially named
HTTP/0.9. The protocol allowed a client to request a file from a server; and
allowed a server to send a response file in Hypertext Mark-up Language (HTML)
format. This format can contain references to an image and links to other docu-
ments. An HTTP client, such as a web browser, can retrieve the referenced image
by using HTTP: the web browser requests the image to a server, and the server
responds by sending the image to the web browser.
This initiative was well received and led to the rapid growth in web-based
communication. Client-side software was written to ease the use of web com-
munication over the Internet. The first client software was Mosaic and it was
renamed to Netscape when it commercialised the software in 1994. Subsequently,
the HTTP Working Group introduced and revised the protocol over time (Table
2.1). HTTP has become the protocol of choice for web browsing communication,
and web browsers such as Mozilla Firefox, Chrome, Internet Explorer and Opera
have become popular client software for facilitating web-based information access
by end-users.
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Table 2.1: HTTP versions and years of release
Version Year introduced
HTTP/0.9 1991
HTTP/1.0 1996
HTTP/1.1 1997
HTTP/2.0 2015
Figure 2-2: A client-server communication detailed with layers
To reach a web server, information sent by web browsers was encapsulated
through different computer communication layers before being transmitted over
the Internet. This is illustrated in Figure 2-2 which essentially depicts the In-
ternet Protocol suite , i.e. a set of protocols used for computer communications.
The figure illustrates the Internet that consists of intermediary machines such as
routers which function to find connection paths between clients and servers. Ide-
ally a router has many physical network interfaces to route network information
from an input interface to an output interface. A series of connected routers link
two end computers and allows these computers to exchange network messages. A
mesh of router links creates an Internet communication infrastructure. The figure
shows that routers are also computers that are equipped with layered computer
communication architecture.
To allow communications between different computers, each message from
each layer is encapsulated at the layer below, to pack the information for network
transmission. A header is affixed at each layer, allowing the layered intercon-
nections. This is shown in Figure 2-3. Header-affixed information in network
communications is termed packets.
13
Figure 2-3: Messages are encapsulated at each layer.
The Application Layer describes protocols for human to interact with the
network. HTTP is an example of an Application Layer protocol. Other than
HTTP, examples of popular protocols are File Transfer Protocol (FTP) to trans-
fer files, Peer-to-Peer (P2P) to seamlessly connect with another computer, and
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) to facilitate exchange of emails. The
Application Layer translates human inputs (such as a website address) for de-
livery to the layer below it. For example, to request a page from a remote
web server, the web browser translates the website address to a destination
IP address (explained shortly) and uses HTTP to send a text message such as
GET /index.html HTTP/1.1 to the destination address. To do this, the GET
message is firstly encapsulated in the Transport Layer packet.
The Transport Layer manages a connection with a remote end, controls the
flow of the packets, and informs the Application Layer service type (e.g. HTTP).
The remote end in this example is the web server (which address was already
typed on the web browser as described above). User Datagram Protocol (UDP)
is an example of a Transport Layer protocol. UDP defines simple connections
without mandating a remote end to acknowledge that a packet has arrived at the
destination. On the other hand, Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) is an ex-
ample of a Transport Layer protocol that mandates a remote end to acknowledge
if it has received a packet. TCP is a reliable transport protocol; it initiates and
terminates a connection. Controlling connections is done through sending TCP
packets with some flags in the TCP header indicating the state of a connection,
such as initiating a connection, ending a connection, or acknowledging a received
packet. The TCP header also specifies the Application Layer service type it car-
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ries through the use of port numbers. For example, HTTP is defined to function
on TCP port 80. To find a path to the destination address (in this example, the
web server), the TCP packet is encapsulated in the Network Layer packet.
The Network Layer is responsible for routing of packets through the Internet.
The Internet Protocol (IP) is the world standard to route packets from the source
(i.e. the computer where the web browser is) to the destination address (i.e. the
web server). These source and destination addresses are defined in the IP header
. Routers, the intermediary devices between the source and destination machines,
inspect the IP headers to find the destination address. They look up the routing
table to find which interface associates with the destination address, and forward
the packets to a physical interface. The Link Layer handles how the packets
are transferred over the wire through the routers’ interfaces as electric or light
signals.
The communication protocols described above are repeatedly applied at each
hop of a route until the packet reaches the destination address. At each router,
the process is reversed from the Link Layer to the Network Layer. Routers remove
the header of the Link Layer so that IP header information can be examined. Sub-
sequently, the Network Layer to Link Layer encapsulation process as explained
above is also repeated: routers find which interface is associated with the desti-
nation address, encapsulate the IP packet into a Link Layer frame, and forward
the packet to a physical interface. At the destination machine, the web server
removes each lower layer header until it obtains the original HTTP message.
After the web server eventually finds the GET /index.html HTTP/1.1 mes-
sage, it sends the requested HTML file back to the client. An example of an
index.html file content is a "<html>HelloWorld</html>" message. The file is
sent as a text message from the web server to the web browser following exactly
the same procedure as previously described. The simplified end-to-end HTTP
communication is illustrated in Figure 2-4. The figure illustrates how HTTP
messages allow clients and servers to communicate while decoupling the protocol
from network issues. In summary, HTTP allows the web browser to request files
from the web server using text messages without having to define the network
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Figure 2-4: An end-to-end HTTP communication
protocols, which are standardised and implemented within HTTP supporting
machines.
The web traffic sent from a client to a web server is termed as HTTP Request,
and the response traffic is called HTTP Response. When a client sends a flood
of HTTP Requests, the server can become too busy handling the requests and
can fail to respond. An adversary can design this scenario to attack a web server.
This attack is called Denial of Service (DoS) attack which is detailed in the next
section.
2.2 DoS Attacks
This section reviews the underlying technical mechanism of DoS attacks. These
attacks can be described as malicious attempts to inhibit the legitimate use of a
computing service (CERT, 1997). There are two techniques that can be employed
by an adversary to carry out such attacks: flooding technique, and vulnerability-
based technique (Loukas, Gan, & Vuong, 2013; Mirkovic & Reiher, 2004).
Flood-based DoS attack
In flooding techniques, an attacker sends a large volume of traffic to a target
machine (e.g. a web server) beyond its processing capabilities. This causes the
target to consume its resources, comprising CPU time, memory, and network
bandwidth. As such, the machine is unable to perform its services in requisite
time frames, leading to incapacitation.
A flood-based DoS attack variant uses many machines to simultaneously flood
a target computer (Figure 2-5). This is called a Distributed Denial of Service
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Figure 2-5: DDoS attack
(DDoS) attacks (Chang, 2002). DDoS is a flood-based attack carried out by many
machines operating in tandem and generating a large volume of requests towards a
target. The technique uses software agents, sometimes called DoS handlers, bots,
or botnets, that are illegitimately installed on compromised computers, which are
also referred to as zombies. They can launch simultaneous attack traffic towards
a victim under the attacker’s control, causing a much larger volume of traffic sent
to the victim compared to the traditional DoS attack traffic volume.
The victim is incapacitated due to the flood of packets that it has to process,
regardless of the distinction between DoS/DDoS technique. In fact, flooding
attacks after year 1999 have been mostly DDoS in nature (Zargar et al., 2013).
Since DDoS was derived from DoS techniques, the word DoS attacks means both
DoS as well as DDoS attacks, in the context of the thesis.
Vulnerability-based DoS attack
Vulnerability is the quality of being easily hurt or attacked. In computing ter-
minologies, ’vulnerability’ refers to a weakness in the computing design that could
be attacked. In vulnerability-based techniques, an attacker sends crafted infor-
mation to a target machine. The information exploits the vulnerability existing
in the target machine causing service disruption. An example of a vulnerability-
based attack is provided in the next section.
It should be noted that a demarcation between flooding and vulnerability-
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based technique is not clearly outlined in the literature. Some DoS techniques
succeed through flooding malicious packets that exploit a vulnerability of a sys-
tem. The examples are given shortly in the following section. Furthermore, when
a vulnerability of a target computer has been patched, the machine can still be
subjected to flood-based DoS attacks.
Based on the communication layer it targets, DoS attacks can be divided into
network-based and application-based, which is discussed in the following section.
2.2.1 Network-Based DoS Attacks
The World-wide communications are based on the Internet Protocol suite as pre-
viously discussed (page 13). In Network-based DoS attacks, adversaries leverage
the features of these network protocols. Network-based DoS attacks comprise a
flood of network-layer packets that causes service disruption on a target machine.
The following discussion details the common and very effective attacks of this
type (Northcutt & Novak, 2002; Peng, Leckie, & Ramamohanarao, 2007).
SYN flood attack
When a client machine attempts to establish communications with a server,
it initiates a three-way handshake in order to establish the connection. This is
a sequence of three TCP packets exchanged between the client and the server.
Some TCP flags defined in the TCP header are exchanged as follows: the client
sends a TCP SYN message to the server; the server responds with a TCP SYN-
ACK message to the client; and the client responds with a TCP ACK message
to the server, as is illustrated in Figure 2-6a.
After the three-way handshake, a communication link is established to facil-
itate bidirectional communications. This design can be abused by a malicious
client, where the adversary can send a large volume of SYN packets to a target
server, followed by not responding with ACK packets. This is shown in Figure
2-6b. The exploit causes the server to indefinitely wait for the ACK packet after
completing the first two steps of the three-way handshake. A large amount of
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Figure 2-6: SYN flood attack
SYN packets sent, in the absence of the subsequent ACK packets can thus deplete
the memory resources of the target machine.
Smurf attack
A broadcast address is an IP address to where a machine can send a packet,
in order to reach all machines in the same network. For example, when a new
device or computer is connected to a network, it attempts to setup an IP address.
It must solicit its IP address from a remote server that supplies IP addresses. It
discovers the remote server by sending its request to a broadcast address. Any
computer that sends a packet to a broadcast address will effectively broadcast this
request to all hosts in the network (Figure 2-7a), where a host is a general name
for all computers or network devices such as routers and servers. In response to
the request, a designated server supplies the IP address to the newly connected
device.
The use of broadcast addresses can be abused when an attacker sends a
spoofed ping packet to the broadcast address. A ping packet is a network packet
sent from one machine to another to detect if the remote machine is turned on
and can respond to network-based requests. A host that receives a ping packet
sends a ping-response packet to the requesting host to signify that the receiving
host is alive (Figure 2-7b). This is a convenient tool for legitimate network ad-
ministrators to audit network connections. When a ping packet is sent from one
machine to a broadcast address, all live hosts in the network send ping-response
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Figure 2-7: Smurf attack
packets back to the source. Smurf attack is a technique where an attacker spoofs
its source IP address and sends a large volume of ping packets to a broadcast
address. The spoofed source IP address is also changed by the adversary to the
address of a target machine, to make the ping appear to be originating from a
legitimate target machine. A spoofed ping packet sent to a broadcast address
causes all hosts in the network to send ping-response packets back to the spoofed
address (Figure 2-7c). A series of spoofed ping packet exploited as such can create
a flood of ping-reply packets that incapacitate the legitimate target.
Tribe Flood Network
The Tribe Flood Network attack is another example of a flooding attack that
exploits the use of ping packets for malicious purposes. This attack makes use of
many compromised computers to generate attack traffic. Malware can be installed
on the compromised machines to receive and run remote commands from the
attacker. Because the machines seamlessly follow the attacker’s command, they
are often referred to as zombies. In Tribe Flood Network, ping-reply packets are
utilised for issuing commands by an attacker to the zombie machines to initiate a
DoS attack. For example, the ping-reply packet causes the malware installed on
the zombie machines to simultaneously generate the previously discussed SYN
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flood traffic. Ping packets are not usually filtered by firewalls, rendering such
attack very effective (Northcutt & Novak, 2002).
Loki
Loki extends the capability of the Tribe Flood Network by exploiting the
protocol used by ping packets, i.e. the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP).
The use of ICMP is to aid router administrations in computing the number of
hops (network devices) from one machine to another, detailing the network and
host status, and checking remote router parameters. The previously discussed
ping packets are defined as a pair (i.e. 21) of ICMP messages: echo requests and
replies. ICMP control header can accommodate a total of 215 instructions. This
ICMP header room is what Loki as an attack exploits to have greater command
options, and to be successful in carrying out attacks.
Loki software acts as a client-server application, with the server agent being
installed on the zombie machines, and the client program interacting with the
attacker on scheduled intervals. When a compromised machine runs a Loki server,
it executes commands received from a Loki client. An attacker controlling the
Loki client can cause the victim machine to display stored passwords, send spam,
or act as a DoS handler. As will be discussed in Section 2.3.2.4, sophisticated
DoS handlers or bots are part of recent challenges in detecting DoS attacks.
WinFreeze
WinFreeze is a technique used to intoxicate a target machine and to cause
failure. The target is remotely configured to flood itself with any network pack-
ets that it receives. The technique uses ICMP packets to configure a target
machine to forward all network packets it receives to its own address until it is
incapacitated.
Legitimately, ICMP packets can be utilised to update the network path of a
remote machine in the network, so that it can efficiently reach a destination ad-
dress. When a machine receives an ICMP-redirect packet, it updates its routing
table according to the information that it received from the packet. In Win-
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Freeze, an attacker sends spoofed ICMP-redirect packet to a target machine so
that the source IP address becomes the target’s IP address. In this phase, the
target computer becomes a victim. The victim updates its routing table with the
information from the packet and it continuously loops back any network packet
to itself. A series of network packets sent this way can accumulate and consume
the memory or the CPU utilisation of the victim.
2.2.2 Application-Based DoS Attacks
The Application layer provides services to Internet users. Popular examples of
several application-layer services are provided above. The discussion in this sub-
section considers only HTTP-based DoS attacks. The attacks are grouped into
two, namely vulnerability-based and flooding-based, within the scope of the the-
sis.
Vulnerability-based attack
Adversaries exploit the design or programming flaw of the software run on a
machine. In web services, attackers can send crafted HTTP packets to attack
the target. The target is any machine that runs HTTP services such as a web
server, or a router that runs a web service as an interface to configure the routing
parameters.
An example of crafted packets are HTTP messages that contain codes, illegal
characters (such as "∖"), or Null parameters. When the server is not programmed
to handle these special situations, it can suffer from a number of undefined be-
haviours such as infinite loops, runtime errors, buffer overflows, or read/write
deadlocks. These behaviours cause the computer to show signs of resource con-
sumption such as high CPU utilisation, high memory consumption, or low net-
work throughput.
Vulnerability-based techniques can attack the weaknesses other machines,
while targeting to incapacitate a web server. Web servers are commonly con-
nected to other networked services such as database servers. An exploit can
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send HTTP requests containing crafted database queries. These queries exploit
vulnerabilities that exist in the web-database connector interface (Zargar et al.,
2013). As a result, web users observe that the web server does not respond to
their requests.
Currently, there are more than 786 known vulnerabilities that are exploited
by sending HTTP packets that lead to the unavailability of a computing system
(Common Vulnerability and Exposures: The Standard for Information Security
Vulnerability Names , 2016).
Flooding-based attack
HTTP Request packets can consume the CPU utilisation of web servers.
When a web server receives an HTTP Request packet, it parses the HTTP mes-
sage to prepare for a response web page. The content of a response page is
structured according to what the message requests. These requests can cause the
web server to search and retrieve a file, connect to a database and update some
parameters, or communicate with other application layer services. Afterwards,
the web server returns the response web page to the remote users as a by-product
of the service. These activities demand CPU utilization at the web server. A
large number of HTTP Request packets will incapacitate web servers from future
processing (Peng et al., 2007; Zargar et al., 2013). Subsequently, this can exhaust
its CPU consumption.
HTTP Requests can also deplete a web server’s memory resources. When a
web server receives an HTTP Request, it maintains a session to keep information
that has been communicated with the client. To illustrate, a session is commenced
when a user logs-in to an e-commerce web account so that the user’s shopping
chart can be tracked. The session is ended when the user logs-out, which is when
the shopping cart becomes empty. Without session maintenance, web users can
never experience personalised logged-in accounts. In many user-friendly environ-
ments, web servers maintain sessions without mandating users to login. Session
maintenance consumes a web server’s memory. A large number of open sessions
can deplete the memory of the web server.
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Because session maintenance can incapacitate web servers, some implementa-
tions allow web servers to limit the total number of active sessions during a frame
of time. However, this security measure can still be exploited. Attackers can send
multiple HTTP Requests within a single session until the web server resources
are exhausted. Session identification number (Session ID) is always exchanged
between a client and a server. In such a scenario, the first HTTP Request causes
the server to return Session ID in the HTTP Response message. Attackers can
craft subsequent HTTP Request messages to always advertise the same Session
ID and send a flood of such messages. This exploit can bypass the security control
that limits the allowed number of sessions and incapacitate the web server.
Another web security measure includes releasing previously opened, unused
sessions. Web servers close sessions where no HTTP Request is received within a
predefined time. An example of this can be seen with electronic banking websites
that log the users off after a period of idle time. Other than to protect users’ data,
this measure is considered as a technique to maintain the amount of available
memory. However, a DoS attack technique can bypass this measure. Adversaries
can learn the Session ID as previously described to open a session and send HTTP
Requests at a rate higher than the server predefined idle period time, to maintain
the opened session. When this procedure is repeated with multiple sessions, the
web server eventually depletes its memory.
Some web services require CPU-intensive tasks and therefore DoS attacks can
succeed by launching a series of requests (Crosby & Wallach, 2003). Web servers
are commonly connected to other networked services such as database servers,
mail exchange servers, voice call services, and interconnection services to other
platform or software. Some services require the CPU to process computationally
demanding tasks. As such, the web server is more susceptible to DoS attacks.
2.2.3 Discussion
There are two observations from the understanding of DoS techniques. First,
regarding the type of DoS attacks (i.e. flooding and vulnerability), and second,
24
regarding the DoS variants (i.e. DoS and DDoS).
It can be shown that the boundary between the two types of DoS attacks
– the flooding and vulnerability-based techniques – is not always obvious. For
example, the SYN flood was often illustrated as an exploit to an implementation
bug (Mirkovic & Reiher, 2004; Moustis & Kotzanikolaou, 2013), while it is only
effective when a flood of such packets is launched (Zargar et al., 2013).
Similarly, the boundary between DoS and DDoS seems not to be essential
when analysing traffic. For example, in WinFreeze, it can be seen that an attacker
does not decide on the number of zombie computers it requires to successfully
flood a target. The victim is incapacitated through the network packets it floods
itself. When the victim receives packets from machines across the Internet, it
sends response packets that are routed back to itself. Because this process loops
indefinitely, one packet sent from a legitimate user to a victim can incapacitate
the victim. A web server usually serves many, rather than one user; when the
victim is a web server, any number of clients can send Request packets to the
victim. Hence, any number of clients can eventually flood the victim, regardless
of the distinction between DoS and DDoS.
2.3 DoS Detection Techniques
This section reviews DoS detection techniques as found in the literature. It is
organized into two parts according to the detection technique, i.e. vulnerability-
based techniques and flooding-based techniques. Because this thesis presented
HTTP/2 flooding techniques, the second part of this section meticulously dis-
cusses the research reported in the area. The review on the detection methods
against flooding techniques presents both network and application-based DoS
detection methods, elaborating on how research in DoS detection using ma-
chine learning techniques remains active, and analyses the challenges to detecting
application-based DoS attacks.
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2.3.1 Detecting Vulnerability-Based Attacks
The most effective measure to detect and prevent known vulnerability DoS at-
tacks is through patching the vulnerability on the target system (Moustis &
Kotzanikolaou, 2013). Vulnerable web servers are patched through replacing vul-
nerable server modules or by upgrading the entire server software to a more secure
version.
Although it might be viewed as a straightforward solution, Internet-connected
web servers are not always rebuilt to run on the latest software version. The ac-
tivity of patching and upgrading software itself can disrupt a service. Maintaining
continuous web services for this purpose requires extra hardware, knowledgeable
operators and a planned-work schedule which altogether can prove to be costly.
Hence, companies often adopt other means to prevent vulnerability-based DoS at-
tacks. These include detecting known attack signatures and blocking the packets
that match the signatures, configuring server session timeout, or using firewalls
to limit the number of suspected connections.
Traditionally, signature-based detection was found to be administratively pro-
hibitive. For example, when a software was vulnerable due to its inability to parse
and process irrelevant characters in network traffic, such as a back-slash, the "∖"
signature is recorded to block the incoming packets that contain such characters.
This implied that new signatures were to be updated when new exploits were un-
derstood, and therefore the server remained vulnerable when new exploits were
discovered. Furthermore, good quality signatures can be complex (Paxson, 1999)
as new signatures must cover the highest abstraction of an attack to represent
all variations of the attack. This requires not only expert knowledge but also
sufficient amount of data to analyse.
Since identifying signatures is non trivial, signature-based detection methods
suffer from false-positives, i.e. some legitimate traffic is identified as an attack.
This prompts research in the area remains active such that new techniques are
proposed to reduce false alarm rates. In fact, signature-based detection methods
were criticised to overemphasise on reducing false alarm rates, at the cost of algo-
26
rithm complexity for gaining real-time performance (Hubballi & Suryanarayanan,
2014).
2.3.2 Detecting Flooding Attacks
Flooding DoS attack traffic does not necessarily rely on signatures. Attackers
generate fictitious traffic packets of a large volume. Hence, many detection tech-
niques in the literature model normal traffic patterns in order to differentiate
and detect anomalous traffic patterns. Statistics have been used to prove the
significance of an observation and how it differs from the defined model. The
rest of this section discusses the detection techniques for flooding attacks, further
divided into network-based and application-based. It provides a comprehensive
background on the application-based flooding technique to review related research
to the subject in this thesis, i.e. HTTP/2.
2.3.2.1 Detection Techniques for Network-Based DoS Attacks
Crafting the content of network packets (as described in Smurf attack and Win-
Freeze) implies that anomalous traffic presents varying patterns, as is evident
from packet header information. Hence, measuring the statistical properties
of network packet headers was proposed to detect anomalies in crafted pack-
ets (Feinstein, Schnackenberg, Balupari, & Kindred, 2003). The authors used
source IP, destination IP, and destination port as features, and measured the
randomness/uniformity of the distribution of a network flow with reference to
a specific feature (e.g. entropy of source IP). The results obtained showed that
source IP and destination port are features that can effectively be used to detect
DoS traffic. The method was highly accurate when applied on a large dataset that
represented core Internet traffic, but degraded when applied on smaller datasets
that represented smaller networks.
Many detection solutions were deployed on the routers of the network
providers. These routers monitored bandwidth usage from traffic that passed
through them, grouped based on destination addresses. One method was to mea-
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sure normal bandwidth against anomalies (Chan et al., 2006). Hence, Smurf
attacks were detected when showing statistically high number of ICMP packets
when compared to TCP packets; and SYN flood attacks were detected when the
number of SYN packets did not balance with the number of ACK packets.
Routers often become the subject of DoS attacks and several studies were
proposed for attack detection on routers. Traffic validation was proposed to
monitor anomalies in the network (Mizrak, Savage, & Marzullo, 2008). Such an
approach asserted that attacks were detected when the property of ingress traffic
was significantly different from traffic leaving the network. Specifically, the study
monitored the flow, content, packet order and timeliness of the packets that
passed through routers. The authors of the study hinted that the accuracy of the
results could be undermined in actual settings where router failure occurrences
were common. A similar approach that monitored incoming and outgoing packets
through routers was proposed to detect anomalous traffic when the IP address
was spoofed (Gonzalez, Anwar, & Joshi, 2011). The study introduced a reliable
router to monitor traffic passing through other entry points to the network.
2.3.2.2 Detection Techniques for Application-Based DoS Attacks
This section explains techniques found in the literature to detect application-
based DoS attacks. The broader area of study to identify flooding-based anoma-
lous traffic falls under the study of traffic analysis. The purpose of the traffic anal-
ysis exercise is to identify traffic characteristics that portray standard application
operations. Identifying the types of traffic that flows in networks is important for
network operators and researchers: network operators often sought to only serve
traffic that is legitimate and differentiate it from illegitimate. Anomalous traffic
is generated by viruses and worms, and traffic that consumes bandwidth such as
DoS/DDoS attack traffic is also malicious by class. Characterising application
types within a network can help categorise traffic into legitimate and anomalous.
Traffic could be classified based on its flow, i.e. the number of packets and
the size of bytes being transferred. One of the advantages of this approach is that
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only one direction of network flows need to be observed (Erman, Mahanti, Arlitt,
& Williamson, 2007). This is useful when only one side of the communicating
equipment in a network was accessible. For example, UDP traffic is unidirec-
tional by nature, rendering traffic analysis methods that rely on bidirectional
flow information ineffective. This approach could be thoroughly independent of
TCP/IP information (Dyer, Coull, Ristenpart, & Shrimpton, 2012; Tang, Lin, &
Luo, 2014), making it suitable for classifying applications and anomalies caused
by their unintended use. For example, a resource-consuming Peer-to-Peer appli-
cation that uses web-traffic port number 80 can be accurately identified through
analysing the flow of one or more packets transmitted between a given pair of
hosts (Auld, Moore, & Gull, 2007).
Traffic could also be analysed through its social and functional pattern, or
through the behaviour of hosts. For example, a scheme was proposed to detect
application types that resided within a network(Karagiannis, Papagiannaki, &
Faloutsos, 2005). The study constructed the behaviour of a host from its IP
address, port number, flow, and size of the packets. The work was able to iden-
tify traffic types or applications through how each host communicates with other
hosts. For example, in DNS lookup activities, many hosts were involved in for-
warding packets to other hosts; in web communications, fewer hosts were commu-
nicating in both directions of the communication channels; in mail services, hosts
cascaded packets from one host to another; and in anomalous behaviour, many
hosts communicated with one single host within a short time period. Analysing
the behaviour of these hosts was effective when the observer had access to both
sides of the communicating equipment (i.e. a pair of computers that communicate
to each other, as in client-server communications).
Inspecting the application-payload packets could also help accurately classify
their application types. Payloads are the content of any network packets. One
study (Moore & Papagiannaki, 2005) aimed to address the urgency of network
operators to identify legitimate customer traffic and those that misused network
resources, and effectively, bandwidth. The challenge to identify legitimate traffic
is that customer traffic patterns change based on emerging applications. By
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the same token, the challenge to identify illegitimate traffic is that attacks can
use a legitimate protocol to carry their malicious instructions. The study was
able to identify up to 79% of malicious traffic, where only 1 KB of each packet
was examined. When the packets were parsed to classify the payload messages
(e.g. FTP control), up to 98% of the traffic was identified. A near 100% traffic
identification was thus achieved when the entire payload was examined.
Statistics on the traffic captured from the real networks have been reported
in many studies to monitor traffic activity. In published methods, DoS attacks
were defined as activities above defined thresholds of a legitimate activity. Traffic
models could be constructed from the average packet rates and inter-arrival times
between consecutive packets for legitimate traffic. A subsequent comparison of
observed traffic with captured traffic flows facilitates anomaly detection. In order
to reduce high-dimensionality of the observed traffic data, a proposed method
(Jung, Krishnamurthy, & Rabinovich, 2002) grouped or clustered similar packet
fields such as address, port, and protocol. Increasing levels of activity within
clusters indicate DoS attacks in action.
Entropy (Shannon, 2001), defined as the degree of concentration or dispersion
of random information, has often been used in statistical methods for detect-
ing DoS attacks. A large entropy value implies large uncertainty of the ran-
dom variables being studied. In detecting DoS attacks, this property of show-
ing distributional changes was found to be superior to methods that only mea-
sure volume changes (Feinstein et al., 2003; Lakhina, Crovella, & Diot, 2005).
Statistics-based detection methods use entropy to identify applications in hetero-
geneous network which transport large-volume applications (Petkov, Rajagopal,
& Obraczka, 2013), and distinguish DoS from sudden increases in volume of le-
gitimate traffic (Ma & Chen, 2014; Rahmani, Sahli, & Kamoun, 2012; Sachdeva
& Kumar, 2014).
Wavelet analysis has been used generally for addressing optimisation problems
in the signal processing domain. The technique was found in the literature to
distinguish anomalous traffic (Barford, Kline, Plonka, & Ron, 2002; W. Lu &
Ghorbani, 2009), and DoS attacks (Dainotti, Pescape, & Ventre, 2006; L. F. Lu,
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Huang, Orgun, & Zhang, 2010), with high effectiveness.
Some DoS mitigation approaches found in the literature identify malicious
clients instead of differentiating traffic. Once a client is identified as malicious,
its access to the server is blocked allowing legitimate traffic to pass. One ap-
proach (W. Meng, Li, & Kwok, 2014) performed identification of malicious clients
through its ’IP reputation’ calculation. When a client alerted an intrusion-
detection system, its source IP address was recorded and monitored. For all
of the client’s subsequent packets, the technique adjusted the IP reputation ac-
cording to the ratio of packets that alerted and passed the intrusion-detection
system. Once the IP reputation surpassed a threshold, the technique blocked
subsequent traffic that originated from the source IP address being monitored.
Similarly, some techniques mitigated DoS through blocking illegitimate source ad-
dresses (Ferguson, 2000) and spoofed IP addresses (Chen, Das, Dhar, El-Saddik,
& Nayak, 2008; Park & Lee, 2001; Savage, Wetherall, Karlin, & Anderson, 2000).
Another approach proposed in the literature identified legitimate clients
through a challenge-response technique. For example, some approaches deployed
a client puzzle protocol where a client machine must solve a cryptographic chal-
lenge sent by a server to identify itself as a legitimate client (Juels & Brainard,
1999; Stebila, Kuppusamy, Rangasamy, Boyd, & Nieto, 2011). In this approach,
clients capable of solving a problem were granted access to a server, while denying
other traffic such as DoS attacks. The drawback of this approach was that re-
sponding to cryptographic challenges could be automated and thus compromised
by attackers. Other approaches require a CAPTCHA – challenge that require
human end-users to type a series of letters illustrated through a distorted image
– to justify that the client is human (Gligor, 2005; Kandula, Katabi, Jacob, &
Berger, 2005). Client machines were tagged as legitimate after they had passed
a CAPTCHA test. In this approach, a finite number of legitimate clients were
served when large traffic volume was detected, thereby guaranteeing access to
human users.
Machine learning techniques are popular in solving network traffic analysis
problems, since they are able to classify large data spanning multi-dimensional
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spaces. Due to its important role in addressing the gaps shown in this thesis,
this method is broadly discussed in the next section. It reviews different tech-
niques based on machine learning techniques, and shows how they are applied for
detecting DoS attacks.
2.3.2.3 Anomaly Detection Techniques using Machine Learning Tech-
niques
This subsection discusses machine learning techniques as part of the methods
used in detecting traffic anomaly. Machine learning methods are divided into
two types: supervised and unsupervised. In supervised learning, training data is
labelled according to class. Labelling data involves tagging the examples in the
training dataset, for example into legitimate and attack class. Supervised learning
techniques learn from the labelled input examples, and produce a classifier that
can be used to map unseen data into one of the two previously defined classes.
These classifiers can be represented in terms of a set of rules. Intrusion-detection
systems that employ supervised learning techniques can be equipped to contain
such rules, filtering instances according to the values of the different features, and
therefore can classify new instances, for example into "legitimate" or "attack".
Unsupervised learning techniques find statistical relationships among in-
stances of the data, and classify instances based on how strongly they correlate.
The techniques do not require labelled training data for learning; rather, they
learn from a probabilistic model of the data. Intrusion-detection systems that
employ unsupervised learning methods are equipped with some statistical pa-
rameters, such as learning rate, and those used to calculate error measurements
between a new instance and the rest of the data. Instances that are statisti-
cally different from the others are considered as belonging to another class, or
anomalous.
It is not always clear to define the boundary of what constitutes machine
learning methods. For example, the Naïve Bayes techniques are introduced when
discussing machine learning in some techniques (Witten & Frank, 2005; Z. Yu &
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Tsai, 2011), while it is referred to as Probabilistic Learning in another reference
(Bhattacharyya & Kalita, 2013). Rather than redefining what constitutes ma-
chine learning techniques, this work follows Witten and Frank’s definition that
many statistical and probabilistic methods can be regarded as machine learn-
ing methods, since "these perspectives have converged" (Witten & Frank, 2005,
p.29). Machine learning techniques involve feature selection and data visuali-
sation which use statistics of data to construct classifier models. In selecting
features, statistics tests are used to find the degree of coherence when a feature
of a data sample is selected. This allows features to be ranked according to their
relevance. Many machine learning techniques benefit from ranked features to
reduce dimensionality and increase performance. The next subsection discusses
examples of machine learning techniques.
Examples of machine learning techniques
This subsection is to introduce the most commonly used machine learning
techniques in identifying attacks or traffic anomalies.
Naïve Bayes
Naïve Bayes is one of the most widely used techniques in data mining com-
munities (X. Wu et al., 2008). The name originates from its nature to naïvely
assume that the features originate from independent events. Despite this as-
sumption, the technique works surprisingly well when tested on actual datasets
(Witten & Frank, 2005, p.91).
The technique is a conditional probability model. It is the probability of an
event given that another event has occurred. Stated formally, it is the probability
of a data sample to belong to a class 𝐶 given a new instance 𝑥 is seen. In Naïve
Bayes, this is commonly called the posterior probability:
𝑝(𝐶𝑘|𝑥1, . . . , 𝑥𝑛) (2.1)
where 𝑘 is the number of classes, 𝑛 is the number of features that represent
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Table 2.2: An example of traffic samples characterised by three features
Class cart today send # examples
e-commerce 400 350 450 500
email 0 150 300 300
news 100 150 50 200
Total 500 650 800 1000
𝑥. For each possible class 𝑘, the highest posterior probability is assigned to the
new instance.
The technique is first applied to a training dataset to construct prior probabil-
ities. The posterior probability defined in equation (2.1) is calculated by finding
the likelihood to belong to a class, based on a prior observation of the evidence.
This is formulated as follows:
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 =
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 × 𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑
𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
An example can illustrate how this technique can classify an unknown in-
stance. The following example is adapted from Witten & Frank (Witten &
Frank, 2005, p.88). Suppose that a web page must be categorised if it were
an e-commerce, an email service, or a page containing sports news based on the
words it contains. The category of the web page should be characterised by three
words: "cart", "today", or "send". To serve as a prior evidence, suppose a re-
searcher collected statistics from a survey. The results are summarised in Table
2.2. In this example there were 1000 web pages surveyed, of which there were
500 e-commerce pages, 300 email pages, and 200 news pages identified.
In this example, the table was the training dataset, the web-page types were
the classes, and the three words were the set of features. The total number of
web pages surveyed was the total number of examples or instances. The first
row after the table header shows that of the 500 e-commerce pages surveyed, 400
of them contained the word "cart", 350 had the word "today", and 450 pages
showed "send" words. Other rows are to be explained similarly.
If a new, unknown web page showed "cart", "today", and "send" words on its
page, Naïve Bayes can be used to determine the class of this new instance. The
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pre-computation is done as follows.
The prior probabilities are the portion of the classes over all instances.
Hence, in this case,
𝑃 (𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒) = 500/1000 = 0.5
𝑃 (𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑙 = 300/1000 = 0.3
𝑃 (𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑠) = 200/1000 = 0.2
The probability of evidence values are not carried in the final calculation for
two related reasons. First, they are independent of the class so their values are
effectively constant. Second, the final calculation compares the posterior value
of the classes, so the probability of evidence as a constant cancels out. The
probabilities of evidence are shown here for illustration purpose:
𝑃 (𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡) = 500/1000 = 0.5
𝑃 (𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑦) = 650/1000 = 0.65
𝑃 (𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑑) = 800/1000 = 0.8
The probability of 𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 is the joint probability of each word (i.e. "cart",
"today", and "send") given a class (e.g. e-commerce), or the product of 𝑃 (𝑥𝑖|𝐶𝑘)
for all 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛. This means the number in each cell in Table 2.2 was divided
by the total number of the class’ examples. The likelihood probability of a class
is the product of these values:
𝑃 (𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡|𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒) = 400/500 = 0.8
𝑃 (𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑦|𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒) = 350/500 = 0.7
𝑃 (𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑑|𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒) = 450/500 = 0.9
𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑(𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒) = 0.8× 0.7× 0.9 = 0.504
Table 2.3 shows the posterior probability on the right-most column. It shows
that the e-commerce class returned the highest number. Hence, the new instance
was classified as an e-commerce web page.
In classifying traffic, Naïve Bayes technique can be used to compute the prob-
ability of an instance belonging to a normal traffic class or attack class, given
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Table 2.3: An example of traffic samples characterised by three features
Class cart today send likelihood prior posterior
e-commerce 0.80 0.70 0.90 0.504 0.5 0.252
email 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.0 0.3 0.000
news 0.50 0.75 0.25 0.094 0.2 0.019
some observed features such as packet flow and size of traffic instances. Although
it is a classic classifier (Pearl, 1988), Naïve Bayes is used effectively in many
recent studies in traffic analysis and DoS detection (Katkar & Kulkarni, 2013;
Moore & Zuev, 2005; Mukherjee & Sharma, 2012; J. Zhang, Chen, Xiang, Zhou,
& Xiang, 2013).
Traffic analysis is classifying traffic to its application service types such as
mail, web, database, games, multimedia, and also attacks. Precise classification
is essential for network operators to determine the policies for its quality of service.
A study used Naïve Bayes to analyse and classify traffic without inspecting the
payload/content of the traffic (Moore & Zuev, 2005). The dataset was obtained
by extracting features from the TCP headers of the observed traffic. The features
were packet flow, lapsed time between consecutive flow, port numbers, and packet
size. The study showed that it achieved accuracy of 95% in classifying the traffic
through application of Naïve Bayes.
One of the biggest challenges in classifying traffic is the large amount of data
to analyse, given a set of features. To illustrate, Table 2.3 can become excessively
large and computationally expensive with increasing number of data samples and
features. A technique was proposed to rank relevant features so that only a subset
of the original features were used for the purpose of classifying attack and normal
traffic using Naïve Bayes (Mukherjee & Sharma, 2012). Feature selection thus
reduced the dimensionality of the data and therefore offered faster computation.
To compare the performance of the proposed technique, other widely used feature
ranking techniques, such as Information Gain and Gain Ratio, were applied by the
authors. These techniques are also used in this study and are discussed in detail in
Section 3.1.4. The proposed technique in the study showed that it outperformed
the widely used feature ranking techniques when selecting large volumes of data.
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In contrast, another study proposed a solution when too few data sample were
available (J. Zhang et al., 2013). Due to a large number of emerging applications,
it was difficult to collect a large number of related data samples. The study pro-
posed a technique to pre-process traffic before extracting features to be classified
using Naïve Bayes. The technique correlated traffic flows that were generated
from the same application. Overall accuracy and F-measure were used as eval-
uation metrics. Overall accuracy is the ratio between the number of correctly
classified instances to the total number of instances to predict. F-measure is the
harmonic mean of precision and recall; precision is the ratio between the number
of correct positive results and the number of all instances identified as positive;
recall is the ratio between the number of correct positive results and the number
of positive instances. The study showed that the proposed method outperformed
other machine learning techniques such as Decision Tree and k -NN in terms of
overall accuracy and F-measure.
Decision Trees
Decision Tree is one of the most popular techniques applied for data classifi-
cation (X. Wu et al., 2008). For classification, Decision Tree is a sequence of rules
in which the current selected rule decides the subsequent rules to be selected by
splitting into two or more branches forming a tree-like structure. Decision Trees
learn from training samples to form a tree with its end leaf nodes signifying the
classes of data such as normal or attack. A new data instance can be classified
through traversing the rules from the root of the tree until an end leaf node is
reached.
Decision Tree is a simple but an outstanding technique for explaining the re-
lationship between the input instance characteristics and its target class (Rokach
& Maimon, 2014). Each instance is characterised by a series of features. The
root of a tree is chosen based on certain split functions of the training sample
features. A feature that can produce the best split value is chosen, with its split
rules determining the number of child nodes. This process is repeated on every
node until only one class is found on each child node.
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Table 2.4: An example of a labelled traffic dataset characterised by three features
flow lapse size class
low short big normal
low short small normal
high short big attack
medium short big attack
medium long big attack
medium long small normal
high long small attack
low short big normal
low long big attack
medium long big attack
low long small attack
high short small attack
high long big attack
medium short small normal
An example can illustrate how a Decision Tree chooses the most relevant
feature to split, and iterates the process until a class is assigned at each of the
end leaf nodes. The following example is adapted from Witten & Frank (Witten
& Frank, 2005, p.97). Suppose a dataset as shown in Table 2.4 describes a 15-
second captured traffic. Each row represents a sample of the captured traffic at
1 second, characterised by some features. These features are the columns of the
table, i.e. packet flow, the time lapse since the last packet of its type was seen,
and the size of the packet. The last column labels the class of each data sample.
Table 2.4 provides the raw data for further processing such as counting the
tally of the features and dividing those values with the total number of occurrences
to compute the probabilities. The counts and their probabilities are shown in
Table 2.5. Examining the first feature in this table, the flow feature showing the
number of attack and normal classes are (2,3), (3,2) and (4,0) respectively. Hence,
when the flow feature was to be treated as a node to split, it would generate three
rules to split:
∙ if the flow was low, then the number of attack and normal classes was (2,3).
∙ if the flow was medium, then the number of attack and normal classes was
(3,2).
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Table 2.5: The counts and probabilities of the features
flow lapse size class
attack normal attack normal attack normal attack normal
low 2 3 short 3 4 big 6 2 9 5
med 3 2 long 6 1 small 3 3
high 4 0
low 2/9 3/5 short 3/9 4/5 big 6/9 2/5 9/14 5/14
med 3/9 2/5 long 6/9 1/5 small 3/9 3/5
high 4/9 0/5
∙ if the flow was high, then the number of attack and normal classes was
(4,0).
In Decision Trees, a measure of split purity is applied to find the most relevant
feature. This example uses Information Gain as the measure, whose formula is
explained in Section 3.2. The higher the Gain value of a feature is, the more
relevant the feature for data classification.
Decision Tree firstly finds the degree of coherence or dispersion of the
Information at a given node. The Information represents a mix of the observed
attack and normal classes through a number, in bits. The higher the Information
value is, the higher the degree of dispersion. Using this measure, the information
values of each node after the flow-feature split are:
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜((2, 3)) = 0.971 bits
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜((3, 2)) = 0.971 bits
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜((4, 0)) = 0 bits
The Information value of the flow feature, or 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜(𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤) is calculated as
follows:
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜((2, 3), (3, 2), (4, 0)) = (5/14)× 0.971+ (5/14)× 0.971+ (4/14)× 0) = 0.693
bits
The examples in the training dataset had 9 attacks and 5 normal classes.
Therefore, the information value of the training dataset, or 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜(𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔) is:
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜((9, 5)) = 0.940 bits
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Figure 2-8: A Decision Tree
The Information Gain of the flow feature is:
𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛(𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤) = 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜((9, 5)) − 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜((2, 3), (3, 2), (4, 0)) = 0.940 − 0.693 = 0.247
bits
The Information Gain is calculated against each feature resulting in:
𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛(𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒) = 0.152 bits
𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛(𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒) = 0.048 bits
Because the gain value for ’flow’, 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛(𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤), yielded the highest number,
the flow feature was selected as the final node by the decision tree technique.
This process is iterated for each feature. The result of this example is shown in
Figure 2-8. The tree can be used to analyse new, unknown instances by traversing
down according to the values of the new instance features. The new instances
eventually find their class when they reach a leaf node.
It can be seen from the illustration that the classification of a new in-
stance is computationally inexpensive since it simply follows a series of pre-
constructed rules, and therefore is suitable for real-time applications. This ad-
vantage prompted a study to use Decision Trees to quickly identify DoS traffic
for the purpose of tracing back the attack source. (Y. C. Wu, Tseng, Yang, &
Jan, 2011). The result presented show that Decision Tree yields 1.2 - 2.4% false
positive rates and 2 - 10% false negative rates in detecting such attacks.
Decision Trees have also been applied in traffic analysis research for identify-
ing botnets (Haddadi, Morgan, & Zincir-Heywood, 2014) and network anomalies
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(Swamy & Lakshmi, 2012). Botnets are not only deployed to generate DDoS
traffic, but also help spread spam mails and to steal passwords. A study used
a Decision Tree to identify botnet behaviour from traffic patterns it generated
(Haddadi et al., 2014). The scheme compared its performance analysis with
Naïve Bayes and concluded that Decision Trees can produce better classification
accuracies. Interestingly, higher detection rates were achieved when analysis was
done on HTTP-filtered traffic, wherein only HTTP traffic was being detected.
The study suggested that the bots communicated using the HTTP/1.x protocol.
Rule-Learning Techniques
Rule-learning techniques recursively seek to find a rule that can identify a
class. A rule is defined as a set of feature values that can maximise an accuracy
measure, e.g. incorrectly classified instances, for classification. Although rule-
learning techniques can yield the same split rules as Decision Trees, the approach
is different. Decision Trees seek to find a feature value that best split the classes;
rule-learning techniques consider one class and seek a set of rules that covers
that class. Additional rules can be sought iteratively to classify the remaining
incorrectly classified instances.
The advantages of rule-learning techniques are that rule sets are relatively
easy for human to understand, and are natural for programming languages to
implement. Certain rules obtained from prior knowledge can therefore be pro-
grammed into rule-learning systems. However, rule-learning techniques do not
scale with sample size. Therefore, a study proposed "repeated incremental prun-
ing to produce error reduction" (RIPPER) as an extension to rule-learning tech-
niques (Cohen, 1995). It introduced a pruning method that reduces the com-
plexity of a tree. Pruning is a method that disregards computation to some
branches of a tree. RIPPER terminates further rule computations when the last
constructed rule yielded error larger than 50%.
JRip is a RIPPER implementation in Java programming language. JRip is
considered faster than Decision Trees (Cohen, 1995; Mohamed, Salleh, & Omar,
2012). Because JRip is fast, it is suitable for real-time data analysis. It was used
41
in traffic analysis studies to reduce false alarms (Gaonjur, Tarapore, Pukale, &
Dhore, 2008), to select features (Yang, Tiyyagura, Chen, & Honavar, 1999) and
to efficiently reduce the amount of data for an intrusion-detection system (Panda,
Abraham, & Patra, 2015).
k-Nearest Neighbour
The k -Nearest Neighbour (k -NN) technique learns directly from the supplied
data as the technique iteratively constructs neighbourhoods from data samples.
The learning is accomplished at the same time as when classifying a new data
instance. Assuming that data points represent previously observed examples, the
technique computes the distance between the new instance and the rest of the
data points in classification. This is illustrated in Figure 2-9. The black dot is
an instance of data that is to be classified. The squares represent data points of
a class, while the hexagons represent those of another class.
The distance metric used is the Euclidean function, which is defined as:
𝐸(𝑋, 𝑌 ) =
⎯⎸⎸⎷ 𝑚∑︁
𝑖=1
(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖) (2.2)
In equation (2.2), 𝑋 and 𝑌 are two multidimensional data points characterised
by the features; 𝑋 is the new data instance and 𝑌 is the previously observed
sample, 𝑚 is the number of features, and 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑦𝑖 are the input values for
feature 𝑖.
Euclidean distance is not the only means used as a distance measure. Other
techniques include Hamming, Cosine, Chi-square, and hyper-rectangle distance
measure (Randall & Martinez, 2000).
Classifying the data is done through assignment of the new data instance to
the closest 𝑘 neighbours of the plot. The final decision is taken by collecting
the votes from all k neighbours. The new instance is classified according to the
majority vote of neighbours. Therefore, the new instance in Figure 2-9 would be
classified as a hexagon (class 2) when 𝑘 = 3, or as a square (class 1) when 𝑘 = 9.
On one hand, the technique can be computationally complex (Kotsiantis,
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Figure 2-9: k -NN finds the most vote from the closest k neighbours
Zaharakis, & Pintelas, 2006), depending on the distance function used and the
value of 𝑘. On the other hand k -NN does not require a training phase, but rather
delays the computation until a new instance is to be classified. Therefore, in
anomaly detection, the technique has been used to detect anomalies in real-time,
allowing detection systems to proactively respond to intrusions (Tsai, Hsu, Lin,
& Lin, 2009; Su, 2011; Guo, Krishnan, & Polak, 2012).
Support Vector Machines
Support Vector Machines (SVMs) (Vapnik & Vapnik, 1998) are an example of
a supervised learning technique. They extend linear regression models to separate
datasets whose classes are otherwise linearly separable. Suppose that a task
requires separation of data points into two classes, as illustrated in Figure 2-10a,
where data points are shown as the black and white dots. SVMs seek to find a
line (or referred to as a ’hyperplane’ when used in multidimensional spaces) that
separates the two classes with the largest distance to the data points. The largest
distance is called the maximum margin. H1 and H2 are possible hyperplanes,
while H3 is the maximum margin hyperplane.
Data points that are closest to the maximum margin hyperplane are referred
to as support vectors. This is shown in Figure 2-10b.
SVMs have been used to classify DoS traffic and normal traffic in a recent
study (Sharma & Parihar, 2013). The study aimed to detect DoS in mobile Ad-
43
Figure 2-10: (a) H3 is the maximum margin hyperplane, (b) Support vectors
hoc networks, which is a network of mobile devices that are connected wirelessly,
wherein each device acts as a router in addition to its normal intended use. Such
kinds of networks are very vulnerable to DoS attacks since there is no security
policy imposed on the connected devices. The study showed that SVMs classify
with greater than 90% accuracy in all conducted experiments.
SVMs can also separate multiclass data. For example, a study reported in
(Li, Yuan, & Guan, 2007) aimed to classify 7 application types of traffic (bulk,
interactive, mail, service, www, p2p, and ’others’). Prior to this study, traffic
classification were focused only on HTTP data. It yielded 96.9% accuracy in
classifying the mixed traffic. The study showed that the same method was able to
classify homogeneous traffic comprising 87% HTTP traffic with 99.4% accuracy.
This suggests that the method was externally valid, i.e. it can achieve a desired
accuracy level when applied to different sets of data.
K -means
An example of an unsupervised learning technique is k -means. This technique
is initialised with 𝑘 number of groups, or clusters, according to the desired number
of classes (e.g. 𝑘 = 2 for classifying traffic to ’normal’ and ’attack’). Then, 𝑘
random points in the data are chosen. These points are treated as the initial
centre of the clusters. All other data points are assigned to their closest cluster
centre and become the member of that cluster. Afterwards, the means of the data
points in each cluster are calculated to choose new centre points. The process
is repeated with new centre points covering different cluster members, until all
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centre points are stabilised as the final ones.
Since k -means does not require a training step, it could be applied to classify
traffic in real time. For example, a study reported in (Bernaille, Teixeira, Akod-
kenou, Soule, & Salamatian, 2006) aimed to identify the categories of traffic of a
large university network. The administrator of the network wished to block traf-
fic responsible for music file sharing and gaming. These types of traffic did not
use universally registered port numbers, rendering identification methods that
map port-numbers-to-application ineffective. The study used k -means to identify
applications such as edonkey, ftp, http, kazaa, nntp, smtp, ssh, https, and pop3s
with accuracy ranging between 81.8% - 99.6%.
Another study applied the ability of k -means to detect intrusions more accu-
rately than a previous method (Elbasiony, Sallam, Eltobely, & Fahmy, 2013). It
modified the k -means technique into weighted k -means in order to assign higher
weight values to more important features of the data samples. The finding showed
that the detection rate was 98.3% with 1.6% false positives. This result was better
than a previous study used as a comparison (Ryan, Lin, & Miikkulainen, 1998)
which yielded only 94.7% detection rate with 2% false positive rate.
Artificial Neural Networks
Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) are inspired from how human-brain neu-
rons work (Haykin & Lippmann, 1994). They consist of ’neurons’ that learn
from data and recognise patterns of unseen data. ANNs assign weights to the
neurons, and adjust them as it learns from each training instance. The learning
process seeks to reduce the error in misclassification. ANNs can be branched into
supervised and unsupervised learning (S. X. Wu & Banzhaf, 2010).
In supervised learning, the neurons learn from labelled data, i.e. instances
whose classes are already known. Supervised neurons are generally modelled as
shown in equation (2.3). Here 𝑌 is the output whose value can be positive or
negative as indicated by the sign on the right hand side of the equation. Positive
𝑌 values indicate one class, while negative values indicate another. 𝑋 is a set
of 𝑛 features. The value 𝑥𝑖 of feature 𝑖 is weighted with 𝑤𝑖 for all 𝑛 number
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of features. The model shows that neurons are weighted sums of inputs with a
threshold value 𝜃. The threshold value can be used to adjust decision boundaries.
𝑌 = sign[
𝑛∑︁
𝑖=1
(𝑥𝑖𝑤𝑖)− 𝜃] (2.3)
The weights are initialised with random values. Neurons learn by adjusting
the weights so that the output value 𝑌 produces the correct class given input
values 𝑥𝑖. That is, a data instance represented by its features is used to train the
neurons through supplying the feature values 𝑥𝑖 to the equation. If 𝑌 outputs
a different class than the label, then the weights 𝑤𝑖 are adjusted at its following
iterations through equation (2.4).
𝑒(𝑝) = 𝑌𝑑(𝑝)− 𝑌 (𝑝) where 𝑝 = 1, 2, 3, . . .
𝑤𝑖(𝑝+ 1) = 𝑤𝑖(𝑝) + 𝛼× 𝑥𝑖(𝑝)× 𝑒(𝑝)
(2.4)
In each iteration, error values from the 𝑌 output value to the desired 𝑌 value
is calculated. The error 𝑒(𝑝) at each iteration 𝑝 is obtained from subtracting
the output 𝑌 (𝑝) from the desired output 𝑌𝑑(𝑝). This yields a positive or negative
vector. Upon the following iteration (𝑝+1), the weight 𝑤𝑖 is increased or decreased
according to the error vector with a magnitude 𝛼. Thus, the weight 𝑤𝑖(𝑝 + 1)
learns (i.e. adjusts its value) from the error between the current and the desired
output. This step is iterated until 𝑌 outputs the desired class after processing
all instance values.
ANNs have the ability to generalise patterns that they learn from limited,
noisy, and incomplete data (S. X. Wu & Banzhaf, 2010). They are therefore
suitable for intrusion-detection system decision making that requires adaptation
to new traffic models, such as mobile networks (Panchev, Dobrev, & Nicholson,
2014). Their ability to generalise from limited and noisy data has been used to
improve intrusion-detection precision (Wang, Hao, Ma, & Huang, 2010). They
have been a very effective solution in detecting DoS attacks (Bivens, Palagiri,
Smith, Szymanski, & Embrechts, 2002) and illegitimate activities such as port-
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scanning that comprises DoS attacks (Al-Jarrah & Arafat, 2014).
In unsupervised learning, there are no labelled instances to be learned by
the neurons. The neural networks discover patterns from input data and adjust
the weights of the neurons to classify instances into appropriate categories. The
weights are adjusted through the scores obtained from the data. Processing
the data is iterated until the network shows statistical regularities of the input
data, thereby indicating the data classes. Self Organizing Map is an example of
unsupervised neural networks, which is explained below.
Self Organizing Map
Self Organizing Map (SOM) is a class of unsupervised learning Artificial Neu-
ral Network techniques (Kohonen, 1982). Similar to ANNs, SOM output neurons
adjust their weights to learn from the inputs. The output neurons are arranged
in a 2 or 3-dimensional grid to facilitate visualisation. SOMs aim to adjust the
weights so that adjacent output neurons represent similar values given varying
input values.
To train the neurons, all weights are initialised with random values. Given an
input vector, an output neuron that has the highest score is selected to become
the winning node. Common score functions for this purpose include Euclidean
distance and Gaussian function (Negnevitsky, 2005). The weights of other neu-
rons within a certain radius 𝜆 from the winning node are adjusted to minimise
the difference between the output values to the winning node value. This step is
repeated for all input vectors within the dataset. Training is then repeated with
smaller radius 𝜆 for a given number of iterations.
SOM has been used in intrusion-detection systems to reduce the map size
it took to process the data (Siripanadorn, Hattagam, & Teaumroong, 2010),
making it suitable for real time detection (Ramos & Abraham, 2005; Srinivasan,
Vijaykumar, & Chandrasekar, 2006). Since SOM is often represented as a two-
dimensional map, it has also been used to visualise network anomalies (Corchado
& Herrero, 2011; Girardin, 1999; Olszewski, 2014).
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Evaluation of machine learning techniques
A notable survey was done reviewing 18 significant works in traffic classifi-
cation that used machine learning for traffic analysis in (Nguyen & Armitage,
2008). The survey showed that machine learning techniques have demonstrated
up to 99% accuracy in classifying a large diversity of Internet traffic.
In order to assess which technique was the best for classifying what type
of traffic, a study (Kim et al., 2008) analysed 7 supervised machine learning
techniques: NB, Naïve Bayes Kernel Estimation, Bayesian Network, DT, k -NN,
ANN, and SVM. The study assessed which technique was the best for classifying
12 types of traffic: 10 different types of applications, attack, or "none". The
result consistently showed that SVM yielded the highest accuracy (more than
98%), followed by ANN and k-NN. This finding justified another study (Tsai et
al., 2009) that reviewed 55 articles on intrusion detection through application
of machine learning. The study concluded that SVM and k -NN were the most
commonly used techniques.
This subsection discusses machine learning techniques and how they are ap-
plied in detecting traffic anomaly and DoS attacks. The techniques can learn
from the data samples, adapt to new environments, produce rule sets, and pre-
dict the class of unseen data. They have been suitable for detecting anomalies
by distinguishing a group of data that have significantly different properties to
other groups. Applications of these techniques are to classify heterogeneous traf-
fic, detect anomalies in large network, detect real-time anomalies, and adaptively
learn from new datasets. The next subsection discusses the challenges that these
solutions pose.
2.3.2.4 Challenges to Detecting Application-Based DoS Attacks
This subsection discusses challenges to detecting flood-based application-layer
DoS attacks and shows what features the different approaches used. It begins
by discussing two challenges: the increasing number of Internet-connected de-
vices and the ability of adversaries to mimic normal behaviour. Furthermore,
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it presents examples of how research in the area is active due to the challenges,
discusses solutions that the state-of-the-art studies propose and the features that
have been used in the reported studies.
The increasing number of Internet-connected devices
The size of the Internet has doubled every 5 years since 2003 as a result of
the growing number of Internet-connected devices and the number of deployed
applications (G. Q. Zhang, Zhang, Yang, Cheng, & Zhou, 2008). As was discussed
in Chapter 1, this number is projected to continue to grow exponentially. This
implies more devices can be made to participate in launching DoS attacks, and
researchers are challenged with analysis of bigger datasets.
The growing number of servers to support the growing Internet traffic has
contributed to the innovative ways in which a DoS attack can be launched. For
example, Content Delivery Networks (CDN) – a network of connected servers
that are geographically located closer to the users for the purpose of providing
better user experience – could be abused to become DoS amplifiers in order to
launch DDoS attacks (Triukose, Al-Qudah, & Rabinovich, 2009). CDN servers
could be instructed to repetitively download HTTP contents from a victim web
server, which would eventually consume the network bandwidth of the web server,
affecting its download speed. An attacker could compromise CDN servers and
modify the cache of the CDN servers to send requests to a victim web server. At
this point the attacker could terminate its connection to the CDN. In this case, the
CDN servers acted as DoS amplifiers since the attacker is not involved in sending
requests to the victim. When large objects (e.g. files, pictures) are requested by
the CDN servers, the victim may consume excessive network bandwidth.
A later study showed that web proxies could also be utilised to launch similar
kinds of attacks (Xie, Tang, Xiang, & Hu, 2013). Web proxies are machines
that serve incoming/outgoing traffic on behalf of a web server in order to load
balance the volume of traffic that the main server must handle. The authors used
historical behaviour to observe traffic in order to identify legitimate traffic and
differentiate it from attack traffic. The study identified legitimate traffic when
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the observed behaviour was not significantly different from historical behaviour.
This implied that the volume and dimension of the data required for traffic
analysis increased. Recent datasets containing traffic generated by new devices
has rendered legacy studies in detecting application types and network anoma-
lies less accurate. Machine learning techniques have been suitable to address
this challenge since they are able to group large data according to the similari-
ties of the data attributes, reducing the high-dimensionality of data. Therefore
recent studies, that have identified anomalies in network traffic, have applied
machine learning techniques to classify large sized networks (Al-Jarrah et al.,
2014; Y.-X. Meng, 2011). Addressing the above-mentioned problems itself has
created challenges to application of machine learning techniques. The features,
i.e. the attributes that play a role to determine key affecting factors, no longer
accurately represent the characteristics of the instances when they are applied to
classify recent data. Hence, recent studies have defined ways to effectively select
the features in order to reduce the dimensionality of the data and yield high clas-
sification accuracy (Al-Jarrah et al., 2014; Baig, Sait, & Shaheen, 2013; Katkar
& Kulkarni, 2013).
Larger volumes of data create challenges for research in machine learning, and
consequently research in the area remains active. Early solutions became less ac-
curate; hence, state-of-the-art studies were to increase the detection accuracies of
the existing techniques (Moore & Zuev, 2005; Stroeh, Madeira, & Goldenstein,
2013). Another implication of having large data is imbalanced traffic distribution
in many networks, i.e. the distribution of the traffic data generated by popular
applications was found to be skewed when generated by a large number of traffic
flows such as HTTP and DoS traffic (Goseva-Popstojanova, Anastasovski, Dim-
itrijevikj, Pantev, & Miller, 2014; Li et al., 2007). The imbalance problem was
caused by machine learning classifiers that favoured large traffic classes, while
poor performance was observed in classifying smaller classes. Hence, an Opti-
mised Distance-based Nearest Neighbour technique was proposed to address the
imbalance problem (D. Wu et al., 2014). The results show that the proposed
technique improved the classification for small classes when tested on real traffic
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datasets, in terms of higher F-measure by 10% to 20%.
It has been shown that machine learning techniques have been used to address
the challenge of analysing large data and heterogeneous networks in the past.
They are able to group large data according to similarities of the data attributes,
reducing the high-dimensionality of data. The next section shows how they were
applied in learning from the data to detect novel adversarial attacks.
The ability of adversaries to mimic normal behaviour
Identifying illegitimate HTTP packets that cause denial of service have been
challenged by flash crowd, i.e., legitimate, but sudden and high volume web brows-
ing activities. This could happen when, for instance breaking news emerges, or
when a popular sports match reaches a final score, causing the web servers to
receive an unusually high volume of visits. Hence, the evolution of detecting
illegitimate HTTP packets has been challenged with advanced adversarial be-
haviour that mimics flash crowds (S. Yu, Guo, & Stojmenovic, 2012; Fabian &
Terzis, 2007).
Traditionally, flash crowds have been seen to originate from a large number
of clients generating a sudden flash of traffic, while DoS traffic usually originates
from a group of unauthenticated, and in all likelihood, illegitimate clients (Jung et
al., 2002). It is observed that DoS traffic originates from a small group of clients,
whilst flash crowd traffic originates from a more dispersed group of attacking
nodes. Furthermore, DoS traffic originates from a group of clients that the server
had not seen before, while flash crowd traffic originates from a number of clients
that the server had seen before the sudden flash of traffic. Using this approach,
the authors showed that the web server was able to drop DoS attack traffic, and
could efficiently handle legitimate, flash crowd requests. This approach grouped
the client topology; hence, access to the source addresses of all clients was required
for the analysis.
Recently, new technologies have been introduced on both the client and server
ends. Hence, novel studies are motivated by the evolution of the adversary to
generate stealthier traffic through the use of new and enhanced techniques. An
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example is the use of HTTP GET requests by the adversary to generate traffic
that appear to be legitimate. In response to this trend, a study observed that
entropy of requests per source IP address of flash crowds is higher than those
of DoS attacks (Ni, Gu, Wang, & Li, 2013). A similar study was motivated by
analysing DoS traffic in the cloud, generated and guised as HTTP GET Requests,
since through such action, all cloud computing resources (platform, software, and
infrastructure) could be attacked simultaneously (Choi, Choi, Ko, & Kim, 2014).
The study monitored the packet flow and HTTP GET requests arriving at the
server end each second, and showed that their solution detected more attacks
than a signature-based solution.
Another recent study was motivated through distinguishing DoS attacks from
flash crowds at the backbone of a network (Zhou, Jia, Wen, Xiang, & Zhou, 2014).
The proposed scheme relied on the frequency metric of web page access and was
found to operate at linear complexity. In contrast to its previous study (Ni et al.,
2013), their technique showed that flash crowd traffic has the least entropy and
was therefore deterministic in nature, thus could be detected with convenience.
Bots, or software that automate repetitious tasks, are common tools to launch
DoS attacks. The increased use of bots by the adversary class provides a new
playground for launching DoS attacks. The traffic produced by such bots is similar
to flash crowd traffic. Therefore, differentiating between bot and legitimate flash
crowd traffic has been proposed as a solution in the past. In a study (S. Yu, Zhou,
et al., 2012), the author observed that the number of concurrent users during a
flash event was an order of magnitude more than the number of live bot attacks.
Hence, the author defined traffic flow as a group of network packets bearing
the same destination address. It was also shown that the standard deviation
of the total flow of attack traffic is smaller than that of the total flow of flash
crowd traffic. Future work was to investigate how attackers could manipulate the
amount of traffic produced by bots to evade the proposed detection method.
One technique to detect the bots behaviour was to take into account HTTP
Request packets appertaining to the browsing session of a website and corre-
sponding user activity associated with individual page access (Ye & Zheng, 2011).
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Packets that were not caused by a normal browsing behaviour showed an average
frequency of HTTP Request packets that was used to browse below a certain
threshold. These packets were tagged as being anomalous, possibly with in-
tentions beyond simplistic and legitimate user browsing. Hence, the technique
proposed in the paper marked the traffic as being suspect.
The concern over attackers evading known detection methods was the mo-
tivation of another work (Rahmani et al., 2012). Previous detection methods
were prone to false negatives i.e., the labelling of attack packets as normal (flash
crowd). It was observed that some legitimate connections had greater packet
volume than the cumulative sum of other connections, making it convenient for
attackers to conceal DoS traffic as a flash crowd. Therefore, it was proposed to
device a measure based on the number of packets as well as the numbers of con-
nections per browsing session. Large volume of legitimate traffic caused a higher
number of connections, whilst DoS attacks caused a disparity between the number
of packets and the number of connections. By analysing the coherence between
the traffic features, the researchers showed that their approach was able to detect
attacks that otherwise went undetected by previously proposed methods.
Machine learning techniques are suitable to address these challenges since they
are able to discover relationships that exist in the data and to predict the class
of unseen instances. Machine learning techniques were used in recent studies
to detect the number of zombie machines that attempt to connect to a target
(Agrawal, Gupta, & Jain, 2011), detect their behaviour (Garg, Singh, Sarje, &
Peddoju, 2013; Liu et al., 2013), and improve the detection accuracy (Barthakur,
Dahal, & Ghose, 2013). A recent study proposed a scalable solution to detect DoS
attacks to large networks due to an increased use of bots (Malialis & Kudenko,
2013).
This subsection has shown the challenges in detecting DoS attacks and the
state-of-the-art approaches proposed to provide various solutions. The next sub-
section provides a discussion summarising the solutions discussed and various
features used in the approaches.
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Features used to detect DoS attacks
The above discussions are summarised in Table 2.6. The table shows the
features used by many of the existing studies discussed above. Many of the
studies used the KDD-99 dataset (Tavallaee, Bagheri, Lu, & Ghorbani, 2009),
which is a publicly available dataset to aid research in intrusion detection. This
section lists the features used in the literature as a base to later compare with
the HTTP/2 traffic data used in the thesis experiments (Section 2.5).
The table shows that the TCP port number is still considered as a relevant
feature in many studies, although the observed traffic is not assumed to use
universally registered numbers. For example, in one study (Rahmani et al., 2012),
the number of connections was used as a feature that corresponded to "IP port-
to-port traffic exchanged between two IP addresses during a period." Many other
studies used TCP port information in combination with other information to
define a connection or flow. However, TCP port number is less relevant when
the study wishes to analyse traffic patterns of only one protocol that uses a
predefined port number (e.g. HTTP uses port 80). An example of this was
a study that sought patterns of different adversarial attacks to servers running
HTTP applications in order to detect DoS attacks (Goseva-Popstojanova et al.,
2014). Since the technique monitored only HTTP traffic, TCP port number was
not used as a feature. Instead, flow information from the network was analysed
to detect attacks.
Table 2.6 also shows that application-layer information (TCP payload) can
be representative of a pattern. Earlier studies used TCP payload information to
detect traffic signatures (Sen, Spatscheck, & Wang, 2004); later studies identified
patterns out of the payload information. For example, when detecting a flood
of HTTP packets, many studies identified patterns out of the observed HTTP
information. Features identified from TCP payload were the number of HTTP
Requests per observation (Ye & Zheng, 2011), the number of HTTP Requests
per source IP (Ni et al., 2013), and the number of HTTP Requests per second
(Choi et al., 2014). Another example was using other HTTP information such as
the name of a file to be retrieved. This data was used to construct a new feature
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based on the number of files accessed per each 10 second interval (Chan et al.,
2006).
Finally, Table 2.6 shows that the statistical properties of the traffic (such as
the flow of the packets, the size of the packets, and the duration of the observa-
tion) were relevant information in detecting DoS attacks. This information was
obtained without inspecting the content of the packet. Studies that aimed to
detect DoS attacks used packet content as features.
While this section discussed how DoS attacks can be launched and showed
current techniques in DoS attack detection and analysis, the next subsection
discusses a new challenge in launching and detecting DoS attacks due to the
introduction of the HTTP/2 protocol.
55
Table 2.6: Features used by the existing studies on DoS detection
Author (Year) Title
Header Data Statistical Data
FeatureIP TCP TCP TCP num size duration
port flag payload packets
Jung, J.,
Krishnamurthy, B.,
& Rabinovich, M.
(2002)
Flash crowds and denial
of service attacks:
Characterisation and
implications for CDNs
and web sites
D D traffic volume
D D
num distinct clients per 10s
interval
D
num files accessed per 10s
interval
Feinstein, L.,
Schnackenberg, D.,
Balupari, R., &
Kindred, D. (2003)
Statistical approaches to
DDoS attack detection
and response
D D D
entropy of a header parameter
(e.g., entropy of source, entropy
of destination port)
Sen, S., Spatscheck,
O., & Wang, D.
(2004)
Accurate, scalable
in-network identification
of P2P traffic using
application signatures
D signature
Karagiannis, T.,
Papagiannaki, K., &
Faloutsos, M. (2005)
BLINC: multilevel
traffic classification
in the dark
D number of hosts
D D distribution of src ports
D D number of packets transferred
Erman, J., Mahanti,
A., Arlitt, M., &
Williamson, C.
(2007)
Identifying and
discriminating between
web and peer-to-peer
traffic in the network core
D total num packets
D D mean payload size (excl header)
D num bytes transferred
D D flow duration
D
mean inter-arrival time of
packets
Auld, Moore, & Gull.
(2007)
Bayesian neural networks
for internet traffic
classification
D D flow
continued . . .
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. . . continued
Author (Year) Title
Header Data Statistical Data
FeatureIP TCP TCP TCP num size duration
port flag payload packets
Kim et al. (2008)
Internet traffic
classification demystified:
myths, caveats, and the
best practices
D D D D D flow
Ye, C., & Zheng, K.
(2011)
Detection of
application layer
distributed denial of
service
D D D
num HTTP Requests
D D D
frequency vector
Yu et al. (2012)
Discriminating DDoS
attacks from flash crowds
using flow correlation
coefficient
D D D flow correlation coefficient
Rahmani, H., Sahli,
N., & Kamoun, F.
(2012)
Distributed
denial-of-service attack
detection scheme-based
joint-entropy
D D D
number of connections
D D
number of packets
Dyer, K. P., Coull, S.
E., Ristenpart, T., &
Shrimpton, T. (2012)
Peek-a-boo, I still see
you. Why efficient traffic
analysis countermeasures
fail
D packet length
D total trace time
D D D flow direction
Malialis, K., &
Kudenko, D. (2013)
Large-scale DDoS
response using
cooperative reinforcement
learning
D D
aggregate traffic arrived over
the last T seconds
Ni, T., Gu, X.,
Wang, H., & Li, Y.
(2013)
Real-time detection of
application-layer DDoS
attack using time series
analysis
D D
num HTTP Request per source
IP
continued . . .
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. . . continued
Author (Year) Title
Header Data Statistical Data
FeatureIP TCP TCP TCP num size duration
port flag payload packets
Xie, Y., Tang, S.,
Xiang, Y., & Hu, J.
(2013)
Resisting web
proxy-based http attacks
by temporal and spatial
locality behavior
D D D total num requests
D D observed behavior index
D D historical behaviour profile
Choi, J., Choi, C.,
Ko, B., & Kim, P.
(2014)
A method of DDoS
attack detection using
HTTP packet pattern
and rule engine in cloud
computing environment
D entropy num packets
D D entropy num src port
D D entropy num dest address
D D D HTTP Request per second
Goseva-
Popstojanova, K.,
Anastasovski, G.,
Dimitrijevikj, A.,
Pantev, R., & Miller,
B. (2014)
Characterization and
classification of malicious
Web traffic
D D
mean length of request
substrings
D D
median length of request
substrings
D D max length of request substrings
D D num requests POST
Zhou, W., Jia, W.,
Wen, S., Xiang, Y.,
& Zhou, W. (2014)
Detection and defense of
application-layer DDoS
attacks in backbone web
traffic
D entropy source IP
D entropy URL
D D traffic intensity
Tang, Y., Lin, P., &
Luo, Z. (2014)
Obfuscating Encrypted
Web Traffic with
Combined Objects
D D num packets
D D packet length
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2.4 The HTTP/2 Protocol
2.4.1 Initiatives
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) has been the protocol of choice for web
browsing communication until today. The current version, HTTP/1.1, was de-
signed to transfer texts. As technology evolved, rich media was being increasingly
transferred using the same protocol, causing the web response time to slow down.
Furthermore, modern web applications that use these rich media have created a
demand for more user interactions, causing the protocol to reach its limit. Con-
sequently, web users experience slow connections to websites.
In 2009, Google introduced the SPDY (read "speedy") protocol to respond
to the above problem. SPDY retained the semantics of HTTP/1.1, while adding
multiplexing mechanisms in order to speed up web communication (Thomas, Ju-
rdak, & Atkinson, 2012). The protocol was implemented in the Google Chrome
browser, allowing users to experience faster web browsing. Google server-end ser-
vices such as Search, Gmail, Maps, were able to use SPDY, leading to improved
quality of Google services. In 2012, industries followed the trend. SPDY client
was implemented not only in web browsers such as Firefox and Opera, but also
on tablet devices such as Amazon Kindle. Major websites such as Facebook and
Twitter implemented SPDY server in subsequent years.
In 2012, the HTTP Working Group proposed to adopt SPDY as a catalyst
to a new HTTP version, HTTP/2 (Grigorik, 2013b). The following subsection
details the anatomy of HTTP/2.
2.4.2 Protocol Specifications
HTTP/2 is designed to improve the communication speed between clients and
servers. It is aimed to address the slow response rates that its predecessor suffered
through introduction of message multiplexing. The following discussion is to
explain the mechanism of HTTP/2 message multiplexing. The architecture was
adopted from the HTTP/2 standard (Belshe et al., May 2015), authored by the
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Figure 2-11: Frame format
HTTP Working Group.
The HTTP/2 protocol format is based on binary framing as opposed to the
newline-delimited plain text mechanism of its predecessor. Figure 2-11 shows
the layout of the frame. The first field of the row identifies the length of the
frame payload. Hence, binary framing allows its parser to efficiently identify the
location of the subsequent packets in the traffic flow, and quickly identify each
packet’s type and flags.
The binary framing also allows multiplexing, i.e., multiple requests/responses
in one TCP connection per origin. First, HTTP/2 messages are broken down
into independent binary frame packets according to their type. Examples of frame
types are headers, data, setting and priority frames. As illustrated in Figure 2-11,
the Type field indicates the frame type of an HTTP/2 packet. Second, each frame
is assigned a stream ID through the application of the Stream Identifier field
in the frame header. Packets with different stream IDs can be sent independently
on the communication line in terms of time and direction. This technique allows
multiple HTTP requests and responses to be sent within one TCP connection.
An example of the technique is illustrated as follows. Suppose that a client
requested a page to a web server, and received a response page as shown in Figure
2-12. In HTTP/1.1, the client must send more that one HTTP Request message
to obtain the auxiliary files mentioned in the HTML code, i.e. the example.js,
Puzzle.jpg, and theme.css files. This is illustrated on the left side of Figure 2-13.
The figure shows that the client sent four request messages to get the four files
as coded in the HTML file.
On the other hand, HTTP/2 only requires one HTTP Request message, as
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Figure 2-12: An html response
Figure 2-13: Illustration on HTTP/1.1 requests/responses and HTTP/2 multi-
plexing
shown on the right side of Figure 2-13. The protocol allows the server to send
(push) the auxiliary files. All assets are sent to the HTTP/2 client without having
to receive other client requests. In addition, the illustration shows that HTTP/2
does not necessarily have to send the files in the order of how they were coded
in the HTML file (Figure 2-13). This is due to the capability of HTTP/2 to
prioritise a flow of frames. As illustrated in the figure, the file theme.css is sent
the last when using HTTP/1.1, but it is sent the first among the other auxiliary
files when using HTTP/2.
The example shows that HTTP/2 is able to interactively send multiple re-
quests from client browsers on one direction, and delivers assets (i.e. response
pages, images, files) from the web server back to the client in different orders.
In addition, the server is able to avoid waiting for subsequent client requests by
pushing assets to the client. This is because the server can already identify where
to find those assets. The example shows that multiplexing, i.e. interleaving and
pushing frames, is one of the novel techniques that HTTP/2 introduces.
Figure 2-14 shows the same example from a different viewpoint. It illustrates
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Figure 2-14: Illustration on HTTP/2 multiplexing from a different perspective
how streams (a flow of frames) are multiplexed in one connection between a client
and an HTTP/2 server.
In addition to the above mechanism, what makes HTTP/2 traffic pattern
different than HTTP/1.1 is that its implementation demands using Transport
Layer Security (TLS) to encrypt the messages. Although HTTP/2 did not man-
date the use of encryption, its implementations only support encrypted HTTP/2
services. Currently, no browser supports HTTP/2 traffic in unencrypted form.
Rather than for privacy purposes, the main motivation for encryption is to ensure
that the protocol can communicate without modification with intermediaries such
as routers or intrusion-detection systems (Grigorik, 2013a). Such intermediary
interventions could alter the client-server settings that may cause an increased
communication delay, thus affecting the end-user experience (Quality of Service).
It can be seen that HTTP/2 has different message exchange mechanism to
its previous version. The ability of HTTP/2 to efficiently exchange messages
and transparently communicate with its predecessors implies that the imple-
mentation introduces state-of-the-art set of rules on how it manages comput-
ing/communication resources. At the same token, the new protocol suggests an
array of security considerations.
2.4.3 Security Considerations
The HTTP Working Group indicated a number of potential security issues in the
HTTP/2 standard (Belshe et al., May 2015). These are discussed as follows.
Server Authority. When a client fails to validate if the server was authori-
tative to push assets (e.g. files) to the client, then the client could receive illegit-
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imate information. As illustrated in the right diagram in Figure 2-13, HTTP/2
servers push assets to clients, without requiring the clients to send additional mes-
sages to request for the assets. These assets can be located at different servers
including those controlled by an attacker. Attacker-controlled assets can be mali-
cious, e.g. carry virus or contain inappropriate texts. Clients that did not certify
servers can thus become vulnerable to attackers.
Cross-Protocol Attack. In cross-protocol attack, illegitimate transactions
in one protocol can appear as valid transactions in another protocol. An attacker
can use a client to send legitimate HTTP/1.1 messages to attack an HTTP/2
server.
To illustrate, consider the Upgrade field that both HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2
can have in their headers. In HTTP/1.1, the Upgrade field is to carry instructions
that specify what additional communication protocols the client supports and
would like to use. For example, a client can propose to switch to Internet Relay
Chat (IRC) protocol through sending "Upgrade: IRC/6.9" message in the HTTP
header to a server. If the server supports the protocol, it can begin communicating
IRC messages with the client.
In HTTP/2, the Upgrade field provides backward compatibility, allowing
clients to communicate with HTTP/1.1 if a server does not support HTTP/2.
Suppose a web browser was equipped with both HTTP/2 protocol and its pre-
decessors. Upon an initial connection to a server, the browser wished to probe
if the server was HTTP/2-enabled or not. Hence, it firstly sent an HTTP/1.1
request containing an "Upgrade: h2c" message in the header to signal that it
wished to communicate using HTTP/2. Servers that support HTTP/2 can begin
communicating the client under the HTTP/2 protocol. If an HTTP/2 server im-
plementation misinterpreted the Upgrade field message from the browser, then a
legitimate message sent by a browser that uses the additional (upgrade) protocol
can become a malicious instruction destined to the HTTP/2 server.
Intermediary Encapsulation Attack. HTTP/2 header fields allow values
that are not valid HTTP/1.1 values. Examples of these values are carriage return,
line feed, and zero characters. An adversary could take advantage of this fact to
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create malicious messages if an HTTP/2 parser did not correctly handle these
values.
Cacheability of Pushed Responses. When an HTTP/2-enabled server
allows access from multiple users, one user could cause cached assets to be sent to
another user. This means attackers could reveal or forward classified information,
which implies a security breach.
Use of Compression. Secret data could be recovered when compressed in
the same context as data under attacker’s control. For example, an attacker could
generate and send messages to an HTTP/2 server. The protocol compresses the
messages before they are sent through a communication channel. The attacker
could observe the length and the ciphertext after the compression, and collect
patterns between the cleartext and the ciphertext. The attacker could eventually
infer the content of communicated secret messages.
Privacy Considerations. Settings, priorities, and flow control values could
be used for fingerprinting (e.g. revealing the type of browser, machine, or activity
of the remote device). Examining the values of protocol parameters has been
used as a technique to fingerprint a target. The introduction frame types and
flow control values in HTTP/2 can open a new landscape of how a target running
HTTP/2 protocol can be fingerprinted.
Denial of Service. HTTP/2-enabled servers demand more computing re-
sources than HTTP/1.1 machines. HTTP/2 introduces techniques previously not
employed in its predecessors. These techniques can demand more CPU utilisation
and memory consumption. This will be further discussed in the next subsection.
The primary elements of security are confidentiality, integrity, and availability
(Pressman & Jawadekar, 1987; Tanenbaum & Van Steen, 2007). Confidentiality
emphasises the ability of a system to guarantee that the information is only
disclosed to the authorised parties. Integrity concerns with the accuracy and
consistency of an asset against alterations. Availability means that information
is accessible when requested by an authorised party. Out of the HTTP/2 security
considerations, the Denial of Service (DoS) issue falls in this category. Detecting
DoS requires pattern matching, classification, and prediction in order to separate
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Figure 2-15: Stream states
normal from attack information. The following subsection discusses how HTTP/2
information exchange mechanism can cause a server running HTTP/2 to become
unavailable.
2.4.4 Exposure to Resource Depletion
Previously it has been explained that HTTP/2 introduced multiplexing, a mech-
anism to interleave and prioritise web messages that was not found in HTTP/1.1.
This subsection reviews how HTTP/2 multiplexing can cause resource depletion.
The review goes back to HTTP messages that are broken down to frames, as
shown in Figure 2-11. Each frame in any flow direction can be grouped based
on its stream ID. In order to govern the types of frames that are legal or illegal
to be sent (or received) after one or a sequence of frames were sent/received,
each stream ID demands maintenance of its own state. Figure 2-15 depicts each
possible state of a given stream. This means HTTP/2-enabled equipment needs
to maintain the state of each stream in its memory (e.g. stream 3 is "idle", stream
2 is "open", stream 1 is "close", etc.)
The state arrangement allows an HTTP/2 connection to have virtual concur-
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rent streams (as shown in Figure 2-14) for the purpose of avoiding the delay of
delivering higher priority frames. When too many frames have similar priority,
the network can become congested. Hence, the protocol imposes a flow control
mechanism in order for the communicating devices to advertise their susceptibility
to congestion.
The window_update frame is an HTTP/2 message that implements flow con-
trol. The purpose of flow control is to moderate the many streams in one con-
nection. This allows a server to lessen the packet flow on one stream, while it
needs to continue processing other streams in the same connection. The win-
dow_update frame is a way that a client or a server communicates the size of
data that the sender can transmit in addition to the current size. This capa-
bility did not exist in HTTP/1.1. Changing the value of window_update frame
causes an HTTP/2 device to carry out processing tasks that were not seen in any
HTTP/1.1 implementation. Changing this value indefinitely can consume more
CPU utilisation. This study observed how changing window_update values affect
the target’s computing resources (Chapter 5).
The HTTP/2-standard specifies the general principle of the flow control mech-
anism, but states that its implementations are to select any suitable technique.
Flow control at the application layer is novel; HTTP/1.1 as such did not define
any flow control. Flow control implementation on an HTTP/2 server can de-
mand great computing resources (CPU time and memory consumption) in order
to monitor the condition of each connection and maintain the state of each frame.
A server running HTTP/2 can consume greater CPU time and memory.
It has been shown that HTTP/2 mechanism is novel as it was not seen in
the architecture of its predecessor. This implies that an HTTP/1.1-enabled web
server should closely monitor its resource utilisation when the same machine was
upgraded to enable HTTP/2. The HTTP/2 standard states that, "An endpoint
that does not monitor this behaviour exposes itself to a risk of denial of ser-
vice attack." Therefore, there is a gap in the literature to observe the network
and endpoint machine parameters when running HTTP/2 services, to study how
HTTP/2 services can consume computing/network resources of a web server.
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2.4.5 Implication to DoS Detection Technique
This study investigated how DoS could be crafted to attack HTTP/2 services
based on two gaps not explored in the literature: the introduction of multiplexing
and the use of encryption.
First, HTTP/2 introduces the flow control mechanism which was not present
in its predecessor, which means it adds dimensionality to traffic data. HTTP/2
traffic pattern is different from its predecessors since interleaved and multiplexed
traffic that the flow-control packets manage depicts new traffic patterns. Large
amount of HTTP/2 traffic requires a new technique to analyse the characteristics
of the traffic with new patterns.
Second, HTTP/2 implementations are encrypted. Although secured HTTP
is not novel, its implications to DoS attack detection had not been explored in
the literature. Securing HTTP/1.1 with TLS or its predecessor, Secure Socket
Layer (SSL), has been commonly used in the past. DoS detection methods dis-
cussed in the literature (Section 2.3) analysed unencrypted HTTP/1.1 traffic. As
was shown, an avenue of the studies proposed payload inspections which required
access to the unencrypted message content. In contrast, this study observes, char-
acterises, and classifies both normal and attack TLS-encrypted HTTP/2 traffic.
While some machine learning techniques are suitable to analyse data with high
dimensionality, different techniques are required to select features and analyse the
performance, since one technique alone might not give the optimum result. This
study uses different machine learning techniques to show comparisons of the new
traffic patterns as presented by HTTP/2 traffic. The methods of generating the
traffic, extracting and selecting features are discussed in the next Chapter.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, various challenges and approaches for detecting DoS attacks were
reviewed. Many research approaches defined features to address their specific
objective. As Table 2.6 summarizes, the data collection for these features was ac-
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complished from inspecting packet headers (e.g. the number of hosts was derived
from IP headers; the number of connections from TCP headers), or the statistical
properties of these packets (e.g. packet length was derived from the packet sizes).
The current challenges in detecting DoS attacks are due to the increasing size
of the Internet, and the ability of adversaries to launch undetected attacks. Ma-
chine learning techniques are suitable to address the problem in the area, since
they are able to learn from new environments, discover relationships that exist
in data samples, adaptively create a classification rule, and provide scalable so-
lutions. They have been used to analyse large data and heterogeneous network
traffic, and detect the presence and the behaviour of zombie machines. The tech-
niques have shown to provide high accuracy of classifying traffic and predicting
the class of new instances.
A novel challenge in detecting DoS attack is due to the introduction of
HTTP/2. Web servers that implement the HTTP/2 protocol can demand
more computing resources than servers that implement previous HTTP versions.
HTTP/2 server implementation introduces mechanisms that were not previously
present such as multiplexing and flow control. This means that research in the
area is challenged through the introduction of a new range of data types and
features, such as window_update and TLS frames. The summary is shown in
Table 2.7. The experiments in this thesis used both the existing and the new
range of data to define features in order to detect DoS attacks against HTTP/2
servers.
Since this study used new range of data to recognise patterns that were not
previously studied, it applied machine learning techniques to detect DoS attacks
against HTTP/2 services. The next chapter describes the proposed investigation
for generating the traffic data, extracting and selecting features for its analysis
using machine learning in detecting DoS attacks against HTTP/2 servers.
68
Table 2.7: The range of data to observe for the investigations in this thesis
Observed Data
Existing Studies This thesis
(HTTP/1.1) (HTTP/2)
Statistical Data:
flow, size, duration D D
Network-layer data:
IP (source, destination) D D
TCP ports D D
TCP flags D D
Application-layer data:
HTTP Request D D
HTTP/2 Frames – D
TLS messages – D
69
70
Chapter 3
Research Approach and
Methodology
The previous chapter reviewed literature on DoS attacks and HTTP/2. Existing
solutions to detect DoS attacks were presented. The topics addressed included
what features of traffic were used, and how they were evaluated by the researchers.
However, these existing solutions were developed for HTTP/1.1 traffic, while none
explored how to detect DoS attacks against HTTP/2 servers.
In this chapter, an approach is shown to attest the distinction between
HTTP/2 DoS traffic and normal traffic through observing traffic patterns. The re-
search approach is discussed in Section 3.1. The study explored how an HTTP/2
DoS attack can be modelled and how traffic can be generated from the model.
The study observed the generated traffic patterns, extracted features and created
datasets to analyse the patterns. Machine learning techniques were applied to
demonstrate how DoS attacks against HTTP/2 servers can be distinguished from
normal traffic.
While an approach to observe traffic and generate data is shown, this chapter
also discusses how the data are evaluated. Section 3.2 discusses the evaluation
metrics used in the study, to provide means to analyse the generated data. Evalu-
ation metrics allow researchers to assess incorrectly classified instances, Detection
Rate, and False Alarm Rates from different results. To model, generate, and ob-
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serve traffic, a lab which comprised of HTTP/2 communicating machines was
designed. The lab setup is detailed in Section 3.3.
3.1 Research Approach
The proposed approach for detecting DoS attacks includes four phases which is
described as follows.
Phase 1 involves traffic modelling. Traffic models allow researchers to under-
stand how traffic can be generated. In this phase, traffic was modelled through
how current equipment, tools, and methodologies can be employed to generate
traffic. State-of-the-art equipment was employed, whose specifications and infras-
tructure are detailed in Section 3.3.
Two traffic models were developed in this study, i.e. attack and normal mod-
els. Attack traffic was modelled through how client-server machines communi-
cates with HTTP/2 protocol, how these machines generated traffic, and how the
sequence of traffic generation can be exploited to generate DoS traffic. Normal
traffic was modelled through mimicking the sequence and rhythms on how human
browse the Internet. Phase 1 is further detailed in Section 3.1.1.
Phase 2 provides a mechanism to generate traffic from the attack model of
the previous phase. The models were simulated at the client side, and HTTP/2
traffic was generated by according to the pattern that the models describe. The
generated traffic was sent by the client towards the server as illustrated in Figure
3-5. How traffic was generated and captured is discussed in Section 3.1.2. Traffic
generated through the proposed model serves as input to phase 3.
In phase 3, network traffic features are extracted and datasets are generated
to represent legitimate and malicious traffic. The study observed patterns from
the generated traffic, such as the packet types and their statistical properties such
as the count, size, and lapse time of each packet. These properties were used to
create traffic features to characterise the different traffic patterns generated in this
study. Furthermore, traffic features were used to create datasets. These datasets
served as inputs to the machine learning techniques that show how attack and
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normal traffic were classified. Feature extraction and dataset creation procedures
are discussed in detail in Section 3.1.3.
In phase 4, features are ranked and machine learning classifier performance
is analysed. Feature ranking reduces the number of inputs for machine learn-
ing processing and analysis, through finding and ranking the most relevant fea-
tures. Ranked features aid the analysis of this study to find a set of features that
can describe the characteristics of the traffic models. Traffic analysers such as
intrusion-detection systems depend on having a finite set of rules to efficiently
detect certain traffic types. Feature ranking techniques are discussed in Section
3.1.4.
In this phase, different sets of ranked features were investigated to observe
performance of classifying attack and normal traffic. Traffic classification was
studied through employing four machine learning techniques, i.e. Naïve Bayes,
Decision Tree, JRip, and Support Vector Machines. To analyse the performance
of these machine learning techniques, several evaluation metrics were adopted.
The evaluation metrics is discussed in Section 3.2.
The details of the methods in each phase are discussed in the following sub-
sections.
3.1.1 Phase 1: Model Development
The study developed two models, i.e. normal and attack traffic model. The
normal traffic model was used as the standard traffic to facilitate comparisons
and analysis against attack traffic. To model normal traffic, the study used a
publicly-available log file that recorded actual human activities depicting routine
behaviour, such as browsing a website from one page to another, logging-in, and
posting a message. The log file is described in more detail, in Section 4.1. Using
the information from this log, a state transition model was used to model real
human actions (Section 4.2). This model was implemented to generate flash-
crowd traffic in the second phase of the study, where a number of human profiles
(extracted from the log) was run using a number of virtual machines connected
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to an HTTP/2 server.
The attack model was developed based on several methodologies found in the
literature (Igure & Williams, 2008; Loukas et al., 2013; Mirkovic & Reiher, 2004).
The study observed the type of HTTP frames, the number of attacking clients,
the amount of traffic generated, and the consumed resources of the target such as
the CPU, memory, and network throughput. The amount of hardware required
and the degree of automation to launch the attack were observed, as they alluded
towards the design for a successful attack.
An attack was considered successful when the target server had consumed its
entire computing resource or network bandwidth. That is, the server showed:
∙ a significant increase in CPU utilization, or
∙ a significant increase in memory utilization, or
∙ a significant decrease in network throughput, or
∙ a significant increase in packet loss.
The study explored the effect of sending various combinations of HTTP/2
frame types, or launching a large number of HTTP/2 packets, and observed
whether the server showed signs of computing resource depletion. This study
also described four attack models as a result of controlling different parameters
of the packet generator, i.e. the number of packets, number of stream ID (Section
5.1), payload value of the HTTP/2 packets (Section 5.2), delay between packets,
and delay between TCP connections (Section 6.1 to 6.2).
The normal model is discussed in Section 4.2. The attack models are discussed
in Section 5.1.1, 5.2.1, 6.1.1, and 6.2.1. These models were used to generate
HTTP/2 traffic.
3.1.2 Phase 2: Traffic Generation
This phase aimed to produce flash-crowd and attack traffic. Flash-crowd traffic is
defined as normal traffic that consumes the computing resources of a web server.
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Normal traffic was generated in this study through simulating the legitimate ac-
tivities from the state-transition model described in the previous phase. When
the simulation was in a specific state of the model, an HTTP/2 Request mes-
sage was generated from a client to target the server. The packet generator that
was discussed in Section 3.3 was implemented to send client request packets for
this purpose to simulate normal-user browsing activities. The traffic it generated
was captured using TShark (Combs, 1998–2015) at the server side. A script was
developed to replicate the model and simulate different user profiles (page 103 de-
fines 21 user profiles). This eventually created flash-crowd traffic (Section 4.4.2).
Hence, the flash crowd traffic was generated out of a large volume of legitimate
traffic, generated by many normal (non malicious) human users connecting to a
server during a given time frame.
This phase also generated attack traffic, which is a flood of network packets
that consume the computing resources of the server such as CPU and memory. To
generate a flood of HTTP/2 packets, the packet generator was designed to con-
stantly send HTTP/2 window_update packets into the outgoing network stream.
From the attack models developed in the previous phase, this study generated
four sets of attack traffic: HTTP/2 flood (Section 5.1), DDoS attack (Section
5.2), and two DDoS attack types that mimicked flash-crowd traffic (Section 6.1
and 6.2).
These sets of normal and attack traffic were then used to create datasets which
are detailed in the subsection.
3.1.3 Phase 3: Feature Extraction and Dataset Creation
The traffic generated from the previous phase was observed by replaying TShark.
The traffic was characterised by enumerating samples of the traffic. A sample is
commonly termed an "example" or an "instance," used interchangeably (Witten
& Frank, 2005, p.45). This study defined an instance as a 1 second time window
of traffic; hence, a 10-second traffic window yielded 10 instances.
Instances are expressed through a set of name-value pairs. The names of
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Figure 3-1: A dataset consists of a set of instances, which are characterised
through a set of features.
the values are commonly termed as "features" or "attributes" (Witten & Frank,
2005, p.49). Stated in other words, instances consist of a set of features. Figure
3-1 illustrates 𝑚 instances, where each instance is expressed through a set of 𝑛
features.
A set of instances that characterise the whole traffic became a dataset. Hence,
datasets can be expressed as a matrix of instances versus features as illustrated
in Figure 3-1. In this study, characterizing traffic began by extracting features
which is explained below.
Extract features
In order to extract features, network packets were identified according to how
they differ from other packet types. Network packets serve different functions,
e.g. to carry IP addresses, initiate an end-to-end connection, initiate a secure
connection (i.e. through a TLS handshake), or to carry application data. Dif-
ferent network packets serve different purposes. This study identified features
according to several defined network packet types.
An example of feature identification is illustrated as follows. Suppose a traffic
instance was observed as shown in Figure 3-2 (adapted from (Grigorik, 2013a)).
The client in the figure began initiating a connection through sending a TCP
3-way handshake, which consists of 3 message exchanges: a SYN packet is sent
from an initiator (client) to its pair on the other end (server); the server replies
to this with a SYN-ACK packet; and the client acknowledges this by returning
an ACK packet to the server. In this case, the packet types are the SYN, ACK,
and SYN-ACK packets, respectively.
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Figure 3-2: TCP and TLS Handshake
Features were extracted from the packets that the client sent to the server,
because the client-to-server communication direction is the one most relevant for
flooding a server. Hence, as in the above example, the packets used for analysing
features in this study are pictured on the left-hand side of Figure 3-2.
The values of each packet type are characterised by three groups of features:
count, size, and lapse. For each 1-second traffic instance, the values of these
features were obtained as follows.
∙ The count feature is the number of packets captured, grouped by packet
type.
∙ The size feature is the total number of bytes of a packet captured, grouped
by packet type.
∙ The lapse feature is the time lapse between packet capture and connection
initiation (i.e. the length of time between a packet and the SYN packet of
a connection), grouped by packet type. For each packet type:
– If there is more than one packet within a connection, only the lapse
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value of the first packet is considered.
– Because there can be more than one connection within an instance,
there are as many lapse values as the number of connections. The
lapse feature considers the minimum, average, as well as maximum
values.
A 1-second time slice was chosen instead of other interval values (e.g. 2
seconds, 5 seconds), to ease the data validation process during the simulations.
For example, a 3,600-second captured traffic should produce a 3,600-row dataset.
Two examples on extracting feature values are hereby presented. The first ex-
ample is taken from a traffic instance shown in Figure 3-3 with the corresponding
extracted feature values shown in Table 3.1. The second example is taken from
a traffic instance shown in Figure 3-4 with the extracted feature values shown in
Table 3.2.
The first example considers the entire packets listed in Figure 3-3 as observed
within a single time window1. The first column of the list is packet number,
the second column shows both source and destination TCP port numbers, the
third column shows the time lapse relative to the time when the first packet was
observed, the fourth column shows the size of the packets in bytes, and the fifth
column represents the packet type. With this information, features of network
traffic packets can be extracted from real traffic.
In Figure 3-3, the SYN packet marked the beginning of a connection. There
was only 1 SYN packet within the observed time window. Hence, the SYN count
feature had a value of 1; and the SYN size feature was equal to 74 (as shown in
the 4𝑡ℎ column of the 1𝑠𝑡 packet in the figure). These feature values are shown in
the first row of Table 3.1. There was no lapse feature for SYN packets, because
the time lapse between a SYN packet to the beginning of its connection is always
zero. This is represented as "n.a." in the table.
Extracting the count and size feature values followed a similar procedure for
1The length of the observed time window to create datasets used for this study was 1 sec.
However, the examples given in this subsection used varying observed time window values to
simplify the discussions.
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Figure 3-3: Captured packets within an observed time window
Table 3.1: Extracted features from network traffic shown in Figure 3-3
Packet type Count Size Lapse max Lapse ave Lapse min
SYN 1 74 n.a. n.a. n.a.
ACK 6 396 0.000243 0.000243 0.000243
ClientHello 1 343 0.109194 0.109194 0.109194
ClientKeyExchange 1 449 0.220194 0.220194 0.220194
ApplicationData 6 777 0.227939 0.227939 0.227939
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Figure 3-4: A snippet of captured traffic
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Table 3.2: Extracted features from traffic shown in Figure 3-4
Packet type Count Size Lapse min Lapse ave Lapse max
SYN 3 222 n.a. n.a. n.a.
ACK 15 990 0.000149 0.000224 0.000264
ClientHello 3 343 0.009138 0.027972 0.065081
ClientKeyExchange 3 449 0.010630 0.029391 0.066050
ApplicationData 3 777 0.015718 0.034489 0.071048
EncryptedAlert 1 97 155.889013 155.889013 155.889013
RST-ACK 1 66 184.029221 192.0153215 200.001422
subsequent packets. Consider the second packet in Figure 3-3, i.e. the ACK
packet. In this instance, 6 ACK packets were observed; their size was 66 bytes
each, totalling to 6× 66 = 396 bytes. Hence, the count feature value was 6, and
the size feature value was 396, which are shown in the table.
To extract the lapse features from the ACK packets, only the first packet
in the connection was considered. Although there were more than one ACK
packets captured, only the value from the first ACK packet in the connection was
extracted. Its lapse time since the connection initiation was equal to 83.408169−
83.407926 = 0.000243. Since there was only 1 connection in this example (with
port 56066 as shown in the second column of the figure), all of the lapse features
(i.e. min, average, max) of the ACK packet were identical, where the minimum,
average, and maximum value of a single value is the value itself. The same
explanation was valid for the rest of the packets shown in the figure – their min,
average, and max lapse features were identical since there was only 1 connection
within the observed time window.
Other packets in this example followed the same procedure to obtain the
feature values, as shown in Table 3.1.
As for the second example, consider the packets shown in Figure 3-4. This ex-
ample presents several connections within an observed time window. In addition,
this example shows a case where one of the connections was initiated outside (i.e.
before) the observed time window; examples obtaining the lapse feature values
from this connection will be discussed below. The features extracted from this
snippet of traffic are shown in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.3: ACK packet time lapse values, extracted from traffic shown in Figure
3-4
TCP port
ACK packets SYN packets
Time Lapse
Packet # Time Stamp Packet # Time Stamp
57441 4989 37923.553689 4987 37923.553430 0.000259
57446 5020 38040.415432 5018 38040.415168 0.000264
57448 5050 38055.892577 5048 38055.892428 0.000149
The count and size feature values of the SYN packet type were obtained as
follows. There were 3 SYN packets in the observed time window; hence, the count
feature was equal to 3, and the size feature value was 222, equal to the cumulative
size of the 3 packets. There was no SYN lapse feature as previously discussed.
The count and size feature extraction of the ACK packet type was carried
out in similar manner; hence, the values were 15 and 990, respectively. The
lapse feature values were obtained by calculating the min, average, and max
lapse time from all of the first ACK packet in each connection. There were 3
connections initiated, i.e. 3 TCP ports are opened for this example. This is
illustrated in Table 3.3, with the first column showing the port numbers of the
initiated connections. The time lapse between the time stamp when the ACK
packet and the SYN packet were observed is shown in the last column of the
table. Using these time lapse values, the min, average, and max lapse features
can be derived as follows:
𝑚𝑖𝑛(0.000259, 0.000264, 0.000149) = Lapse min = 0.000149
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒(0.000259, 0.000264, 0.000149) = Lapse average = 0.000224
𝑚𝑎𝑥(0.000259, 0.000264, 0.000149) = Lapse max = 0.000264
Other lapse feature values of all packets in the example were extracted in
similar fashion: subtract the connection initiation time stamp from the packet
time stamp. In some cases, it is possible to have a TCP connection span multiple
instances, where the connection is initiated in an instance before the current
observed one. This was the case with the Encrypted Alert and RST-ACK packets
(with TCP port number 57358) in the above example, where the connection was
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Table 3.4: RST-ACK packet time lapse values, extracted from traffic shown in
Figure 3-4
TCP port
RST-ACK packets SYN packets
Time Lapse
Packet # Time Stamp Packet # Time Stamp
57358 5047 38055.890435 (assume) 37900.000000 155.890435
57441 5081 38107.582651 4987 37923.553430 184.029221
initiated before the observed instance, as shown in Figure 3-4. In other words, the
packet did not have its associated SYN packet shown in the same instance; the
SYN packet must have been initiated in one of its previous instances. Extracting
the time lapse values from the packets in such cases was done using the same
procedure, i.e. subtract the connection initiation time stamp from the packet
time stamp. Examples of the above are given as follows.
The Encrypted Alert packet (packet number 5044) in Figure 3-4 had its con-
nection initiated before the observed traffic sample. Its TCP connection port
number was 57358; there was no associated SYN packet that initiated the con-
nection observed in the example. To simplify the discussion, assume that this
connection started at time stamp 37900.000000, which happened before the ob-
served instance. Therefore, the time lapse value for the Encrypted Alert packet
was calculated as 38055.889013− 37900.000 = 155.889013. Since there was only
1 such packet in this example, the lapse features for the Encrypted Alert packet
presented the same value, i.e. 155.889013. These lapse feature values are shown
in Table 3.2.
Similarly, the time lapse value for the RST-ACK packet of connection 57358
could be calculated as 38055.890435 − 37900.000000 = 155.890435. Because
there were two RST-ACK packets with different connections in Figure 3-4, their
lapse values were calculated as shown in Table 3.4. The lapse features could thus
be derived as follows:
𝑚𝑖𝑛(155.890435, 184.029221) = Lapse min = 155.890435
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒(155.890435, 184.029221) = Lapse average = 169.959828
𝑚𝑎𝑥(155.890435, 184.029221) = Lapse max = 184.029221
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Table 3.5: Features used in this study
network layer packet type
count size lapse
min ave max
Application Data D D D D D
Application Client Hello D D D D D
Client Key Exchange D D D D D
Encrypted Alert D D D D D
SYN flag D D (n.a.) (n.a.) (n.a.)
ACK flag D D D D D
TCP RST flag D D D D D
RST-ACK flag D D D D D
FIN-ACK flag D D D D D
In this study, all lapse values could be obtained from the relevant packet time
stamps in the data. There was no need to assume values. Because all time stamps
were available in this study, extracting the lapse feature values from the packets
was done through applying the same procedure, i.e. subtract the connection
initiation time stamp from the packet time stamp.
There were a total of 42 features in this study: 5 groups (and subgroups)
of features (i.e. count, size, lapse min, lapse ave, lapse max), with each group
describes the values of 9 packet types, giving an initial total of 5×9 = 45 features.
With no lapse features for the SYN packets, the total number of features is
45−3 = 42 features. These are illustrated in Table 3.5. The features were named
according to what their values described, as is shown in Table 3.6.
The table also shows features other than those discussed in the examples
above, since other network messages of different layers and types were also in-
volved in the HTTP/2 message exchange. This is detailed in Figure 3-2, a sce-
nario of initiating an Internet connection before sending an HTTP/2 message is
illustrated. An Internet connection was initiated by a TCP 3-way handshake, fol-
lowed by a TLS handshake, followed by an application-layer data exchange. Here,
HTTP/2 messages were shown as Application Data – the universal term used for
application-layer messages. As could be seen, the packets on the left-hand side
of Figure 3-2 made up the features tabulated in Table 3.5.
In addition to those extracted from the TCP and TLS handshake discussed
above, the features in this study included TCP teardown packets, i.e. TCP
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Table 3.6: Features and their names
packet type count size
Application Data count_app size_app
Client Hello count_tlsHello size_tlsHello
Client Key Exchange count_tlsKey size_tlsKey
Encrypted Alert count_encAlert size_encAlert
SYN flag count_syn size_syn
ACK flag count_ack size_ack
RST flag count_rst size_rst
RST-ACK flag count_rstAck size_rstAck
FIN-ACK flag count_finAck size_finAck
packet type
lapse
min ave max
Application Data lapse_app_min lapse_app_ave laps_app_max
Client Hello lapse_tlsHello_min lapse_tlsHello_ave lapse_tlsHello_max
Client Key Exchange lapse_tlsKey_min lapse_tlsKey_ave lapse_tlsKey_max
Encrypted Alert lapse_encAlert_min lapse_encAlert_ave lapse_encAlert_max
SYN flag (not applicable) (not applicable) (not applicable)
ACK flag lapse_ack_min lapse_ack_ave lapse_ack_max
RST flag lapse_rst_min lapse_rst_ave lapse_rst_max
RST-ACK flag lapse_rstAck_min lapse_rstAck_ave lapse_rstAck_max
FIN-ACK flag lapse_finAck_min lapse_finAck_ave lapse_finAck_max
packets involved in terminating a connection. Since either side of the connection,
i.e. client or server, could initiate a packet signifying the end of a connection, the
RST-ACK and the FIN-ACK were also captured in addition to the RST packets.
Extracting features was achieved by piping TShark output to an awk program
developed in this study, i.e.
tshark [replay instructions] | awk -f [extract feature code] > dataset.arff
The output of the awk program was a file that was used as the dataset.
Dataset Creation
A snapshot of traffic within an observed time window was characterised by
the above features. Each snapshot represented an instance, and several instances
comprised a dataset. Hence, tabular datasets were created with the rows as the
instances of the traffic, and the columns as the features of each instance. One
additional column, usually placed as the last one, contained nominal data that
labelled the class of each instance, i.e. flash-crowd or attack.
The datasets were represented in text-formatted files. These files can be read
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using Weka (University of Waikato, 1993–2016) – a collection of machine learning
technique tools. To evaluate the goodness of the dataset, the feature values were
examined for irrelevant values. The procedure involved examining the correctness
of the data, such as missing or inaccurate values (e.g. zero, negatives, too large
values), and the correctness of the data types. Changes or inconsistencies in the
procedure during data collection might result in missing values, errors, or data
type inconsistencies. Therefore, these changes were also observed and studied.
The datasets created in this phase served as the input data for the following
phase.
3.1.4 Phase 4: Feature Ranking and Traffic Classification
This study used Weka to rank features and run a range of machine learning tech-
niques. Ranking features is an important step before analysing machine learning
performance, because some irrelevant features can produce inaccurate classifi-
cations. For example, in Decision Trees, the most relevant values should be
selected to avoid or minimize errors introduced by irrelevant features. Feature
ranking addresses this problem. This study used two feature ranking techniques,
i.e. Information Gain and Gain Ratio.
Information Gain is a measure of purity when a feature is taken into ac-
count. Its value can be used to measure the degree of information if a new instance
were classified as a certain class. The relevance value is given by equation (3.1),
𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛(𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒) = 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜(𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔)− 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜(𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒) (3.1)
where 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜(𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔) is the amount of information when the whole set of
training example is included, and 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜(𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒) is the amount of information
when a specific feature is selected. The amount of information is obtained from
an entropy function that measures the degree of coherence with respect to a each
class 𝑘, which is given in equation (3.2),
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𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜(𝑥) = −
𝑛∑︁
𝑘=1
𝑝𝑘𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝𝑘) (3.2)
where 𝑝𝑘 is the probability of an occurrence that an instance was classified as
𝑘 when feature x is selected. In a two-class scenario as used in this study, the
information of the training example set can be simplified as shown in equation
(3.3).
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜(𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔) = −𝑝𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙)− 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘) (3.3)
The problem with Information Gain is that features with a large range of
possible values returns a near-zero entropy value. Consequently, the Gain value
of the feature becomes greater than any other features causing it to become ranked
higher without truly representing its relevance.
Gain Ratio is a feature ranking measure that compensates the above draw-
back. It normalizes the Gain value of the training dataset with the entropy value
of the feature’s subsets, named the 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑉 𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒. Gain Ratio formula is given
in equation (3.4).
𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜(𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒) =
𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛(𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒)
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑉 𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
(3.4)
The Intrinsic Value represents the information value of the feature. It dis-
regards any information about the class of the data sample. This is given in
equation (3.5).
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑉 𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = −
∑︁
𝑣∈𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠(𝑓𝑡𝑟)
|𝑥 ∈ 𝑆, 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒(𝑥, 𝑓𝑡𝑟)|
|𝑆| .𝑙𝑜𝑔2
|𝑥 ∈ 𝑆, 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒(𝑥, 𝑓𝑡𝑟)|
|𝑆|
(3.5)
where 𝑆 is the number of instances in the training dataset, 𝑥 is a sample of
the training dataset, 𝑓𝑡𝑟 is the selected feature to measure, 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠(𝑓𝑡𝑟) is a set
of all possible values of the selected feature, and 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒(𝑥, 𝑓𝑡𝑟) is the value of the
selected feature in sample 𝑥.
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The drawback of Gain Ratio is that it can rank a less relevant feature high, due
to the feature’s low intrinsic value. Therefore, this study used both Information
Gain and Gain Ratio to take the advantages of each measure and to ascertain
comparison of the relevance of features. This comparison is discussed in Section
6.3.1.
Ranking features was done to study the effect of machine learning perfor-
mance with a selected subset of features. Four machine learning techniques were
employed in this study to classify attack and normal traffic. These are Naïve
Bayes, Decision Tree, JRip, and Support Vector Machines. Machine learning
classification allows the investigation to understand how the generated traffic can
be distinguished. For example, performance of the classification can show how
one traffic model can closely mimic another. The machine learning performance
was quantified using a set of evaluation metrics, as defined below.
3.2 Evaluation Metrics
Evaluation metrics were applied in order to analyse and compare the results ob-
tained from various observations. Evaluating classification techniques was based
on metrics such as incorrectly classified instances, Detection Rate, and False
Alarm Rate. These metrics were further based on True Positives (TP), False
Positives (FP), and False Negatives (FN) of the data, which are explained as
follows.
∙ 𝑇𝑃 is the percentage of attacks that the machine learning technique cor-
rectly identifies as attacks.
∙ 𝑇𝑁 is the percentage of normal traffic that the machine learning technique
correctly identifies as normal traffic.
∙ 𝐹𝑃 is the percentage of normal traffic that the machine learning technique
incorrectly identifies as attack traffic.
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∙ 𝐹𝑁 is the percentage of attacks that the machine learning technique incor-
rectly identifies as normal traffic.
The incorrectly classified instances (equation (3.6)) are self-explanatory. It
shows the percentage of instances incorrectly classified out of the total number
of the whole instances 𝑆.
Incorrectly classified instances =
𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
𝑆
× 100% (3.6)
The Detection Rate 𝐷𝑅 is also the TP rate, i.e. instances correctly classified
to belong to a given class. Its value lies between 0 and 1. The results shown
in this study were weighted, i.e. the number of samples from each class was
considered in the calculation. Hence, the weighted Detection Rate, or 𝐷𝑅𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑,
was computed based on the values of 𝐷𝑅𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 and 𝐷𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘. This is given in
equation (3.7)
𝐷𝑅𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 =
𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃
𝐷𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
𝐷𝑅𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 =
𝐷𝑅𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 × 𝑆𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 +𝐷𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 × 𝑆𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘
𝑆
(3.7)
where 𝑆𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 is the number of instances in the normal class and 𝑆𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 is the
number of instances in the attack class.
The False Alarm Rate 𝐹𝐴𝑅 is the FP rate, i.e. the measure of instances
falsely classified to belong to a given class. Similarly, its value lies between 0
and 1. The results shown in this study were also evaluated through the weighted
False Alarm Rate, or 𝐹𝐴𝑅𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 metric. This is given in equation (3.8)
𝐹𝐴𝑅𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 =
𝐹𝑁
𝐹𝑁 + 𝑇𝑃
𝐹𝐴𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 =
𝐹𝑃
𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
𝐹𝐴𝑅𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 =
𝐹𝐴𝑅𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 × 𝑆𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 + 𝐹𝐴𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 × 𝑆𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘
𝑆
(3.8)
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It can be seen that the chosen evaluation metrics, incorrectly classified in-
stances, Detection Rate and False Alarm Rate facilitated comparison and as-
sessment of the accuracy of the various DoS attack scenarios. Hence, iterative
investigations were arranged by refining the way traffic was generated and mea-
sured, based on the combination of selected features. The investigations were
conducted until the evaluation metrics yielded acceptable results. The evalua-
tion metrics also allowed the study to discuss different kinds of traffic types and
techniques to launch DoS attacks (Chapter 6.3).
In order to perform the investigations outlined in this chapter, the following
section details the infrastructure, tools and software.
3.3 Experimental Setup
The purpose of setting up an investigatory lab is to allow exploration of different
network traffic characteristics. The setup facilitated generation of network traffic
and helped demonstrate how the generated traffic consumes computing resources,
significant enough to cause Denial of Service. Furthermore, it facilitated applica-
tion of machine learning techniques to characterise the traffic into legitimate and
malicious.
The lab setup for the investigation is illustrated in Figure 3-5. All devices
pictured in the figure are virtual devices run on a desktop computer that serves
the host machine. The host runs Windows 10 on Intel-i7 quad core with 64 GB
RAM; and the virtual machine was VMware Player 12. The host machine could
run the whole virtual machines required in this study without showing any signs
of RAM exhaustion or CPU utilisation.
The network connecting the clients and the servers was comprised of VMware
machines. There was no bandwidth limit set on the network.
The client was used to generate traffic. Various traffic patterns, attacks as
well as normal traffic, were generated and studied to model several client-server
scenarios. Each client ran a Debian Linux Operating System, Ubuntu 15.04, on
the VMware virtual machine.
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Figure 3-5: The traffic generation setup
Each client also ran a packet generator, i.e. software developed in this study to
generate traffic. A packet generator is a program that allows a user to craft certain
packet types to be sent at a chosen rate. The study used nghttp2 (Tsujikawa,
2015) and curl (Stenberg, 1996–2016) as the library to implement the HTTP/2
protocol.
The intermediary intercepted traffic before it arrived at the server. Packet
monitoring was installed here using publicly available tools such as Wireshark
and its command-line version, TShark (Combs, 1998–2015). In this study, Wire-
shark was run on the host machine, capturing all traffic that passes through the
virtual network (i.e. a VMware network interface). Wireshark displays graphical
outputs, visualizing traffic packets that pass through a network interface. It can
interactively display the content of traffic packets; hence, it was used in this study
to aid in understanding HTTP/2 packet patterns sent by the clients and servers.
While Wireshark allows graphical interactions, TShark provides a command-
line interface. In this study, TShark was run on the server, capturing traffic that
passes through the virtual Ethernet interface on the server. The tool provides
commands to select the output format of captured packets. The outputs can be
saved to a file, which can be further processed for feature extraction as will be
detailed in Subsection 3.1.3.
The server was an HTTP/2 web server. This study used a publicly avail-
able HTTP/2 server, named libevent-server written by the nghttp2 author
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(Tsujikawa, 2015). The investigation monitored the server for effects of resource
consumption. In order to detect symptoms of resource consumption, the fol-
lowing measurements were to be monitored (Salah, Sattar, Sqalli, & Al-Shaer,
2011): CPU usage, memory consumption, network throughput, and packet loss.
When a computing resource is under load, CPU usage, memory consumption and
packet loss indicators can show increasing activities, while network throughput
can decrease.
Two server setups were designed to limit the above resource consumption
measures to indicate activities caused by only HTTP/2 processes. First, the
server only runs HTTP/2 services; it did not run web applications or back-end
databases. Therefore, client requests cause the server to respond only with the
Application Layer protocol it serves, the HTTP/2. Second, a simple HTML
file index.html which contained only "<html>HelloWorld</html>" text mes-
sage was stored on the server. Hence, upon client requests, the server responses
through sending only simple text messages rather than large files.
The command ps -ef showed that there were 218 processes that the server
executed upon startup. However, the Ubuntu System Monitoring showed that
the server CPU consumption was near 0% when idle, despite having active back-
ground processes. This suggests that these background processes did not demand
CPU utilisation that would interfere with the investigations in this study.
The next section provides an explanation on how the experimental setup fa-
cilitates generation of traffic and how machine learning techniques were applied
for traffic classification. Evaluation metrics used to assess the result of the inves-
tigations are also discussed.
3.4 Ethical Issues
This study involved only machines. There was no human nor animal involved as a
subject. In line with the Edith Cowan University procedure for PhD candidature,
an Ethics Declaration approval was sought and obtained.
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3.5 Conclusion
This chapter presented the methodology for data collection, evaluation and analy-
sis adopted. It detailed the hardware equipment and software tools in a computer
lab used for the investigations. The experiments were conducted to generate
HTTP/2 traffic of both classes (normal and attack), following traffic models. A
dataset was created from the traffic, and its evaluation metrics for analysis were
detailed in this chapter. While this chapter provided overview of the methodol-
ogy, the following two chapters detail the provisioning, results, and analysis of
the legitimate traffic (Chapter 4) and attack traffic (Chapter 5 to 6).
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Chapter 4
Legitimate Traffic Modelling and
Analysis
This chapter explains how legitimate user traffic can be modelled, and how
HTTP/2 traffic can be generated from the defined model. Normal traffic was
subsequently built-upon to create flash-crowd traffic and a corresponding dataset.
Figure 4-1 illustrates this framework.
While HTTP/2-enabled services are gaining popularity, currently most web
servers still communicate using the HTTP/1.1 protocol. This implies that a
sensor placed at a backbone of a computer network would not be able to tap much
data on HTTP/2 traffic. Through this study, HTTP/2 traffic was subsequently
modelled to mimic real user traffic and was generated as part of the experiments.
This chapter also explains how flash-crowd traffic was modelled. Flash-crowd
Figure 4-1: The framework for creating flash-crowd dataset from a defined normal
user model.
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traffic was generated from a large volume of normal traffic that best presented
an HTTP/2 resource consumption on a server. Firstly, the proposed method
adopted a publicly-available log that described user actions in the Internet. This
was followed by a model construction task from the observed user actions. The
model was simulated to generate HTTP/2 traffic, and a dataset from the traffic
was created by extracting all traffic features. Secondly, flash-crowd traffic was
generated from simulating the model, and the traffic was extracted through the
feature extraction procedure described in Section 3.1.3 to create a normal traffic
dataset.
The following section describes the publicly-available log picturing normal
browsing actions.
4.1 Logs of Online User Browsing Behaviours
Behaviour of a normal Internet user was modelled from DOBBS, a publicly
available log of user actions obtained from online browsing (von der Weth &
Hauswirth, 2013). This log was comprised of records of user actions when a user
is online, such as opening a new browser, adding a new browser tab, clicking a
link or typing a web address, etc. The dataset was for a year-long activity record,
and was collected from volunteers from around the world who installed a browser
plugin that sent logs of these actions to a central archiving system.
In this study, a 3-day DOBBS data collection that had the most number of
users and surf entries was adopted. Typically, normal users do not continuously
surf the Internet; they take breaks and daily sleeps. Therefore, the 3-day sample
included not only records of user actions in the Internet as described above, but
also the duration of time when the users sleep overnight and other breaks. The
statistics of this sample are described in Table 4.1. The table shows the number
of users on each day, and the number of web surf events generated by these users.
The 3-day DOBBS data is named DOBBS Sample 1.
There are three tables in the DOBBS log representing three types of events:
first, that logged the browser’s window-related data such as window mini-
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Table 4.1: Dataset sample information
Sample name Log date # users # distinct users # surfs
6 Aug 2013 14 14540
DOBBS Sample 1 7 Aug 2013 13 21 8774
8 Aug 2013 12 9835
Table 4.2: A snippet of DOBBS Sample 1
Time User ID Event ID Event description
20130826181127.900 48115555 100 New browser window opened
20130826181127.900 48115555 200 Session started
20130826181128.400 48115555 110 New browser tab opened
20130826181128.400 48115555 110 New browser tab opened
20130826181143.600 48115555 400 New web page loaded
mized/maximized, browser tab opened/closed, and whether window is focused;
second, that logged session-related data such as user inactive or idle (for example
due to reading the information on the browser); and third, that was related to
user actions as a result of browsing activities. Each table has a user ID column to
identify the unique user who performed the actions. For the purpose of this study,
the three tables were combined and the data was sorted based on the recorded
time-stamp per user ID. This log showed a story-like event illustrating how a user
browsed websites during a given period of time. An example of a data sample is
shown in Table 4.2.
The table illustrates that a user initialised its browser, opened two tabs, and
initiated web browsing after 15 seconds. The time-stamp for each entry presented
how much time a given event took.
In reality, each of the human users who took part in contributing to the
DOBBS log belonged to a different time zone. They were not active and did not
browse the Internet at the same time; some used the Internet at a time when oth-
ers slept. Furthermore, each user showed variations on their behaviour such as the
time it take for them to load a new page after browsing one, the amount of time
they spent online, taking breaks, and sleep. Although each user behaviour dif-
fered, they all can be represented by a state transition model (described shortly),
with each user having its own transition and dwell-time to represent its unique
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Figure 4-2: State Transition representing a User Model
behaviour. A User Model can thus be created to represent each of these user
actions.
4.2 User Model
The User Model was represented in terms of states and transitions. Each recorded
event was represented as a state with its own dwell time in that state. Specifically,
the dwell time was the time an event remained in one state, before moving to
another state. Therefore, each state also took into account the time spent to
complete one event. Each state led to one other state or more, and the probability
of a state transitioning to another state was calculated by counting its frequency
of occurrence in the actual DOBBS log. This effectively modelled one sample user
that browsed web sites. Figure 4-2 shows the model of traffic that was described
in Table 4.2. In the figure, there was an equal chance of state 110 to transit to
either state 400 or to itself, because the frequency of those transitions in the data
log was equal. As for the model used in this study, the transition probability
of a state was tallied from the 3-day sample, i.e. the DOBBS Sample 1, which
accommodates larger data than the example given in Table 4.2. Therefore, the
transition probability was more fine-grained than the results shown in the above
example. The states and transition probabilities were named the User Model.
The User Model was constructed from a sequence of DOBBS Sample 1 entries.
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Figure 4-3: An example of one User Model taken from DOBBS Sample 1
As illustrated in Figure 4-3, the model had 16 states with many edges (transi-
tions). The "S" state identified the first event observed in the log; therefore, it
pointed to only one state in the model and acted as the starting state. The data
structure of the model was coded using a two-dimensional matrix with 𝐼 rows
representing the current state, and 𝐽 columns representing the next state. The
data structure of each cell 𝑐𝑖𝑗 in the matrix had the dwell-time value for state 𝑖
and the probability value to transit to the next state 𝑗. Simulating the model to
transit from one state to another used a random number generator rand() from
the Linux C library.
The defined User Model was used to generate traffic which is described as
follows.
4.3 A Framework to Generate Normal Traffic
The framework describing how DOBBS log can be adopted to generate normal
network traffic is depicted in Figure 4-4. Two scenarios were implemented for this
research. The first one was called Ubot, with the "U" standing for "User". It was
defined to replay one User Model and generate normal traffic that mimicked the
user. Ubot takes a User Model as input, looks for a starting state and transits
to other states after a given dwell-time. When Ubot is in a state that represents
a user requesting a web page, Ubot generates an HTTP/2 Request packet. The
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Figure 4-4: The framework on how DOBBS log was used to generate normal
traffic
second scenario was named BotMaster, defined to run a large number of Ubot
modules to generate flash-crowd traffic. Each Ubot module simulates a user. A
number of Ubot modules running in tandem simulate different user behaviours,
generating HTTP/2 traffic patterns that mimic normal users. BotMaster simu-
lates flash-crowd traffic by generating a large volume of normal traffic.
Ubot simulated the User Model, with the input data acquired from the
DOBBS Sample 1 (see Figure 4-4). Ubot simulated (normal) actions of 1 user,
with a defined idle time on each state to represent the length of time an event
took to complete, and executed another event (i.e. moved to another state) based
on the probability definitions for the state transitions. Because Ubot transits to
another state following a defined probability, it can show different patterns when
it replays the same user. Therefore, it mimics the logged actions of a user without
replaying the log verbatim. Ubot also produces variations when run repeatedly,
showing different sequence of user actions, but still follows the browsing activity
pattern of a specific user.
The Ubot implementation varied the pattern of user activities while maintain-
ing the identity of that user behaviour, i.e. each user’s preferred time rhythm and
choice of actions. Users allocate a certain amount of time to browse and sleep;
their browsing speed differs; and some launch more browser tabs than others.
Although Ubot transits to another state based on a probability, its implementa-
tion maintains the identity of user behaviours. The implementation considered
the phase when a user is active or idle according to its time-zone, the amount of
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Figure 4-5: State Transition representing a User Model
break-time and sleep between activities, and the intermediate actions to complete
an activity. These are described in the following procedures.
∙ Ubot mimicked the activity phase of the user according to its time zone.
For this, a pause value was adopted to indicate an idle time before the first
event of a user was started. When each Ubot was first started, the user
that it simulated paused for the same duration as what was logged in the
DOBBS log. Each user was active at a different phase; hence, each had a
different pause value. For example, consider Table 4.2 as the input data.
State "S" would pause for 18 hours 11 minutes 27 seconds because the first
event for that user in the log occurred at that time. The pause in state "S"
is illustrated in Figure 4-5. At the end of the pause time, Ubot transited to
its next state indicating that the user initiated web browsing activity.
∙ Each state had a list of dwell time with each list entry signifying the amount
of idle time when Ubot was in that state. Dwell time is depicted in Figure
4-5 as an element of a state. A list of dwell time in each state was collected
from DOBBS Sample 1. Because a state could have more than one dwell
time value, it was chosen at random for the simulation. To illustrate, using
the logs from Table 4.2, the dwell time for which the user stayed in state
110 in the log was either 0 seconds or 15.2 seconds. A Ubot would randomly
choose either 0 or 15.2 seconds and stayed for the chosen duration at state
110 before transitioning to another state. It then retained the dwell time
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it chose in memory. Suppose the Ubot firstly chose the 0-second pause, it
would then pick the 15.2-second pauses when it arrived at state 110 for the
second time. This rule is repeated when Ubot moves to any other state.
Dwell time could also represent the user break time, a temporary withdrawal
from web surfing activity, or daily sleep – which is explained next.
∙ Unlike robots, human sleep is usually taken overnight. Sleeping time be-
tween days could be observed within the 3-day sample (DOBBS Sample 1)
as a long idle time between two consecutive days. In Ubot, the sleep time
was treated the same as dwell time. As previously explained, Ubot remem-
bered the dwell time it chose and picked another dwell time value when it
reached the same state later. Once a sleep time was chosen, Ubot simulated
a user until it exhausted all dwell time entries in the list. Ubot cleared its
memory on the dwell time entries it chose, allowing it to regain access to
the whole dwell time entries in the list including the sleep time. In other
words, Ubot chooses the same sleep time value for the second time only
after it has simulated all other activities. Therefore, Ubot did not sleep for
more than the length the user normally sleeps, because it would not sleep
twice. This arrangement allowed Ubot to mimic the duration for which a
user was awake.
∙ When Ubot reached state 400, which according to DOBBS log means "new
web page loaded," then Ubot would generate an HTTP/2 Request. The
simulation code used curl as the programming library to generate HTTP/2
Request to a web server (as described in Section 3.3). The generated traffic
was captured at the server side as described in subsection 3.1.2.
∙ Ubot runs indefinitely and is terminated by an operator. In this study,
Ubot was terminated after a 2 GB file that captured the generated traffic
was successfully collected.
Since DOBBS Sample 1 had 21 distinct user IDs in the log, this study was
equipped with 21 unique user models depicting individual web-surfing behaviour.
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Ubot was run to simulate any one of these users and generate traffic according to
the individual patterns. Its data structure was coded using a three-dimensional
matrix: a 2-dimension matrix to represent the User Model, and a one-dimension
parameter designated with the user ID. Therefore, Ubot replayed any behaviour
of the 21 users depending on the user ID that it was initialised with. This is
depicted in Figure 4-4 with 𝑁 = 21 users.
The second scenario implementation, BotMaster, was written to run an ar-
bitrary number of Ubots. Its code ran threads – computer processes to execute
multiple programming modules simultaneously. Each Ubot was assigned to a
thread so that traffic could be generated simultaneously. However, a large num-
ber of threads can lead to a race condition, i.e. a situation where the behaviour
of one process affected another. For example, a process can block another pro-
cess from execution. Hence, the number of threads before a race condition is
observed must be defined a priori. The challenge is that the maximum number
of threads that can be launched on a machine differs depending on its computing
environment. Therefore, a preliminary test was conducted in this study to find
the number of threads that BotMaster could run. When tested on the virtual
machine used in this study, 400 threads were found to be runnable which stopped
interactively without showing any signs of blocking. However, some threads could
not be stopped when 500 threads were run simultaneously, suggesting that a race
condition had occurred. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, one virtual ma-
chine was set to run 200 Ubots using threads. This number was chosen to give a
reasonable distance from the upper bound of 400, the number observed to avoid
a race condition. It was also observed that while the BotMaster was designed to
run any number of Ubots, 200 was the optimum number to run on each of the
virtual machines used in this study.
To generate a large volume of HTTP/2 traffic, this study used BotMaster
to mimic the behaviour of 200 users. For each of the 200 Ubots it ran, it ran-
domly chose any one of the 21 user IDs. Because a random number was used for
assigning a user ID to a Ubot, running BotMaster repeatedly would yield differ-
ent compositions of user IDs assigned to the 200 Ubots. Hence, the traffic that
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BotMaster generated did not show identical patterns when the simulation was
replayed, or when the BotMaster was reproduced on different virtual machines.
Running several BotMasters simultaneously using several virtual machines cre-
ated flash-crowd traffic, which is explained in Section 4.4.2.
This section has shown a framework on how the User Model was simulated
using Ubot, and how a number of Ubots could generate a larger volume of traffic
using BotMaster. The next subsection discusses the evaluation of the framework.
4.3.1 Evaluating the Framework
This section shows the BotMaster simulation results when supplied with different
DOBBS log samples. The expected outcome of running the simulation was that
BotMaster could show that the number of visits to each state was closely related
to the number of actions in the DOBBS log it corresponded to. Testing the
framework included assessing all modules involved, including the User Model,
Ubot, and BotMaster. Observing the simulation outputs indicate:
∙ The User Model internal validity. The model was expected to adapt to
variations of the DOBBS log used as the input sample. For example, the
list of dwell times must be able to differentiate 0 or Null values. Large dwell
time values exceeding the whole duration of the sample indicated a time
conversion error. The model should correctly convert overnight cases, where
the clock was reset and the day count was increased. The model should also
be able to adapt to different user behaviours, such as being active on one
day and becoming idle on the next. Any unexpected output could question
the internal validity of the model.
∙ The Ubot veracity to choose a next state. The next state should be ran-
domly chosen with a probability equivalent to the tally of the corresponding
event in the DOBBS log. Therefore, the number of visits to each state in
the simulation should be similar to the number of logs for the event. Large
deviations between the numbers shown in the simulation and that in the
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Table 4.3: Dataset sample information
Sample name Log date # users # distinct users # surfs
26 Aug 2013 12 8232
DOBBS Sample 2 27 Aug 2013 14 18 11483
28 Aug 2013 11 11979
original log could imply that the random number generator generated unfair
outputs.
∙ The BotMaster versatility in handling threads. BotMaster outputs de-
pended upon the concurrency of threads to run many Ubots as though
each of these were run by independent processes. When certain threads
blocked other threads, some user IDs could not be correctly simulated ac-
cording to their behaviours. For example one user ID could be simulated
indefinitely while another could not run at all. The test done in this part
of the study was able to detect such cases.
The test used two 3-day samples. One sample, the DOBBS Sample 1 had
been previously discussed (Table 4.1). A second 3-day sample was extracted
from DOBBS log to serve further tests and comparison. The sample, named
DOBBS Sample 2, is described in Table 4.3. The second sample was chosen due
to its high number of users per day, number of distinct users, and number of surfs
compared to the remainder of the data in DOBBS log.
In this part of the study, BotMaster was meant to simulate a number of
distinct users from a sample. Previously it was explained that a BotMaster was
set to run a maximum number of 200 threads to avoid race conditions. However,
for the purpose of evaluating the framework, BotMaster was set to run the same
number of threads as the number of distinct user ID in the sample. Therefore,
the number of threads was set to 21 when evaluating DOBBS Sample 1, and was
set to 18 when evaluating DOBBS Sample 2. Each Ubot that a thread processed
simulated a unique user IDs. Consequently this procedure was able to simulate
different types of DOBBS samples.
Table 4.4 and 4.5 show the simulation results through running the BotMaster
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Table 4.4: BotMaster mimicked DOBBS Sample-1 closely
Event/State ID
DOBBS Sample-1 count:
total number of logs
BotMaster
average number
of visits
standard
deviation
100 199 190 14
101 196 190 15
110 1384 1339 73
111 1367 1333 90
140 261 253 19
150 1251 1211 47
151 1247 1201 44
155 5 5 2
200 197 188 14
201 197 189 15
210 1369 1311 28
211 1402 1347 39
215 9 8 4
400 7760 7640 348
410 10724 10567 594
420 8522 8385 520
430 6143 6034 306
total events 42233 41391 1969
using the above procedure. The table shows the number of times each state
was reached during a run. For each sample, BotMaster was run 30 times to see
the variations among different simulations. Each of the states in the model was
visited randomly, while maintaining a similar total number of states to the total
number of events within the entire simulation duration.
In simulating both samples (DOBBS Sample-1 and DOBBS Sample-2), it can
be seen that the total number of logs for each event were mostly 2 standard
deviations from the average number of state visits produced by BotMaster. Some
of the values showed that the gap was as close as within 1 standard deviation. This
meant that the events were closely mimicked by the BotMaster. The aggregate
number, i.e. the total number of logs for all events were within 2 standard
deviations from the simulation average. Therefore, the simulation results did
not deviate significantly away from the original log.
This subsection demonstrated that the proposed framework to generate nor-
mal traffic was internally valid. The technique for mapping samples to the User
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Table 4.5: BotMaster mimicked DOBBS Sample-2 closely
Event/State ID
DOBBS Sample-2 count:
total number of logs
BotMaster
average number
of visits
standard
deviation
100 143 136 6
101 147 140 11
110 1587 1453 95
111 1651 1523 115
140 417 395 26
150 1224 1169 59
151 1220 1166 55
155 18 18 4
200 143 138 16
201 147 139 13
210 1703 1622 59
211 1711 1614 73
215 13 12 7
400 7537 7131 306
410 10016 9547 444
420 8025 7615 362
430 6116 5759 270
total events 41818 39576 1665
Model, which was simulated by Ubots and BotMaster, produced valid results
when different samples were used. Although simulating the User Model repeti-
tiously produced different patterns, it was confirmed that the traffic it generated
mimicked normal user behaviours. In other words, the experiments in this study
can confidently simulate copies of the User Model to generate a large volume of
normal traffic. Normal traffic that consumed computing resources of a server can
be thus labelled as flash-crowd traffic.
4.4 Flash-Crowd Traffic
While the previous section detailed how normal traffic was generated, this sec-
tion explains how flash-crowd traffic was produced from the normal traffic. The
generated flash-crowd traffic was subsequently captured and processed to create
a dataset. This part of the framework is illustrated in Figure 4-6. The grey boxes
in the figure illustrate how generating flash-crowd traffic (subsection 4.4.1) and
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Figure 4-6: Generating flash-crowd traffic and creating dataset
creating flash-crowd dataset (subsection 4.4.2) fit in the framework explained in
this Chapter.
4.4.1 Generating Flash-Crowd Traffic
The flash-crowd traffic was generated by running several BotMasters on client ma-
chines, to target an HTTP/2 server. This is illustrated in Figure 3-5. The clients
and the server were all virtual machines. To describe the left side of the figure,
each client ran 1 BotMaster thread, and each BotMaster thread ran 200 Ubots.
On the right side of the figure is an HTTP/2 server running on Ubuntu 15.04.
Two monitoring tools were deployed on this machine: collectl and TShark. The
tool collectl was used to monitor the resource utilisations: CPU consumption,
memory usage, and network flow rate. This allowed the study to detect the con-
dition when the server began to show signs of resource consumption. The tool
TShark was deployed to capture the traffic generated from the clients.
A snippet of normal traffic produced by a user is illustrated in Figure 4-7. The
first column represents the packet numbers; the second is the port numbers; the
third is the time stamps relative to the time when the first packet was observed;
the fourth is the size of the packets in bytes; and the fifth column details the
packet information.
The number of clients was incrementally added to the client-server system
until the server showed a sign of resource consumption. The study showed that
the server reached 100% CPU consumption continually when 26 virtual machines
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Figure 4-7: The generated traffic, captured and viewed using TShark
Figure 4-8: Filtering traffic and extracting features
were actively generating traffic directed towards the server. This represented
26 × 200 = 5200 normal users visiting a website. The captured traffic at the
server side represented flash-crowd traffic, because it was generated from normal
traffic pattern and it consumed the CPU utilisation of the server.
The file format was named packet-capture (pcap); the traffic was captured over
8706 seconds, which occupied a pcap file of size 2 GB. Currently this number is
the maximum pcap-format file size, when captured using TShark. TShark was
also used to replay the captured traffic for further analysis including displaying
with filters, counting and searching particular events.
4.4.2 Creating Flash-Crowd Dataset
To create a dataset of flash-crowd traffic, the traffic captured was filtered and
extracted. This procedure is illustrated in Figure 4-8.
The traffic captured by TShark was filtered twice, through the direction filter
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Table 4.6: Filtering traffic messages to extract features
Network layer Used for features Not used
Application HTTP/2 DNS
SSL DHCP
Transport TCP
Network IP address
Data Link ARP
and the protocol filter. The first filter was to retain traffic only from client-to-
server. This filtering procedure ascertained that the packet flow from client to
server alone was captured, to represent a DoS attack. Hence, referring back to
the illustration in Figure 4-7, the direction filter yielded non-contiguous packet
numbers in column 1.
The second filter was a protocol filter, which operated so that only traffic
involved in an end-to-end communications was considered. Messages irrelevant
to a remote HTTP/2 server, such as DNS, DHCP, and ARP messages, were not
considered for creating the dataset in this study. To illustrate this using Figure
4-7, traffic shown on lines 55, 76, and 87 did not pass the filter and were thus
removed. Traffic that was relevant to creating the dataset was the end-to-end
network data such as HTTP/2 and SSL messages (application layer), and TCP
messages (transport layer). This is shown in packets 5 to 51 in Figure 4-7.
To illustrate the protocol filtering process from a common layered-network
perspective, Table 4.6 groups the traffic messages into network layers that were
found to be either relevant or irrelevant to the study.
After the traffic was filtered with the direction and protocol filters, it was
further characterised using the feature extraction procedure. As described in
Section 3.1.3, the procedure extracted the count, size, and minimum lapse, aver-
age lapse, and maximum lapse values, yielding 5 different values for each packet
type. There were 9 packet types extracted as shown in Table 3.5. In this study,
captured traffic was organized into 1-second instances. Therefore, each instance
could be characterised by 9× 5 = 45 feature values; however, there was no lapse
(min, average, max) value for one of the packets (i.e. the SYN packet), yielding
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42 feature values to characterise traffic in this study.
A 3,600-second flash-crowd traffic was sampled for this purpose. That is,
the feature extraction procedure extracted the 42 feature values of each time
frame of length 1 second of flash-crowd traffic. Therefore, the feature extraction
procedure was iterated 3,600 times for obtaining 3,600 instances. The result could
be arranged in a table with its columns representing the feature values, and each
of its rows representing 1-second traffic instances.
This table represents the flash-crowd dataset. It describes HTTP/2 flash-
crowd traffic in a 42 × 3600 table. Table 4.7 also summarises the values of the
42 features. Statistics were applied to represent the 3600 values of each feature
through its maximum, minimum, average, and standard deviation values.
The shape of the flash-crowd traffic can be understood from the lapse feature
values. Table 4.7 shows that some of the lapse feature values showed 0 minimum
values, denoting an instance where the packet was sent immediately after its
previous one. On the other hand, the maximum value of the lapse features was
mostly several standard deviations away from 0, signifying that a special network
condition occurred. For example, the mean values for 𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒_𝑎𝑝𝑝_𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 0,
𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒_𝑎𝑝𝑝_𝑎𝑣𝑒 = 0.032, and 𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒_𝑎𝑝𝑝_𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1.563. These values indicate
that the Application Data packets sent by clients were received by the server 0.032
seconds on average after their connection was initiated. However, the Application
Data packets can also take 1.563 seconds, or 1.563/0.032 = 48.8 times higher than
average, from connection initiation until they were received by the server. One
explanation for having a very high lapse value was that the server was busy
and incoming packets were queued. Hence, this observation conforms to the
general understanding of flash-crowd traffic descriptions that legitimate traffic
can consume server resources.
Furthermore, Table 4.7 describes the nature of the flash-crowd traffic, indi-
cated by the gaps between the minimum and maximum values of the count and
the size features. The server was not made busy during any instance of time
where the volume of packets was at its minimum, but it found to approach its
serving limit during a time instance when the features showed its maximum val-
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Table 4.7: Flash-crowd traffic characteristics described through its feature values
no feature name min max mean s.d.
1 count_app 18 398 201.553 34.783
2 size_app 2356 60634 30610.343 5264.759
3 lapse_app_min 0 0 0.000 0.000
4 lapse_app_ave 0 6 0.032 0.264
5 lapse_app_max 0 156 1.563 11.530
6 count_syn 33 132 76.790 13.772
7 size_syn 2442 9768 5682.460 1019.131
8 count_ack 16 464 223.777 41.804
9 size_ack 1056 30648 14778.687 2762.303
10 lapse_ack_min 0 0 0.000 0.000
11 lapse_ack_ave 0 23 0.042 0.654
12 lapse_ack_max 0 691 1.966 20.826
13 count_rst 0 231 73.048 25.134
14 size_rst 0 13860 4382.883 1508.043
15 lapse_rst_min 0 274 1.057 11.967
16 lapse_rst_ave 0 274 3.785 15.935
17 lapse_rst_max 0 873 25.631 67.556
18 count_rstAck 0 69 39.523 9.075
19 size_rstAck 0 4554 2608.503 598.944
20 lapse_rstAck_min 0 518 1.359 15.516
21 lapse_rstAck_ave 0 518 6.279 21.992
22 lapse_rstAck_max 0 979 36.71 79.556
23 count_finAck 0 112 24.902 12.201
24 size_finAck 0 7392 1643.528 805.276
25 lapse_finAck_min 0 401 1.831 18.409
26 lapse_finAck_ave 0 401 7.003 23.367
27 lapse_finAck_max 0 934 36.107 76.897
28 count_tlsHello 17 139 76.793 14.2
29 size_tlsHello 6343 51997 28695.703 5315.083
30 lapse_tlsHello_min 0 0 0.000 0.000
31 lapse_tlsHello_ave 0 0 0.000 0.000
32 lapse_tlsHello_max 0 3 0.011 0.137
33 count_tlsKey 0 19 6.154 2.475
34 size_tlsKey 0 4883 1581.549 636.142
35 lapse_tlsKey_min 0 1 0 0.017
36 lapse_tlsKey_ave 0 179 0.051 2.984
37 lapse_tlsKey_max 0 896 0.271 14.934
38 count_encAlert 1 155 76.713 15.104
39 size_encAlert 97 15035 7441.139 1465.058
40 lapse_encAlert_min 0 581 1.391 21.877
41 lapse_encAlert_ave 0 581 3.168 24.39
42 lapse_encAlert_max 0 800 23.864 68.85
112
ues. For example, the count_syn feature values reveal that flash-crowd traffic
is made of 77 connections per second on average, which ranges from 33 to 132
connections per second.
The average number of TLS handshake initiation per second, denoted by the
count_tlsHello feature, equalled to 76.793. This number is almost identical to
the average number of TCP connection initiation per second, count_syn, which
equalled to 76.790. This demonstrates that both the TCP SYN packet and the
TLS Hello packet are always in pair in initiating a connection, as illustrated in
Figure 3-2.
The count_ack mean feature value was 223.77, which is 3 times higher than
the count_syn mean feature value of 76.790. This means that the server receives
on average 3 ACK packets in a connection. Upon an investigation, these 3 ACK
packets were used to acknowledge a SYN packet for connection initiation, a TLS
Hello for TLS handshake initiation, and an HTTP Response page. Flash crowd
traffic can be identified through having count_ack feature values between 16 and
464. Table 4.7 shows that other count and size feature values also show that
flash-crowd traffic can be identified through feature values that lie between these
low and high traffic measures.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter showed how legitimate user behaviour while online could be mod-
elled, and how flash-crowd traffic could be generated from the defined model.
The study produced a flash-crowd dataset and showed its feature values. This
dataset can be used to analyse how attack or anomalous traffic deviates from
the normal traffic. The following chapter presents a scheme to model and detect
attack traffic.
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Chapter 5
Attack Traffic Modelling and
Analysis
The earliest Denial of Service (DoS) attack reported in the literature was launched
in 1974 (Heron, 2010; Dear, 2010). The attack required only one client command
to cause 31 remote machines to become unresponsive. The command was designed
to share the use of external devices in the network. The command launched data
transmission to an external device connected to another machine in the network.
However, in the absence of an external device, the machine indefinitely waited to
communicate with the non-existent device and was unable to serve other input
devices such as the keyboard. The attacker sent such a command to each of the
machines in the network, causing all 31 of them to become unresponsive to key-
board commands. DoS attacks in the subsequent years demanded launch of more
traffic from an attacking client. In 1996, a flood of ping packets (discussed in page
19) was found to cause target machines to freeze (CERT, 1996). Subsequently,
the Internet has facilitated means for attackers to increase the volume of traffic
to flood a target more effectively. Internet-connected machines have been used to
send simultaneous traffic, creating a Distributed DoS (DDoS) attack to incapac-
itate a target (Chang, 2002). Henceforth, flooding-based DoS attacks after the
year 1999 have been generally distributed in nature (Zargar et al., 2013).
This chapter shows how DoS attack traffic against an HTTP/2 service can
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be modelled. It details the impact of launching HTTP/2 packets with varying
parameter settings to depict CPU utilization and memory consumption of a target
machine running an HTTP/2 server. The chapter is divided into two sections.
The first section presents a model of a flooding-based attack, and the second
section presents a model of a distributed attack.
5.1 Flood Attack
Prior to this study, flooding-based detection techniques discussed in the liter-
ature (subsection 2.3.2.2) analysed floods of HTTP/1.1 traffic. The techniques
employed HTTP/1.1 Request packets to create floods against web servers (Zargar
et al., 2013). Attackers at the client side launched a big amount of packets to the
server. As a result, the server was incapacitated.
In contrast, a flood of HTTP/2 Request packets observed in this study could
not be used to incapacitate a target running an HTTP/2 service. A client ma-
chine was designed in this study to continuously launch HTTP/2 Request packets
to an HTTP/2 server. The client used nghttp2 library to continuously generate
HTTP/2 data packets containing GET requests, and sent these packets towards
the server. However, the server was not incapacitated. The client machine, in-
stead of the server, reached 100% CPU utilization during the time that it launched
continuous HTTP/2 Request packets. This shows that the flooding-based attack
against the HTTP/2 server was unsuccessful. Therefore, flooding-based tech-
niques previously used to incapacitate HTTP/1.1 services, such as launching a
big amount of HTTP/1.1 Request packets, cannot be adapted to attack HTTP/2
services.
However, HTTP/2 packet types are not restricted to an HTTP/2 Request
packet. HTTP/2 standard (Belshe et al., May 2015) defines 10 frame types, i.e.
the ping, data, settings, window_update, headers, priority, rst_stream,
push_promise, go_away and continuation frames. This section further explores
other HTTP/2 packet types, particularly the window_update and the ping pack-
ets, to fit a model that allowed a client to launch flooding-based HTTP/2 DoS
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attack traffic towards a target. Such an attack model is introduced in the follow-
ing subsection.
5.1.1 Attack Model and Scenarios
An attacking client was designed to generate and launch HTTP/2 attack packets
towards a target server. The attack packets were generated at the client side
based on a flooding-based attack model. The aim of the investigation in this
section is to find HTTP/2 packet types that can be employed as attack packets,
which consumes 100% CPU usage of a target server.
The flooding-based attack is modelled based on two intuitions. First, a target
server can be incapacitated when processing a big amount of packets. There-
fore, the proposed model allows the investigation to launch a predefined number
of attack packets from an attacking client to a target server. Second, sending
continuous attack packets could overload the CPU usage of the attacking client.
Reducing the attack flow, i.e. the number of packets launched per second towards
the target server, could still incapacitate the server. Hence, the model allows the
investigation to add and adjust a time delay between successive attacking packets.
The attack model proposed in this study is shown in Figure 5-1. The model
allows test cases in this study to generate a cumulative 𝑁 number of packets.
Hence, a variable 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 is initialised to 0, to set that no packet has been generated.
The model generates and sends one HTTP/2 packets towards a target HTTP/2
server. Hence, the variable 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 is incremented each time after an HTTP/2 packet
is generated, shown in the figure as 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡+1. This process is iterated until
a 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 equals to the cumulative number of packets 𝑁 . The terminating condition
is shown in the figure as a 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 == 𝑁 conditional statement. The process
terminates when the condition is true.
Furthermore, the model provides a conditional statement to add a time delay
before sending an HTTP/2 packet towards a target server. When set to true,
the conditional statement add time delay allows a test case to set a delay with
a 1 nanosecond granularity, and allows the model to pause for the given time
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Figure 5-1: The flooding-based attack model
delay before sending an HTTP/2 packet towards a target server. To bypass this
behaviour of adding a time delay, the conditional statement should be set to false.
In this study, the effects of varying different HTTP/2 packet types on the
CPU and memory consumption of a target were observed. This is explained in
Investigation-1 of the following subsection. Investigation-2 furthered the experi-
ment through observing the number of target machines that a single client was
able to flood. The effect of adding a time delay between attack packets on the
computing resources of a target was observed in Investigation-3.
Investigation 1: HTTP/2 Packet Types
The first investigation was to examine how DoS attack could be launched
against an HTTP/2 server. The following lab configuration was set up to facili-
tate the investigation. Two VMware Player virtual machines were deployed: one
hosted a client (as the attacker) and the other hosted a server (as the victim).
Each virtual machine was configured to have 1 processor core with 1 GB RAM,
and ran Ubuntu 14.10 Linux distribution. The client and the server were con-
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nected through a 100 Mbps virtual network. The two virtual machines were run
on the same host machine.
Several test cases were run to launch various packet types, i.e. settings,
data, ping, and window_update packets. Some of the results were not in accord
with the expectancy. For example, sending settings frames more than once
generated an error; and transmitting data frames containing GET requests did
not successfully cause resource depletion. It was found that the client machine
(instead of the target) reached 100% CPU consumption when the data packet
was used to flood the target. Of interest in this investigation, two packet types
i.e. the ping and window_update frames could be used for further observation,
as they allowed the flood-based attack model (Section 5.1.1) to iteratively send
HTTP/2 packets.
The ping packet discussed in this section is an HTTP/2 frame types at the
application level, as not to confuse it with ping messages at the network level,
notoriously known to cause DoS attacks (Section 2.2.1). The ping frame is part
of the HTTP/2 protocol.
The window_update packets are used to control the amount of bytes an
HTTP/2 machine can send (discussed in Section 2.4.4). Every HTTP/2 packet
is tagged with a stream ID, which allows packets to be grouped and transmit-
ted asynchronously to a remote machine, regardless of the packet flow of other
groups. While every HTTP/2 packet is tagged with a stream ID, the win-
dow_update packets can control the flow of different stream IDs. In other words,
window_update packets allow flow control, grouped by the stream IDs of the
packets.
The window_update frame format, shown in Figure 5-2, has a payload named
window-size-increment. The figure shows that the window-size-increment occu-
pies 31 bits of the frame. In addition, the Figure also shows a 1-bit reserved
payload denoted with "R" – this reserved payload is not discussed in this study.
The window-size-increment value indicates the maximum length of a frame
that the machine (that sends the frame) can transmit in addition to its previous
value. This is illustrated in Figure 5-3. In the figure, a machine running HTTP/2
119
Figure 5-2: The window_update payload format
Figure 5-3: The window-size-increment tells the receiver how many more bytes
the sender can transmit
service initially kept a local value of window size. This value signifies how many
bytes the machine can transmit. In this example, (suppose) the three shaded
boxes meant that the machine could send three bytes of data. After it sent
a window_update packet with window-size-increment value of 1, the machine
increased its local window size to 3+1 = 4 bytes. This allowed the machine to send
1 more byte. The machine henceforth sent four-byte data to a remote machine.
Likewise, a window-size-increment value of 2 indicates that future frames can
send 2 more bytes. As illustrated in the figure, the machine increased its window
size to 4 + 2 = 6 bytes, and henceforth sent six-byte data.
The traffic generation setup for Investigation-1 is shown in Figure 5-4. A
client machine run the flood-based attack model to generate attack traffic towards
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Figure 5-4: The traffic generation setup for Investigation-1 and Investigation-3
a target server. A code called packet generator was constructed using nghttp2
library to generate a large number of HTTP/2 window_update packets as the
attack traffic. The packet generator was equipped with some user-supplied input
parameters to allow control over the total number of HTTP/2 stream IDs and
the window-size-increment value used to launch an HTTP/2 packet.
In this investigation, five observations were noted when a flood of packets
against an HTTP/2 server were generated. For each observation, the packet
generator sent one test case of crafted HTTP/2 frame packets against the server.
Hence, there were five test cases in total. These are :
∙ Test case 1: 2M ping packets were sent to the victim.
∙ Test case 2: 2M window_update packets were transmitted on stream 0,
with random window-size-increment.
∙ Test case 3: 2M window_update packets were transmitted on stream 0,
with fixed window-size-increment.
∙ Test case 4: 10K window_update packets with random window-size-
increment were transmitted on each of 100 different stream IDs.
∙ Test case 5: 10K window_update packets with fix window-size-increment
were transmitted on each of the 100 different stream IDs.
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Each experiment was repeated 30 times to reduce the variance in the results
obtained, and to improve the overall confidence in the findings. The next section
presents the results of the observations. It is important to note that test case 1
required sending ping frame packets at the application level, as not to confuse it
with the ping messages sent at the network level, known to cause DoS attacks
(Section 2.2.1). The ping frame is part of the HTTP/2 protocol.
In order to send packets in different stream IDs as done for test cases 4 and 5,
a header frame was sent to the receiver to open a new stream ID. Hence, there
were 100 header frame packets sent to create 100 different stream IDs.
Investigation 2: The Power of the Attack
The second investigation was to observe how many servers a single client
can flood. The intuition behind this was that if the client required minimal
computational and storage resources to launch a DoS attack, multiple victim
machines could be targeted. This is opposed to the nature of DDoS attacks,
where a single server is attacked by many client machines.
In this investigation, one server was added in the network each time all servers
in the network have shown 100% CPU usage. This is shown in Figure 5-5. The
client was used to generate attacks according to the five test cases discussed in
Investigation-1. In this investigation, one client was used to send attack traffic
to all servers in the network. The investigation was concluded when any one of
the servers did not yield a near 100% CPU usage. The number of servers was
observed at the conclusion.
Investigation 3: Adding a Delay
The third investigation was to observe if a time-delay could make an attack
to become stealthier. As shown in Figure 5-1, the attack model in this section
allows a time-delay to be inserted between consecutive attack packets. The in-
tuition behind this was that a time-delay would reduce the attack traffic rate. If
the attack could be lowered gradually, the lowest possible packet rate that will
translate to a successful DoS attack would be observed.
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Figure 5-5: The traffic generation setup for Investigation-2
To implement a pause between attack packets, the programming interface
nanosleep() was used in the code. The interface allowed the study to vary a delay
up to a minimum of 1 nanosecond, before a packet was generated. The same
five test cases were run again to observe the effect of adding a time-delay to the
attack packets, on the behaviour of the victim machine.
The traffic generation setup is shown in Figure 5-4. A client implemented the
flooding-based attack model to generate attack traffic towards a server. A delay
was added before each packet was sent towards the server. This investigation
varied the delay value to find a minimum value that caused the server to show
100% CPU usage.
5.1.2 Results
This section presents the results of the observed parameters of the server when
subject to the attack. The effect of flooding different types of HTTP/2 packets
to a server was investigated in five test cases (page 121): first, flooding with
ping packets; second and third, with window_update packets on one stream
with random and fixed window-size-increment respectively; fourth and fifth, with
window_update packets on 100 stream IDs with random and fixed window-size-
increment respectively.
Since the server resources were the parameters of interest to observe in this
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Table 5.1: Computing resource consumption during attacks
Test case
CPU size (KB/sec) count (packets/sec)
ave s.d. ave s.d ave s.d.
1 98.56 6.29 403.98 45.67 274.06 31.81
2 94.80 17.23 320.40 88.38 224.04 78.20
3 88.39 24.22 305.35 120.79 219.94 103.73
4 97.99 8.82 321.42 127.00 223.71 121.04
5 98.14 7.46 324.59 121.26 226.41 122.60
study, the host and client resource parameters were not considered for the anal-
ysis. It is useful to note that the host machine did not show any sign of resource
depletion during the attack traffic generation, indicating that the observed re-
source parameters at the victim machine were not affected by the underlying
host environment. Similarly, the client machine did not show any sign of resource
depletion, suggesting that it did not require high computing resources to produce
such attacks.
Result of Investigation 1
The results from each test case are shown in Table 5.1. The table shows the
average (ave) and standard deviation (s.d.) of the server resource parameters:
the % CPU consumed, the size of packets received per second, and the number
of packets received per second.
It can be seen from the table that the average CPU consumption was near
100% for all cases. During the flooding-based attack, a simple HTTP/2 Request
sent to the server was not responded to. That is, in all five observations, the server
did not respond to a page request that was sent from another client terminal
during the attack. The response page was received by the client as soon as the
attack ended. This indicated that the DoS attack was successful in incapacitating
the victim.
The server’s free memory was stable at 235 MB when idle. When it was
attacked based on test case 1, the memory was consumed at about 1.5 MB per
second. However the available memory was then stable between 67 - 80 MB even
though the attack was still ongoing. In other words, the attack consumed the
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server memory up to 168 MB. The test results differed when test cases 2 - 5 were
run; the server memory only consumed up to 2 MB during the attack.
In all five observations, ICMP ping packets were sent from the client to the
server to test network conditions such as packet loss and round-trip delay. When
the network that connects the client to the server is not congested, a client receives
responses for ICMP ping packets that it sends to a server. In other words, a
network condition such as network congestion had occurred when a client did not
receive the ICMP ping packet it sent to a server. In this study, packet loss tested
through ICMP ping tests was 0%, suggesting that the network was not congested,
and did not contribute to packet loss.
ICMP ping can also yield round-trip delays, which is a metric showing the
time it takes for a client to receive back ICMP responses from a server. In all
five observations in this study, the round-trip delay was doubled from about 500
ms when the server was idle to 1 second during an attack. This suggests that
the server responded slower to ICMP ping packets during the attacks. As it was
shown that the network was not congested, the slow response was due to a busy
server, rather than a congested network. Hence, the doubling of round-trip-delay
values shows that the server was busy.
It was difficult to sample the average and variation of the round-trip delay
since different measurement tools were used: ICMP ping packets were used to
measure the round-trip delay, while a collectl tool was used to monitor the other
parameters. This created difficulties to align the data collected. The key observa-
tion was that there was no noted packet loss during the attack thus showing that
the high CPU usage observed at the server was not due to a congested network.
Because the victim machine only run an HTTP/2 server, the high CPU usage
was due to a DoS attack against an HTTP/2 service.
Result of Investigation 2
After running 12 servers (as the victims) and 1 client (as the attacker), all
servers were still successfully attacked. The host machine had very low remaining
available memory to run a further experiment, thus the investigation concluded
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with the 12 servers. During the attack, all servers showed CPU usage of almost
100% and they could not respond to a given client request page. The results were
consistent when attacks were launched using each of the five test cases, i.e. all
test cases caused the 12 servers to show near 100% CPU usage.
Result of Investigation 3
As expected, adding a delay between attack packets yielded less CPU usage
than what was shown in Table 5.1. However, when a simple page request was sent
by the client in this investigation, the requested page was promptly returned by
the server. This indicated that the server was still able to serve incoming requests
in a timely manner. The delay value was varied during the investigation until
the smallest fraction of delay that the programming interface could provide (1
nanosecond) was attempted, yet the server was not incapacitated from providing
service.
It was observed that larger time delay (e.g. 100 ns) yielded lower CPU usage at
the victim’s end. This result confirmed the internal validity of this experiment:
less frequent delays between offending packets should cause less stress on the
victim. The results were also consistent when attacks were launched using each
of the five test cases.
This investigation also showed that adding a time-delay did not successfully
incapacitate the server, yet caused lower CPU utilization of the HTTP/2 server.
5.1.3 Discussion
Interpretation of the Results
In all five test cases sending attack traffic, the server was incapacitated during
the attacks: Table 5.1 shows that the CPU utilization was near 100%. Further-
more, it was observed that the server did not send a response page during each
of the five attack test scenarios, confirming that the DoS attacks were successful.
In all five scenarios tested, the network was not congested for two reasons:
first, the observed packet sizes were 3 to 4 hundred KB per second (shown in
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Table 5.1) which were much lower than the 100 Mbps virtual network bandwidth;
and second, the ICMP ping requests yielded no packet loss. The latter signified
that the network still had available capacity to receive network packets, i.e. the
attack packets and the ping packets. Because the network was not congested, the
inability of the server to respond to a requested page as described above was due
to its CPU utilization approaching 100%.
Much of the server memory remained available during the attack, suggesting
that the observed server CPU consumption was not due to its limited memory
setting of 1 GB. As a comparison, the client did not show any resource consump-
tion despite it operated at the same 1 GB memory setting. This demonstrated
that the client did not require much memory or high CPU processing power to
create, buffer and send attack packets to a target. Rather, it was the processing
of these packets at the server that caused CPU resource depletion. This was
confirmed through the second investigation which showed that one client could
still pose computing power to successfully attack many machines that processed
HTTP/2 packets. Hence, it can be stated with confidence that processing of
HTTP/2 packets at the receiving end (server) required a lot of CPU usage.
Implication of the Observations
The study in this section indicated that it was possible to detect HTTP/2
flooding-based DoS attacks when launched through the five proposed test cases.
Table 5.1 shows that attacking the server through test case 1 caused the highest
CPU consumption (98.56%). However, test case 1 also yielded the highest packet
size per second (403.98), and the highest numbers of packets per second (274.06).
Furthermore, the rate at which the server memory was consumed at 1.5 MB per
second proved to be an indication of an attack. As a result, it was possible to
detect the test case-1 attack or to trigger an alarm when the memory resources
depleted at higher than normal rate.
It is more economical for an attacker at the client side to incapacitate a
target with less effort. Attacks demonstrated through test cases 2 - 5 proved
so: lower-rate attacks could incapacitate an HTTP/2 server. In addition, these
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attacks did not consume noticeable memory. This implied that through certain
test cases, attacks could be made more efficient, hence stealthier. Such stealthy
attack traffic, when inserted with legitimate traffic, can be difficult to detect.
It was still unclear whether launching attacks through different stream IDs (as
in test cases 4 - 5) were stealthier than attacking through only 1 stream ID (as in
test cases 2 - 3). As shown in Table 5.1, the packet size per second and the number
of packets per second did not differ significantly in these test cases (2 - 5). The
investigation did not reveal if sending attacks in different stream IDs were more
difficult to detect when legitimate traffic was inserted. However, since HTTP/2
traffic typically runs through multiple streams at a time, test cases 4 - 5 mimicked
the legitimate traffic closely. Currently, HTTP/2 is not yet widely used; hence,
legitimate HTTP/2 traffic dataset is not yet available. There is room for future
study to observe if test cases 4 - 5 were stealthier than the others, which became
the motivation for the study reported in the following section (i.e. Distributed
Attack, Section 5.2).
External Validity
Through the second investigation, it was observed that one client machine
could attack many (in this case 12) servers simultaneously. This meant that it
did not need distributed machines as in a DDoS attack to successfully disrupt
HTTP/2 services. Since the client still had available computing resources, it was
possible for an attacker to mimic a DDoS attack through a single client.
However, this observation might not be externally valid. The investigations
were done using virtual machines where there was no physical distance between
the machines. When a 1 ns delay between the attack packets was inserted in the
third investigation, the server was still able to serve client requests by sending
a response page, indicating that the DoS attack was not successful. In reality,
several millisecond delays could be noticed between two remote client-server end
points. Hence, when time-delay in the communication channel was considered
for launching the five attack test cases, a flood of HTTP/2 traffic was not able
to incapacitate the servers as demonstrated here.
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Nevertheless, the ability of one client to successfully attack many servers si-
multaneously that this study observed is externally valid for the following reasons.
Real web applications host services that interact with databases and send big files.
They are busier than the idle servers used in this investigation. Furthermore, they
are visited by many clients simultaneously. When the attack traffic proposed in
this study is combined with legitimate web traffic, real HTTP/2 servers in the
Internet are successfully attacked.
5.1.4 Conclusion
The study demonstrated flooding-based DoS attack models targeting HTTP/2
servers. The test cases 1 - 5 showed how the attacks could be launched against
a target server. However, the demonstrated attacks were still detected through
observing whether the victim memory resources gradually deplete at a certain
rate. It had been previously argued that it was possible to launch stealthier DoS
attacks through sending packets based on traffic generation rules that exploit the
way a victim processes HTTP/2 packets.
The results showed that a single malicious client flooding with win-
dow_update packets can successfully attack 12 servers at any time. This was
in contrast to flooding a server with HTTP/2 Request packets, which consumed
the computing resource of the client. Adding a time-delay of 1 ns between con-
secutive attack packets did not make a successful attack; hence, DoS attacks
using the test cases herewith presented could not be made stealthier through
adding time-delays higher than 1 ns between the attack packets. The demon-
strated flooding-based attack model in this section was extended to construct
DDoS attacks models that will be presented in the next section.
5.2 Distributed Attack
The previous section presented the effect of flooding-based attack on HTTP/2
window_update packets, and how they could incapacitate an HTTP/2 server.
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While the previous section employed one attacking client, this section presents
how a distributed attack, or DDoS attack, employing more than one client could
be modelled. The intensity of DDoS attack traffic was analysed to see if it could
bypass a hypothetical intrusion-detection system that monitored CPU consump-
tion and increased memory usage activity.
The study aimed to generate stealthy attack traffic, where each attacking client
caused a target server to consume 50% CPU usage, yet caused the target server
to consume 100% CPU usage when a number of malicious clients were employed
in attack traffic generation. Hence, further parameter values were investigated
in this study. These are the window-size-increment value, the number of attack
packets, and the number of malicious clients (bots) used. These parameters af-
fected the intensity of DDoS attack traffic. Furthermore, this section describes
how the attack traffic could be classified using machine learning techniques; in-
cluding steps to train and test on network traffic packets.
5.2.1 Attack Model and Scenarios
A DDoS attack model is shown in Figure 5-6. This model extends the previously
introduced flooding-based attack model (Figure 5-1) in setting a predefined value
for the total number of packets 𝑁 to be sent towards a target server, and setting
a predefined window-size-increment value. The remaining procedures defined by
the model remained equal as the flooding-based attack model; a packet is sent
towards a target server until the number of packets sent equals to the predefined
total number of packets 𝑁 .
The DDoS model in Figure 5-1 allows the investigation in this section to find
two parameters, i.e. the maximum number of packets 𝑁 and the window-size-
increment value, to generate attack traffic that caused a target server to consume
50% CPU usage. The other parameter, the number of bots required to generate
attack traffic that consumes 100% CPU usage of a target server, was observed by
varying the number of bots at the client side. This is illustrated in Figure 5-7.
To find the maximum number of packets, the window-size-increment value,
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Figure 5-6: The DDoS attack model
Figure 5-7: The traffic generation setup for DDoS attack
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and the number of bots required in a DDoS attack, three investigations were
conducted, as reported in this section. They extended the flooding-based attack
model using window_update packets discussed in the previous section. Because
this study is based on encrypted HTTP/2 communications, the number of win-
dow_update packets received at the server could not be directly inspected, as
the window_update packets were part of the encrypted data. However, the max-
imum number of window_update packet communicated by a sender depends on
the value of its payload, i.e. the window-size-increment. Hence, Investigation 1
aimed to find the window-size-increment value that represented 50% CPU con-
sumption, and Investigation 2 deduced the number of window_update packets.
Investigation 3 aimed to find the number of bots needed to form a successful
DDoS attack that led to a 100% CPU consumption at the victim.
Investigation 1: Effective window-size-increment value
The aim of this investigation was to find the window-size-increment value
that yields a 50% CPU utilization at the victim. The window-size-increment
value affects the total number of window_update packets that a sender (in this
case the attacking client) can send. In this investigation, a window-size-increment
value 𝑑 was sought until the victim machine began to show indications of excessive
resource consumption through flooding by window_update packets.
The HTTP/2 standard (Belshe et al., May 2015) defines that the window-
size-increment is represented as a 31-bit integer payload of a window_update
frame (Figure 5-2). Hence, when the window size of a stream reaches its limit
of 231 − 1, the client does not send any further window_update packet, even if
the client interface (such as the packet generator used in this study) triggers a
command to send a window_update packet. The implication of this behaviour is
that the window-size-increment value of 1 would allow a client to send a flood of
window_update packets within a much longer period of time than when window-
size-increment value is set to 231 − 1. The latter would allow the client to send
one or less window_update packets to a server. This is illustrated in Figure 5-8.
When a client sends a window_update packet, it updates its local window size
value according to the window-size-increment value. In the example, the window
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size was pictured as having size equal to 3 bytes, represented by the 3 shaded
boxes. If the client sent a window_update packet with window-size-value set to
1, the local window size value was incremented by 1 byte. Therefore, in the top
figure, the local window size value became 4 bytes (represented by the 4 shaded
boxes). A series of window_update packets sent by the client, with window-size-
increment value set to 1, caused the local window size to increase by 1 byte until
the local window size reached its maximum value. When the local window size
reached its maximum value, no further window_update packets could be sent by
the client.
Consequently, higher window-size-increment values imply fewer win-
dow_update packets to be sent. This is illustrated at the bottom of Figure
5-8. A series of window_update packets sent by the client, with window-size-
increment value set to 2, caused the local window size to increase by 2 bytes
until the local window size reached its maximum value. Similarly, when the local
window size had reached its maximum value, no further window_update packet
could be sent by the client. Comparing the top and the bottom figure, it can
be seen that fewer number of window_update packets can be sent by the client
when the window-size-increment is set to a higher value.
In this investigation, a client sent a flood of window_update packets to a
server with window-size increment set to 𝑑 = 2𝑛, where 0 ≤ 𝑛 ≤ 31. (The flood
duration was to be observed in Investigation 2.) To implement a test framework,
the test cases 2 and 3 from the previous section were employed. They are repeated
here as follows:
∙ Test case 2: 2M window_update packets were transmitted on stream 0,
with random window-size-increment.
∙ Test case 3: 2M window_update packets were transmitted on stream 0,
with fixed window-size-increment.
In the above two investigations, test case 2 was run with random window-size-
increment value that was set between 1 and 𝑑 for each window_update packet,
where 𝑑 is a value to be sought in this investigation. Test case 3 was run with a
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Figure 5-8: A higher window-size-increment value allows fewer number of subse-
quent window_update packets
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fixed windows-size-increment value 𝑑. Using a monitoring tool collectl, the CPU
consumption of the machine was monitored when flooded with varying window-
size-increment values. The value found in this investigation would serve as a
constant input for the next stage of investigation.
Investigation 2: Effective number of packets
The aim of this investigation was to find the number of packets required to
flood an HTTP/2 service, deduced through observing time duration of attacks.
Using the window-size-increment value from the previous step, this investi-
gation deduced the number of packets 𝑘 received at the server end when the
window_update packets was no longer sent by the client machine, i.e. when the
local window size had reached its maximum value of 231− 1. To find 𝑘, the client
sent varying numbers of 𝑥 = 10𝑛 window_update packets to the server, where
4 ≤ 𝑛 ≤ 9.
The study observed the flood duration, i.e. the time duration for which the
CPU of the server showed near 50% consumption, when subjected to the varying
values of 𝑥. When the local window size at the client side had not reached its
maximum value, lower 𝑥 values sent by the client caused a shorter flood duration
observed at the server side. Consequently, higher 𝑥 values caused longer flood
duration.
When the local window size at the client had reached its maximum value of
231 − 1, no further window_update packets were sent by the client. Under this
condition, higher 𝑥 values did not show longer flood durations. Hence, 𝑥 values
above a certain threshold were no longer effective to flood a server. The threshold
was the condition when higher 𝑥 values did not yield longer flood durations.
The value 𝑘 was deduced to be below the value 𝑥 when this condition was first
observed.
The results found in this investigation were used as a parameter to launch a
DDoS attack in the following investigation.
Investigation 3: DDoS attack packets
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This investigation aimed to find the minimum number of attacking bots as
part of a DDoS attack to indicate symptomatic depletion of resources on the
victim machine represented through a delayed HTTP response from the victim.
The independent variables were the number of bots and the number of threads
(processes) per bot, while the variables to be observed were the number of captured
packets, the number of dropped packets, and the flood duration (in seconds) at the
victim’s end.
Each bot in this investigation sent stealthy attack traffic, i.e. a flood of traffic
that consumed 50% CPU usage of a victim. Hence, the window-size-increment
value found in Investigation-1 and the maximum number of packets found in
Investigation-2 was employed in this investigation. In addition, this investigation
used multiple streams to simulate multiple clients under a DDoS attacks. Test
cases 4 and 5 from the previous section were used as follows to send packets from
an attacking client to a target server:
∙ Test case 4: 10K window_update packets with random window-size-
increment were transmitted on each of 100 different stream IDs.
∙ Test case 5: 10K window_update packets with fix window-size-increment
were transmitted on each of 100 different stream IDs.
5.2.2 Results and Discussion
Result of Investigation 1
As previously explained, creating a flood of window_update messages is not
trivial: an open stream established between HTTP/2 clients and servers cannot
be set up for a client to send an endless flood of window_update packets to a
server. The client does not send the frame when the local window size value of a
stream is high enough that it would exceed the maximum value, when supplied
with a given window-size-increment value. Therefore, the victim’s CPU would
not be continuously over-utilised. Hence, the CPU consumption was studied in
this investigation, when the client sent a flood of window_update packets to the
server given a window-size-increment value of 𝑑 = 2𝑛 with 0 ≤ 𝑛 ≤ 31.
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The results obtained are presented as follows. When 𝑛 > 29, there was no
observable CPU consumption. A calculation can show that there were only
231/229 = 22, or at most 4 frame packets sent to the server assuming a very
small initial window size. On the contrary, the CPU consumption was 100% at
all other times when 𝑛 = 0; and after 1 hour and 7 minutes into simulation,
the CPU consumption returned back to normal with no further packets received
at the server end. This finding confirmed the above explanation that the win-
dow_update packets were prevented from arrival at the server after the window
size of the stream reached its maximum value of 231−1. This investigation sought
a window-size-increment value 𝑑 that consumed around 50% CPU, and through
further experiments, this value was found to be 𝑑 = 214, or 16,384.
Result of Investigation 2
Given the window-size-increment value of 16,384 from the previous step, this
investigation sought to find the minimum number of packets, and to observe
the time duration of a flood of window_update packets which can be sent by
an attacking client to a target victim on a given stream. These were measured
against the methods described for test cases 2 and 3, i.e. sending a flood of
window_update packets with a fixed window-size-increment value of 16,384 (as
in test case 2), and those with a random window-size-increment value between 1
and 16,384 (as in test case 3).
The results of investigation 3 are shown in Table 5.2. The results indicated
that varying the number of window_update packets sent did not cause a large
variation of duration for which the flood packets were observed at the victim.
The number of window_update packets, or 𝑘, was deduced to lie between
100K and 1M since the flood duration did not show significant fluctuations when
the number of packets sent were above 1M. The average flood duration for test
case 3, when 100𝐾 < 𝑘 ≤ 1𝑀 is (30+54+34+36)/4 = 38.5 seconds. The number
of window_update packets can be confirmed with the following calculations. The
HTTP/2 standard stated that the initial window size is 65,535 (Belshe et al., May
2015, p.23). Therefore, when the window-size-increment value was set to 16,384
137
Table 5.2: Duration the WINDOW_UPDATE frame was sent
Test case Number of packets Flood duration (ms)
2 10K 4
100K 23
1M 64
10M 56
100M 64
1B 70
3 10K 5
100K 25
1M 30
10M 54
100M 34
1B 36
or 214, the value 𝑘 was found to be (231 − 1− 65, 535)/214 = 131, 068. Attacking
clients that sent higher number than 131,068 packets to a target server would
observe similar flood duration of 38.5 seconds.
The implication of this observation was that a packet generator should be
designed to send an effective number 131, 068 of window_update packets. An
attacking client designed to send 1M packet should distribute the packets into
several stream IDs. For example, 10K window_update into 100 stream IDs. The
distribution of 1M packet into 100 stream IDs was used as a parameter for the
following investigation.
Result of Investigation 3
This investigation sought to find the number of attacking bots it took for an
HTTP/2 service to reveal a symptom of resource depletion when one attacking
bot alone did not indicate suspect behaviour. From the previous investigations,
it was found that the victim’s CPU was only utilized around 50% for about 64
ms (for test case 2) or 30 ms (for test case 3). Any normal computing activities
(e.g. disk writing) could show such indications. Hence, the proposed meth-
ods produced stealthy attack traffic which could bypass a hypothetical intrusion-
detection-system that triggered an alert when a client caused a machine to reach
near 100% CPU consumption. The values found in the first and second investi-
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gation served as the ground to set up a stealthy attacking bot. These are 16,384
window-size-increment as the window_update payload value, and a maximum
number of 131,068 window_update packets on a stream.
To simulate hundreds of clients as seen in a flash crowd (or bots as in a DDoS
attack), the methods described in test cases 4 and 5 were employed. Each of these
test cases required sending of 10K window_update packets in each 100 different
stream IDs successively, that in this case represented 100 clients connecting to a
server in succession (and the flood duration was part of the observed variable). In
addition, a delay 𝑡𝑑 between individual stream IDs was inserted, where 10 ms ≤
𝑡𝑑 ≤ 200 ms. That is, an attacking client sent 10K window_update packets on
one stream without any delay 𝑡𝑑 in between the packets, and a delay was added
before the client sent other 10K window_update packets on another stream. This
investigation observed different delay values inserted between stream IDs at the
client side, and a delay value was noted as soon as packet drops were reported
by TShark at the server side. This delay value represented the smallest delay
that can be added between stream IDs until the server showed packet drops. The
delay value for test case 4 was found to be 𝑡𝑑 = 45 ms; values smaller than this
number showed that some packets were always dropped, while values exceeding
this number showed no packets dropped. The delay value for test case 5 was
found to be 𝑡𝑑 = 100 ms.
In this investigation, both threads and virtual machines were used to represent
the number of attacking bots. As discussed above, each bot sent stealthy traffic
to a target server. The traffic was designed to consume 50% server CPU for
duration of 38.5 ms; and consumed no more than 2 MB server memory. The
study varied the number of virtual-machine clients and the number of threads
per bot to represent a DDoS attack, each thread sending 100 packets sequentially
(test cases 4 and 5). The results are shown in Table 5.3 and 5.4.
It can be seen that a higher number of packets were dropped when the num-
ber of attacking bots were increased. This was to confirm that the computing
resources of the victim were consumed using the stealthy traffic generated; and
subsequently, the victim was compromised.
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Table 5.3: DDoS using test case 4
Num bots Num threads/bot Captured Dropped Flood duration (sec)
1 1 144775 298 30.11
2 1 293879 8199 29.90
3 1 353986 22786 29.59
4 1 345743 83780 29.41
1 2 231041 2575 29.52
2 2 330567 16305 29.35
3 2 362003 76313 29.77
4 2 344580 80256 29.69
Table 5.4: DDoS using test case 5
Num bots Num threads/bot Captured Dropped Flood duration (sec)
1 1 263522 391 29.73
2 1 410097 1379 30.27
3 1 513076 3984 30.14
4 1 532612 6560 30.33
1 2 266191 132 30.21
2 2 384540 1460 29.96
3 2 531913 4625 30.27
4 2 530751 7257 30.44
To witness the significance of the observed packets dropped, the study man-
ually sent an HTTP/2 Request every second and measured the time it took for
the server to respond to a hello.htm page, and subsequently closed the conver-
sation. When 4 virtual-machine clients (bots) with 2 threads/bot were employed,
up to 40 ms of delay for test case 4 was observed, and up to 97 ms delay for
test case 5. This delay was higher than a 0.3 ms delay that was observed when
the attack traffic was not present. As real web applications serve more than just
displaying a hello.htm message, the stealthy offending traffic proposed in this
section can translate to a recipe that fully incapacitates an HTTP/2 service upon
introduction of variant client behaviour types, based on diverse web page access
patterns.
Comparison to flash-crowd traffic
In this part of the study, one of the above attack traffic patterns was analysed
using several machine learning techniques. Specifically, the study utilized the
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Figure 5-9: Process for normal and attack traffic classification
attack traffic shown in the last row of Table 5.4, i.e. using test case 5 with 4 bots
and 2 threads/bot. The purpose was to understand how the attack traffic can be
distinguished from flash-crowd traffic.
Figure 5-9 describes the process for classifying attack and flash-crowd traffic.
A set of features from both the attack and flash-crowd traffic was extracted (as
explain in Section 3.1.3). The feature extraction yielded a dataset with 124
attack traffic instances. The dataset was merged with the flash-crowd dataset
which consisted of 3600 instances (explained in Section 4.4.2), yielding a dataset
with a total of 3724 instances. The features from the dataset were ranked using
two features selection techniques, Information Gain and Gain Ratio (as explained
in Section 3.1.4). The study applied four machine learning techniques, i.e. Naïve
Bayes and Decision Tree J48, JRip and Support Vector Machines, to classify
the attack traffic when subjected to the flash-crowd traffic that was described
in Section 4.4.2. The parameter values of these machine learning techniques are
given in Appendix A. The result of the feature ranking is shown in Table 5.5 and
the result of the machine learning classification is shown in Figure 5-10 to 5-13.
The incorrectly classified instances graphs (the (a) graphs of Figure 5-10 to 5-
13) showed that the attack traffic could be distinguished from flash-crowd traffic
using these machine learning techniques. Naïve Bayes and Decision Tree perfectly
classified the two classes when at least 4 most relevant features were employed
(Figure 5-10.a and 5-11.a). Although Naïve Bayes produced 0.027% incorrectly
classified instances when 2 features were used, it yielded a perfect classification
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Table 5.5: Ranked features for the distributed attack traffic
rank
Information Gain Gain Ratio
feature # feature name feature # feature name
1 1 count_app 1 count_app
2 9 size_ack 8 count_ack
3 7 size_syn 9 size_ack
4 6 count_syn 7 size_syn
5 29 size_tlsHello 29 size_tlsHello
6 28 count_tlsHello 6 count_syn
7 2 size_app 28 count_tlsHello
8 8 count_ack 2 size_app
9 18 count_rstAck 39 size_encAlert
10 19 size_rstAck 38 count_encAlert
11 38 count_encAlert 13 count_rst
12 39 size_encAlert 14 size_rst
13 34 size_tlsKey 19 size_rstAck
14 14 size_rst 18 count_rstAck
15 13 count_rst 23 count_finAck
16 23 count_finAck 24 size_finAck
17 24 size_finAck 10 lapse_ack_min
18 33 count_tlsKey 32 lapse_tlsHello_max
19 22 lapse_rstAck_max 31 lapse_tlsHello_ave
20 21 lapse_rstAck_ave 30 lapse_tlsHello_min
21 12 lapse_ack_max 35 lapse_tlsKey_min
22 11 lapse_ack_ave 36 lapse_tlsKey_ave
23 27 lapse_finAck_max 37 lapse_tlsKey_max
24 26 lapse_finAck_ave 4 lapse_app_ave
25 4 lapse_app_ave 3 lapse_app_min
26 37 lapse_tlsKey_max 11 lapse_ack_ave
27 36 lapse_tlsKey_ave 33 count_tlsKey
28 17 lapse_rst_max 34 size_tlsKey
29 5 lapse_app_max 12 lapse_ack_max
30 42 lapse_encAlert_max 5 lapse_app_max
31 10 lapse_ack_min 22 lapse_rstAck_max
32 31 lapse_tlsHello_ave 21 lapse_rstAck_ave
33 32 lapse_tlsHello_max 27 lapse_finAck_max
34 16 lapse_rst_ave 26 lapse_finAck_ave
35 35 lapse_tlsKey_min 42 lapse_encAlert_max
36 30 lapse_tlsHello_min 17 lapse_rst_max
37 3 lapse_app_min 16 lapse_rst_ave
38 40 lapse_encAlert_min 40 lapse_encAlert_min
39 15 lapse_rst_min 15 lapse_rst_min
40 20 lapse_rstAck_min 41 lapse_encAlert_ave
41 41 lapse_encAlert_ave 20 lapse_rstAck_min
42 25 lapse_finAck_min 25 lapse_finAck_min
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(a) Incorrectly classified instances (%)
(b) Detection Rate
(c) False Alarm Rate
Figure 5-10: Distributed Attack Performance with Naive Bayes classification
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(a) Incorrectly classified instances (%)
(b) Detection Rate
(c) False Alarm Rate
Figure 5-11: Distributed Attack Performance with Decision Tree classification
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(a) Incorrectly classified instances (%)
(b) Detection Rate
(c) False Alarm Rate
Figure 5-12: Distributed Attack Performance with JRip classification
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(a) Incorrectly classified instances (%)
(b) Detection Rate
(c) False Alarm Rate
Figure 5-13: Distributed Attack Performance with Support Vector Machine clas-
sification
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when only 1 feature was used, which is the count_app feature. This showed that
Naïve Bayes was able to classify the DDoS traffic from flash-crowd through ex-
amining the amount of Application Data. While Decision Tree produced 0.027%
incorrectly classified instances when using 2 Information Gain-ranked features
or 3 Gain Ratio-ranked features, it yielded 0.054% incorrectly classified instances
when only 1 feature was used, the i.e. the count_app. Both Naïve Bayes and De-
cision Tree yielded 0% incorrectly classified instances when more than 4 features
were employed, regardless of the ranking technique used.
The attack traffic was not perfectly identified when JRip was used, as it
returned some incorrectly classified instances regardless of the number of features
selected (Figure 5-12.a). JRip yielded 0.027% incorrectly classified instances at
best, while yielded higher incorrectly classified instances (0.107%) when using
some feature sets, i.e. 38 Information Gain-ranked features; and 14, 22, and
38 Gain Ratio-ranked features. With JRip, no feature sets yielded a perfect
classification.
When analysed using Support Vector Machines, the attack traffic could be
perfectly identified when 3 to 5 Information Gain-ranked features were used, or
when 4 to 7 Gain Ratio-ranked features were employed (Figure 5-13.a). Support
Vector Machine yielded 0.027% incorrectly classified instances when feature sets
outside the above range were used. That is, higher than 5 and lower than 3
Information Gain-ranked features; and higher than 7 and lower than 4 Gain
Ratio-ranked features.
The Detection Rate (the (b) graphs of Figure 5-10 to 5-13) and the False
Alarm Rate (the (c) graphs of Figure 5-10 to 5-13) of the machine learning classi-
fication results also supported the above analysis. All machine learning techniques
were able to reach a perfect Detection Rate of 1 and a clean False Alarm Rate of
0, mostly when the number of features selected was higher than 3. An exception
was shown with JRip analysis which did not reach a zero False Alarm Rate when
analysed with all series of ranked features.
The detailed numbers for the Detection Rate are as follows. Naïve Bayes
(Figure 5-10.b) and Support Vector Machine (Figure 5-13.b) yielded Detection
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Rate of 1 in all number of features selected . Decision Tree showed similar results,
but the Detection Rate (Figure 5-11.b) degraded to 0.999 when 2 Information
Gain-ranked features were used, and when 1 Gain Ratio-ranked feature was used.
JRip yielded Detection Rate of mostly 1 (Figure 5-12.b). It degraded to 0.999
when 38 Information Gain-ranked features were used; or when 14, 22, or 38 Gain
Ratio-ranked features were used.
The detailed numbers for the False Alarm Rate are as follows. Naïve Bayes
(Figure 5-11.c) yielded False Alarm Rate of 0 in all number of features selected.
Decision Tree (Figure 5-11.c) showed similar result, but it degraded to 0.008
when 2 - 3 features were selected with Gain Ratio. JRip only reached 0.008 False
Alarm Rate when using almost all number of features selected. It degraded to
0.031 when 38 Information Gain-ranked features were used; or when 14, 22, or
38 Gain Ratio-ranked features were used. Support Vector Machine (Figure 5-
13.c) was able to reach 0 False Alarm Rate; it degraded to 0.008 when 3 to 5
Information Gain-ranked features were used, or when 4 to 7 Gain Ratio-ranked
features were employed.
The analysis in this section showed that machine learning techniques were able
to detect the DDoS model simulated. Naïve Bayes, Decision Tree, and Support
Vector Machines were able to distinguish DDoS from normal traffic when using
more than 4 features out of the 42 features proposed in this study.
5.2.3 Conclusion
This section presented a DDoS attack model where each attacking bot sent a large
volume of HTTP/2 traffic to a victim machine in a fixed time frame. From the
results obtained, it was noted that the protocol itself did not restrict the intensity
of traffic generated, and therefore, auxiliary mechanisms ought to be deployed for
identifying the volumes and patterns of network traffic communicated between a
client and server machine.
Three varying investigations were conducted to analyse the behaviour of a vic-
tim machine when subject to large HTTP/2 traffic volume through an established
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connection stream. The first investigation found that a flood of window_update
packets sent by an attacking client caused a target server to show 50% CPU
consumption when the window-size-increment value was set to 16,384. The sec-
ond investigation showed that the effective number of window_update packets
that the client sent was 131,068; a higher number than this did not yield longer
flood duration. The third investigation demonstrated that 4 attacking bots were
able to cause a target server to show 100% CPU consumption. The traffic flood
that each of these bots sent caused the target server to consume only 50% CPU
consumption. Therefore, the proposed DDoS attack model could bypass a hypo-
thetical intrusion-detection system that monitored its resource consumption such
as CPU consumed.
However, the attack traffic could be distinguished from flash-crowd traffic
using various machine learning techniques. Naïve Bayes, Decision Tree, and Sup-
port Vector Machines were able to distinguish DDoS from normal traffic when
more than 4 out of 42 features proposed in this study were employed. Machine
learning techniques performed well when they were used to detect the proposed
HTTP/2 DDoS attack traffic.
The next chapter aims to present a stealthier attack model than the DDoS
model presented here. It was observed that a stealthier model could be achieved
through a better understanding of flash-crowd traffic characteristics and mimick-
ing the feature values.
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Chapter 6
Stealthy Attack Modelling and
Analysis
The study carried out and reported in Chapter 4 presented the characteristics of
legitimate, HTTP/2 flash-crowd traffic and introduced an HTTP/2 attack traffic
model (Chapter 5). The attack traffic based on the presented model was able to
bypass hypothetical intrusion-detection systems that monitored CPU consump-
tion caused by process execution remote clients to service and also successfully
incapacitate a target machine when a number of attacking clients collectively
launched a DDoS attack. The attack traffic characteristics presented previously
could be distinguished from flash-crowd traffic through machine learning-based
analysis. This chapter extends the attack model introduced in the previous chap-
ter to demonstrate how HTTP/2 attack traffic which is stealthy in nature can
degrade the performance of machine learning analysis. It aims to show how
HTTP/2 attack traffic could cause machine learning techniques to incorrectly
classify traffic instances, leading to degraded Detection Rate and False Alarm
Rate.
The chapter introduces two models, namely, Stealthy Attack 1 and Stealthy
Attack 2 and shows how the generated traffic could be distinguished from flash-
crowd traffic based on machine learning. The analysis applied four machine learn-
ing techniques, i.e. Naïve Bayes, Decision Tree, JRip, and Support Vector Ma-
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chines. In addition, the Self Organizing Map was applied to visualize the clusters
of similar traffic groups. Furthermore this chapter compared the HTTP/2 attack
traffic characteristics when the analysis was built upon features traditionally em-
ployed in the literature for HTTP/1.1 DoS attack analysis.
6.1 Stealthy Attack 1
Stealthy traffic causes machine learning analysis to yield more incorrectly classi-
fied instances. This section introduces a variant of the attack model presented
in Chapter 5 to generate stealthy attack traffic, as opposed to flash-crowd traffic.
The study aimed to model attacks whose traffic continually consumed the vic-
tim’s computing resource, yet caused machine learning techniques to incorrectly
classify some traffic instances. It contrasted the traffic characteristics produced
from the investigation in this section to that of the DDoS traffic produced and
reported in Section 5.2.
In addition, the study tried to find the least possible number of attacking
clients to successfully incapacitate a victim machine. In this chapter, attacking
clients are named as ’bots’. There were two motivations for this study. First, it
would aid in quantifying malicious flood traffic launched from one generic com-
puter (e.g. from an attacker’s place of residence) towards a victim. Second, it
quantifies the number of remote computers that would be required to be compro-
mised to run bots, when an attacker intends to launch a DDoS attack against a
victim.
6.1.1 Attack Model and Scenarios
The study proposed to camouflage attack traffic with features of normal traffic.
The stealthy attack model presented herewith comprises two groups of bots to
camouflage attacks. One group attempts to exactly mimic the flash-crowd traffic
features, and another does the generation the offending traffic derived from the
current understanding (Chapter 5) (Adi, Baig, Lam, & Hingston, 2015; Adi, Baig,
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Hingston, & Lam, 2016), i.e.: a flood of 131,068 window_update packets with
window-size-increment payload set to 16,384 sent by an attacking bot for 38.5 ms
caused a target server to consume 50% CPU consumption; and 4 attacking bots,
where each bot sent such a flood caused a target server to consume 100% CPU
resources. The mimicking bots are labelled as the mime group, and the attacking
ones are labelled as the offending group.
The proposed implementation was to have the number of TCP connections of
the attack traffic mimic that of the flash-crowd traffic closely. The feature that
represented this characteristic was the count_syn feature, which is defined as
the volume of SYN packets observed in a one-second traffic instance. Hence, the
mime group attempted to mimic the number of SYN packets/sec of flash-crowd
traffic generated by the bots targeting a victim, while the offending group gen-
erated attack traffic towards the victim. The attack traffic aimed to continually
consume 100% CPU usage of the victim. The study controlled the amount of
traffic generated by each group, until instances of 100% CPU consumption were
observed at the victim machine.
To control the amount of traffic, two independent variables were added to the
packet generator that constructed both the mime and offending bot anatomy.
First, instead of indefinitely transmitting a flood of window_update packets as
attempted in the previous sections, the bot sent intermittent floods. A flood was
defined as 131,068 (or 131K) window_update packets in 38.5 ms. Here, stealthy
factor is defined as the outcome of rolling an 𝑥-sided dice, where a random integer
was generated between 1 and 𝑥. A flood from a bot towards a target server was
launched when 𝑥 equalled to 1. When 𝑥 ̸= 1, the bot sent only 1 HTTP/2 Request
and then disconnected the TCP connection. Higher stealthy factor numbers imply
smaller chances to have an outcome value of 1 out of a given stealthy factor 𝑥;
hence, the higher the stealthy factor the less frequently for launching a flood.
This mechanism created intermittent floods from the bots towards the victim
rather than continuous attack traffic.
Second, a delay variable was introduced. Instead of pausing for 100 ms be-
tween streams as previously proposed (Section 5.2.2), the bots disconnected the
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TCP connection and reconnected after a given delay. This variable controlled
the flow of SYN packets/sec from each bot towards the victim. As illustrated on
page 19, a SYN packet initiates a client-server TCP connection. Hence, the bots
created SYN packets with a fixed delay between connections. The investigation in
this section searched for a delay value between connections initiated by the mime
group and the offending group. Larger delay values aided the mime group to
mimic the number of SYN packets/second of flash-crowd traffic. However, larger
delay values caused the offending group to send less attack traffic flow, causing
the CPU consumption of the victim to slide from 100%.
In bot-induced DDoS attacks, the higher the number of bots, the closer the
traffic pattern that they generated is to flash-crowd traffic (S. Yu, Guo, & Stoj-
menovic, 2012). This is reasonable, since both flash-crowd as well as attack traffic
floods are generated from Internet-connected machines. In this study, a minimum
number of bots were observed when the traffic that the bots generated caused a
target machine to continually show 100% CPU consumption. An attacking bot
anatomy is modelled as being built upon five parameters:
∙ number of threads : the number of simultaneous processes runs on a bot
machine, where each process can independently initiate a TCP connection
with a remote machine, i.e. a target server.
∙ number of streams : the number of stream IDs in one TCP connection, where
each stream ID generates a traffic flood towards a target machine.
∙ number of window_update: the number of window_update packets in each
stream.
∙ stealthy factor : the frequency at which a TCP connection is used to send a
flood of packets against a target machine, equals to 1/𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 .
∙ delay : a time delay between successive TCP connections.
This section proposed one implementation of a stealthy attack model which
is shown in Table 6.1. The table shows that the proposed stealthy attack traffic
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Table 6.1: Stealthy Attack-1 model
Bot 1 Bot 2
Number of threads 1 1
Number of streams 1 1
Number of window_update 131K 131K
Stealthy factor 50 500
Delay between connections 11 ms 11 ms
could be generated by simply two bots, with one bot representing the mime group
and the other the offending group. One virtual machine was used to run each bot.
Bot 1 acts as the offending group that sends 131K window_update packets as
attack traffic towards the victim, the value of which was obtained from Section
5.2.2 (page 138). The attack traffic is sent periodically with a stealthy factor
equals to 50. This means the attack traffic is sent when a random variable 𝑥 yields
1 of 50 chances, otherwise the bot sent 1 HTTP/2 Request and disconnected its
TCP connection with the victim. Bot 2 sends less frequent attack traffic, as
it is assigned a stealthy factor 500. This number is ten times higher than Bot
1, to maintain the desired number of TCP connections in its attempt to mimic
flash-crowd traffic.
The traffic these bots generated was extracted using the feature extraction
method described in Section 3.1.3, yielding an attack traffic dataset with 549
instances. The attack traffic dataset was merged with the flash-crowd dataset
which consisting of 3600 instances (explained in Section 4.4.2), yielding a dataset
with 4149 instances. The features from the dataset were ranked using Information
Gain and Gain Ratio techniques, upon which the dataset comprising flash-crowd
and attack traffic features was classified using four machine learning techniques,
i.e. Naïve Bayes, Decision Tree, JRip, and Support Vector Machines. The ma-
chine learning classifications were executed on an Intel Core-i3 machine with a 2
GB RAM. Three machine learning techniques, i.e. Naïve Bayes, Decision Tree,
and JRip, took less than 1 minute to yield classification results. Support Vector
Machines took more than 2 minutes to yield classification results. The param-
eter values of these machine learning techniques are given in Appendix A. The
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Figure 6-1: Visualization of count_syn feature values. Left: DDoS attack. Right:
Stealthy Attack-1.
following subsection presents the results of this investigation.
6.1.2 Results and Analysis
This section compares the results from observing the TCP connection flow for
DDoS and Stealthy Attack-1 traffic. It shows the feature ranking results as well
as the results of machine learning classification of Stealthy Attack-1 traffic.
Comparison of the number of TCP connections
The proposed implementation method of camouflaging attack traffic was in-
tended to mimic the number of TCP connections from flash-crowd traffic. The
number of TCP connections in the dataset comprising flash-crowd and attack
traffic was represented by the count_syn feature. Figure 6-1 presents how
the count_syn feature values of DDoS and Stealthy Attack-1 compare to the
count_syn feature values of flash-crowd. The figure was obtained from Weka.
The X-axis shows the number of SYN packets/sec, and the Y-axis shows the
number of instances, or the tally for the X values. The left figure illustrates the
count_syn features of the DDoS attack, particularly from the last row of Table
5.4, i.e. using test case 5 with 4 bots and 2 threads/bot. The right figure illus-
trates the count_syn values for the Stealthy Attack-1 as proposed in this section.
There are similarities as well as contrasting differences between the two figures.
In both left and right figures, the black graph shows the distribution of the
flash-crowd count_syn feature values, and the grey one shows that of attack traf-
fic. Hence, it could be seen that in both figures, the flash-crowd traffic produces
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Figure 6-2: A threshold line can split DDoS and flash-crowd traffic
higher flow of SYN packets/sec than the DDoS attack traffic, as the values of both
black graphs are shown on the right hand side of their respective grey graphs.
However, the difference is that the DDoS traffic (the left figure) can be visually
classified, since the attack traffic (grey) is shown on the far left of the flash-crowd
traffic (black). It is unambiguous to choose a threshold value such as a vertical
dotted-line to split the two colours as illustrated in Figure 6-2. In contrast, the
Stealthy Attack-1 traffic (Figure 6-1 right) camouflaged the attack traffic as the
values can be seen to overlap with those of the flash-crowd traffic.
Hence, the two proposed bots in this section (Table 6.1) were able to cam-
ouflage the number of SYN packets/sec and operate as flash crowd, remaining
undetected. This traffic was stealthier than the DDoS traffic of Section 5.2.
Feature ranking and performance analysis
Table 6.2 lists the results of ranking the traffic features when subjected to
Stealthy Attack-1 and the flash-crowd dataset. The more relevant features are
ranked closer to the top of the list. The order of the rank number is used to
select the features when the processed traffic is analysed using machine learning
techniques. For example, when the number of features selected is set to 1, then
the techniques used the top-ranked feature to split the two classes. When the
number of features selected is 𝑛, a set of features ranked {1 . . . 𝑛} is employed.
This is repeated until the total number of 42 features (as shown in Table 3.6
on page 85) was selected. Figure 6-3 to 6-6 present the performance analysis
when the different sets of features are employed by each of the machine learning
techniques.
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Table 6.2: Ranked features for Stealthy Attack-1traffic
rank
Information Gain Gain Ratio
feature # feature name feature # feature name
1 19 size_rstAck 19 size_rstAck
2 18 count_rstAck 18 count_rstAck
3 1 count_app 2 size_app
4 34 size_tlsKey 34 size_tlsKey
5 29 size_tlsHello 1 count_app
6 33 count_tlsKey 33 count_tlsKey
7 2 size_app 6 count_syn
8 6 count_syn 7 size_syn
9 7 size_syn 28 count_tlsHello
10 28 count_tlsHello 39 size_encAlert
11 38 count_encAlert 38 count_encAlert
12 39 size_encAlert 24 size_finAck
13 24 size_finAck 23 count_finAck
14 23 count_finAck 27 lapse_finAck_max
15 8 count_ack 22 lapse_rstAck_max
16 14 size_rst 26 lapse_finAck_ave
17 13 count_rst 21 lapse_rstAck_ave
18 9 size_ack 29 size_tlsHello
19 27 lapse_finAck_max 17 lapse_rst_max
20 22 lapse_rstAck_max 16 lapse_rst_ave
21 26 lapse_finAck_ave 14 size_rst
22 21 lapse_rstAck_ave 13 count_rst
23 17 lapse_rst_max 42 lapse_encAlert_max
24 16 lapse_rst_ave 8 count_ack
25 42 lapse_encAlert_max 41 lapse_encAlert_ave
26 41 lapse_encAlert_ave 9 size_ack
27 20 lapse_rstAck_min 20 lapse_rstAck_min
28 25 lapse_finAck_min 25 lapse_finAck_min
29 5 lapse_app_max 5 lapse_app_max
30 15 lapse_rst_min 15 lapse_rst_min
31 12 lapse_ack_max 12 lapse_ack_max
32 4 lapse_app_ave 4 lapse_app_ave
33 37 lapse_tlsKey_max 37 lapse_tlsKey_max
34 11 lapse_ack_ave 11 lapse_ack_ave
35 32 lapse_tlsHello_max 32 lapse_tlsHello_max
36 3 lapse_app_min 36 lapse_tlsKey_ave
37 40 lapse_encAlert_min 3 lapse_app_min
38 35 lapse_tlsKey_min 40 lapse_encAlert_min
39 36 lapse_tlsKey_ave 31 lapse_tlsHello_ave
40 30 lapse_tlsHello_min 35 lapse_tlsKey_min
41 31 lapse_tlsHello_ave 30 lapse_tlsHello_min
42 10 lapse_ack_min 10 lapse_ack_min
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The (a) graphs from Figure 6-3 to 6-6 reveal the incorrectly classified instances
when Stealthy Attack-1 were analysed against flash-crowd traffic. These graphs
show more sets of selected features that yield incorrectly classified instances,
than the DDoS graphs previously presented (the (a) graphs from Figure 5-10 to
5-13). In other words, the graphs show more 𝑥 values that yield above-zero 𝑦
values, signifying that the Stealthy Attack-1 traffic is stealthier than the DDoS
traffic. It could be seen that Naïve Bayes (Figure 6-3.a) did not classify the
traffic unimpaired, as the incorrectly classified instances were above 0. Similarly,
Decision Tree (Figure 6-4.a) could distinguish the two traffic types only in special
cases when certain sets of features were selected using Gain Ratio. Contrary to
the DDoS traffic, the Stealthy Attack-1 traffic led to more incorrectly classified
instances when analysed using the two machine learning techniques, i.e. Naïve
Bayes and Decision Tree. This can be seen where the number of features selected
are 5 or more, Stealthy Attack-1 analysis with Naïve Bayes (Figure 6-3.a) and
Decision Tree (Figure 6-4.a) show more incorrectly classified instances than DDoS
analysis with Naïve Bayes (Figure 5-10.a) and Decision Tree (Figure 5-11.a).
In contrast, JRip (Figure 6-5.a) showed that some 𝑦 values reached 0, given
certain 𝑥 values, suggesting that Stealthy Attack-1 can be classified using JRip.
Contrary to DDoS analysis with JRip (Figure 5-12.a) where all feature sets
yielded incorrectly classified instances, the Stealthy Attack-1 analysis with JRip
can have 0 incorrectly classified instances when certain sets of features were se-
lected. That is, Information Gain-ranked features yielded 0 incorrectly classified
instances when 10, 12, 15, and 17 features were selected. Gain Ratio-ranked fea-
tures yielded 0 incorrectly classified instances when 5, 7 to 13, and 17 features
were selected. It can be seen that it was difficult to predefine a set of features
to yield 0 incorrectly classified instances, as the simulations did not show a reg-
ular pattern. Hence, while JRip was able to distinguish Stealthy Attack-1 from
flash-crowd traffic, it had a drawback that a minimum set of features to yield 0
incorrectly classified instances was difficult to define.
Support Vector Machines (Figure 6-6.a) performed best as they showed 0
incorrectly classified instances when the number of features selected were 5 or
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above. Hence, a hypothetical intrusion-detection system that employed Support
Vector Machine could adopt a set of features with at least 5 most relevant features
selected, to detect attack traffic. On the other hand it showed 17.5% incorrectly
classified instances when 3 most relevant Information Gain-ranked features were
employed, or 11.6% when Gain Ratio-ranked features were employed. These num-
bers were the highest (worst) compared to the performance of other techniques
(Naïve Bayes, Decision Tree, JRip). Hence, the hypothetical intrusion-detection-
system could yield the worst percentage of incorrectly classified instances among
the other techniques tested, when predefined to employ an incomplete set of fea-
tures (such as a set of 3 features as demonstrated here).
When True Positives were examined, all four machine learning techniques
tested were able to produce a high rate of instances correctly classified as a given
class. As shown in graphs (b) from Figure 6-3 to 6-6, Support Vector Machine
yielded the highest Detection Rate with the least number of features, followed by
Decision Tree and Naïve Bayes. It was difficult to define a threshold value for JRip
to choose the number of features selected that resulted in a perfect Detection Rate,
as the graph showed that the performance degraded when a certain feature set
was selected. In particular, figure 6-5.b shows that JRip yielded Detection Rate
of less than 1 when 1-4, 6-7, 19, 25-26, 30, 40 and 42 Information Gain-ranked
features were selected; or when 1-4, 19, 25-26, 30, 40, and 42 Gain Ratio-ranked
features were selected.
However, the high Detection Rate obtained using the four machine learning
techniques tested were not without an associated cost. As shown in graphs (c) of
Figure 6-3 to 6-6, Support Vector Machine yielded 18.4% normal traffic instances
falsely classified as attacks when 3 features were employed. Other techniques
tested showed between 0.4% to 0.5% incorrectly classified normal traffic.
This study described the characteristics of stealthy attack traffic that made
it indistinguishable when compared to flash-crowd traffic. Feature selection pro-
cedures were applied to rank the most relevant features using two techniques,
Information Gain and Gain Ratio. The machine learning analysis showed the
percentage of incorrectly classified instances, Detection Rate and False Alarm
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(a) Incorrectly classified instances (%)
(b) Detection Rate
(c) False Alarm Rate
Figure 6-3: Stealthy Attack-1 Performance with Naive Bayes classification
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(a) Incorrectly classified instances (%)
(b) Detection Rate
(c) False Alarm Rate
Figure 6-4: Stealthy Attack-1 Performance with Decision Tree classification
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(a) Incorrectly classified instances (%)
(b) Detection Rate
(c) False Alarm Rate
Figure 6-5: Stealthy Attack-1 Performance with JRip classification
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(a) Incorrectly classified instances (%)
(b) Detection Rate
(c) False Alarm Rate
Figure 6-6: Stealthy Attack-1 Performance with Support Vector Machine classi-
fication
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Rate when classifying the attack and flash-crowd traffic.
6.1.3 Conclusion
This section presented an attacking-bot model that impaired the performance of
two machine learning techniques when classifying the bots-generated and flash-
crowd traffic. The investigation showed that the attack model could rely on as few
as 2 bots (Table 6.1) and remain undetected. Using the features proposed for this
study (Table 3.6), the four machine learning techniques (Naïve Bayes, Decision
Tree, JRip, Support Vector Machines) were able to yield accurate Detection Rates
and low False Alarm Rates. However, Stealthy Attack-1 analysis with these four
machine learning techniques showed more sets of selected features that yielded
incorrectly classified instances (the (a) graphs from Figure 6-3 to 6-6), than the
DDoS analysis (the (a) graphs from Figure 5-10 to 5-13). This demonstrates
that the traffic generated through the proposed attack model in this section was
stealthier than the Distributed Attack traffic presented earlier (Section 5.2).
The implementation method in this section attempted to mimic the flash-
crowd traffic features. Particularly the method attempted to mimic the
count_syn feature values, which is an HTTP/2 feature for the number of SYN
packets sent from an attacking client towards a target machine. The next section
examines how the attack model could resemble other flash-crowd traffic features,
and therefore operate in even more stealthier manner.
6.2 Stealthy Attack 2
Previously it was demonstrated that HTTP/2 DDoS attack traffic could be gen-
erated to cause a CPU depletion of an HTTP/2 server without triggering an
alarm at a hypothetical intrusion-detection system that monitored per connec-
tion CPU and memory consumption (Section 5.2). However, the traffic model
it produced could be accurately classified when compared to flash-crowd traffic:
a set of 4 features or more yielded 0 incorrectly classified instances when Naïve
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Bayes, Decision Tree, or Support Vector Machines were employed. Therefore,
Stealthy Attack-1 was proposed as a model to produce stealthier traffic less eas-
ily detectable by the detection system. It was shown that four machine learning
techniques incorrectly classified the attack traffic that the model produced as
flash-crowd traffic (Section 6.1).
Stealthy Attack-1 traffic was crafted to delude machine learning-based detec-
tion by camouflaging one of the traffic features (count_syn), which is representa-
tive of TCP connection flow between a device pair. This was done through having
a group of bots (it was found that 1 bot would suffice) to send traffic, mimicked
by count_syn feature values to represent flash-crowd traffic. The proposed attack
model in the previous section led to another investigation if the same camouflage
strategy could be adopted to produce stealthier HTTP/2 attack traffic. Hence,
the aim of this section is to examine how two groups of bots could launch stealth-
ier attack traffic than the previously defined Stealthy Attack-1 model. The study
reported in this section is therefore named Stealthy Attack-2.
The following subsection details the proposed method to model and generate
Stealthy Attack-2 traffic. It then analyses the traffic it generated using the same
four machine learning techniques, and presents a comparison of the results.
6.2.1 Attack Model and Scenario
Similar to the strategy adopted to model Stealthy Attack-1 as presented in Section
6.1, this study proposes to camouflage attack traffic to mimic flash-crowd traffic.
The difference is that this study aimed to have attack traffic mimics another
feature value of flash-crowd traffic, i.e. size_rstAck. Hence, it was aimed that
Stealthy Attack-2 traffic is stealthier than Stealthy Attack-1 traffic, indicated
through yielding more incorrectly classified instances when analysed with machine
learning techniques.
Two groups of bots were defined as part of the proposed model. A mime
group aimed to mimic the flash-crowd traffic, and an offending group to generate
attack traffic. In this study, the mime group mimicked another feature values,
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Figure 6-7: Visualization of Stealthy Attack-1 size_rstAck feature values.
i.e. size_rstAck in addition to the count_syn feature values of flash-crowd traf-
fic. The minimum number of bots was observed when the traffic that the bots
generated caused a target machine to continually show 100% CPU consumption.
The intuition behind mimicking the size_rstAck feature values of the flash-
crowd traffic is that the Stealthy Attack-1 feature ranking results (Table 6.2)
pointed to size_rstAck as the most relevant features. This feature represents
the total size of TCP packets with RST and ACK flags set, or named RST-
ACK packets, observed in a 1-second traffic instance on the victim machine. For
connection termination, a TCP packet with the RST flag set, or named RST
packet, is sent by one bot machine to a remote machine. RST-ACK packets sent
by the bot are essentially RST packets with the ACK flag set, to also acknowledge
a previous packet received by the same machine. To further mimic the flash-crowd
traffic, the Stealthy Attack-2 study proposed to have the mime-bot group closely
mimic the values of the size_rstAck feature.
Figure 6-7 shows the size_rstAck feature values of both Stealthy Attack-1
and flash-crowd traffic dataset. The X-axis represents the feature values, and the
Y-axis represents the number of traffic instances that was representative of such
a feature value. The size_rstAck values of Stealthy Attack-1 traffic are shown
as the tall grey bar on the left side of the figure, while the values of flash-crowd
traffic is shown as the black normally-distributed graph on the right hand side of
the figure. The figure shows that the size_rstAck values of both traffic datasets
are different: Stealthy Attack-1 traffic shows lower size_rstAck values than those
of flash-crowd traffic.
The difference between the size_rstAck values produced by the two traffic
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patterns was due to varying implementations of the attack and the flash-crowd
traffic. The former was implemented using nghttp2 library, while the latter was
using curl. It is acceptable to have various implementations of a communication
standard, since standards also clearly indicate the implementation requirement
levels that ranged from "must" to "optional" for HTTP/2, according to RFC 2119
(Bradner, 1997). Consequently different HTTP/2 libraries, while maintaining the
requirements mandated by the HTTP/2 standard (Belshe et al., May 2015), are
not uniform in their implementations, and subsequently the traffic pattern they
produce varies.
An example of the variations is shown in Figure 6-8 and 6-9, detailing traffic
associated with one sample HTTP/2 Request traffic through implementation of
nghttp2 and curl libraries. The "Protocol" column specifies which data samples
relate to HTTP/2 packets1 and which ones to TCP packets. It could be seen
from these figures that the traffic pattern produced by the two implementations
differed. With nghttp2, the client was observed to terminate the connection
by sending a RST packet. On the other hand, the curl library terminated the
connection with a RST packet while at the same time acknowledging previously
received packets; hence, the client was observed to finish the connection with an
RST-ACK packet.
Understanding the cause of these differences, the study in this section therefore
uses curl to implement the mime-bot group, while maintaining the use of nghttp2
as the engine for the offending group. The Stealthy Attack-2 implementation is
presented in Table 6.3, comprising 4 bots. Bots 1 and 2 are the offending group,
launching a flood of attacking traffic periodically towards a target machine. A
flood was defined as 131K window_update packets sent in 38.5 ms. The stealthy
factor 5 meant that a flood was sent once every 5 seconds on average by chance.
Hence, there was 1/5× 1/5 = 1/25 chance during each second that the two bots
simultaneously launched a flood of traffic towards a victim. Bots 3 and 4 formed
1Encrypted messages cannot be inspected. However the content of the encrypted HTTP/2
traffic in this example could be revealed by the monitoring tool Wireshark, since the TLS Server
Key was supplied to its configuration for debug and research purposes in this study. Otherwise,
TLS/SSL encrypted traffic only showed "Application Data" to designate its data packets.
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Figure 6-8: A sample of HTTP/2 Request traffic produced using nghttp2 library
Figure 6-9: A sample of HTTP/2 Request traffic produced using curl library
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Table 6.3: Stealthy Attack-2 model
Bot 1 Bot 2 Bot 3 Bot 4
# threads 1 1 2 40
# streams 1 1 1 1
# window_update 131K 131K 0 0
stealthy factor 5 5 n.a. n.a.
delay 1 sec 1 sec 0.001 ms 5 sec
the mime group that attempted to mimic the flash-crowd traffic. Because these
two bots did not send any window_update traffic to the victim, any number
assigned to the stealthy factor did not serve any purpose for launching attack
packets. Hence, the table shows "n.a." for the stealthy factors. The number of
threads indicates the number of instances of the above scenario that were run by
each bot during a given time frame. These threads, although relatively small in
their number (2 for Bot 3, and 40 for Bot 4), were an attempt to mimic the 5200
users (Section 4.4.1) that comprised flash-crowd traffic.
Maintaining consistency with the performance measurement previously car-
ried out for Stealthy Attack-1, the traffic generated in this section was extracted
using the feature extraction method described in Section 3.1.3 (page 75), yield-
ing an attack traffic dataset with 254 instances. The dataset was merged with
the flash-crowd dataset which consisted of 3600 instances (explained in Section
4.4.2), yielding a dataset with 3854 instances. The features from the dataset were
ranked using Information Gain and Gain Ratio techniques, following which the
traffic was classified using four machine learning techniques, i.e. Naïve Bayes,
Decision Tree, JRip, and Support Vector Machines. The machine learning clas-
sifications were executed on an Intel Core-i3 machine with a 2 GB RAM. Three
machine learning techniques, i.e. Naïve Bayes, Decision Tree, and JRip, took
less than 1 minute to yield classification results. Support Vector Machines took
more than 2 minutes to yield classification results. The parameter values of these
machine learning techniques are given in Appendix A. The following subsection
presents the results of this investigation.
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Figure 6-10: Visualization of the size_rstAck feature values. Left: Stealthy
Attack-1. Right: Stealthy Attack-2.
6.2.2 Results and Analysis
Comparison of the RST-ACK flag packets size
It was aimed to have the size_rstAck feature values of the attack traffic re-
semble that of the flash-crowd traffic. Figure 6-10 shows the comparison of the
Stealthy Attack-1 size_rstAck values (the left figure), with the results obtained
through experiments reported in this section (the right figure).
In both figures, the black graph represents the flash-crowd size_rstAck values,
and the grey represents the attack traffic size_rstAck values. The left figure shows
that the Stealthy Attack-1 traffic (grey) could be clearly distinguished from the
flash-crowd traffic (black) by designating a threshold value, such as a vertical line
separating the two colours. In contrast, the right figure shows that the Stealthy
Attack-2 size_rstAck values amalgamated with that of the flash-crowd traffic,
causing ambiguity in differentiation of both traffic types.
The size_rstAck values extracted from the Stealthy Attack-2 traffic were gen-
erated by the mime group, i.e. bots 3 and 4 shown in Table 6.3. Hence, the right
side of Figure 6-10 demonstrates that the mime group camouflaged the attack
traffic with flash-crowd and caused encumbrance in the detection process.
Feature ranking and performance analysis
Table 6.4 shows the ranked values of features extracted from Stealthy Attack-
2 as well as flash-crowd traffic. The size_rstAck feature was no longer ranked as
the topmost. The table shows that it was listed as rank 6 when measured using
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Information Gain, and ordered 7 with Gain Ratio.
The performance analysis of machine learning techniques is shown in Figure
6-11 to 6-14. The results are for Naïve Bayes, Decision Tree, JRip, and Support
Vector Machines. The following discussion is to firstly discuss the incorrectly
classified instances, which are shown on the (a) part of the figures, followed by
Detection Rates (the b graphs) and False Alarm Rates (the c graphs).
Stealthy Attack-2 traffic yielded incorrectly classified instances when using
the first three classifiers, i.e. Naïve Bayes, Decision Tree and JRip, regardless of
the feature sets used. Only Support Vector Machine were able to distinguish the
traffic when at least 5 Information Gain-ranked features or 13 Gain Ratio-ranked
features were selected. Interestingly, the traffic led to Naïve Bayes yielding higher
percentage of incorrectly classified instances with greater number of features se-
lected. This result showed that Stealthy Attack-2 caused a degraded classification
when the graphs were compared to those of Stealthy Attack-1.
Other performance measurements made included Detection Rate and False
Alarm Rate. Three of the techniques, i.e. Naïve Bayes, JRip and Support Vector
Machines, reached a Detection Rate of 100% when certain feature sets were se-
lected, but no pattern was observed on the number of features required to achieve
the same. Decision Tree did not yield a 100% Detection Rate for any of the feature
sets analysed.
Decision Tree yielded a 0% False Alarm Rate. However other techniques did
not perform as well. Naïve Bayes and JRip always yielded high False Alarm
Rates with all feature sets. Support Vector Machine could reach 0% False Alarm
Rate when at least 13 features were selected.
Comparison with DDoS and Stealthy Attack-1 performance
This part of the study compares the performance measurement obtained in
this section with those from the previous sections. It considers the 3 attack traffic
models presented in this study, DDoS (Section 5.2.1), Stealthy Attack-1 (Section
6.1.1) and Stealthy Attack-2 traffic (Section 6.2.1). Here, the best performance
values of the incorrectly classified instances, Detection Rate, and False Positive
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Table 6.4: Ranked features for Stealthy Attack-2 traffic
rank
Information Gain Gain Ratio
feature # feature name feature # feature name
1 34 size_tlsKey 19 size_tlsKey
2 33 count_tlsKey 18 size_app
3 1 count_app 2 count_tlsKey
4 2 size_app 34 count_app
5 29 size_tlsHello 1 lapse_tlsHello_max
6 19 size_rstAck 33 count_rstAck
7 18 count_rstAck 6 size_rstAck
8 42 lapse_encAlert_max 7 lapse_tlsHello_ave
9 22 lapse_rstAck_max 28 lapse_encAlert_max
10 17 lapse_rst_max 39 lapse_rstAck_max
11 27 lapse_finAck_max 38 lapse_rst_max
12 7 size_syn 24 lapse_finAck_max
13 6 count_syn 23 size_tlsHello
14 28 count_tlsHello 27 count_encAlert
15 38 count_encAlert 22 size_encAlert
16 39 size_encAlert 26 size_syn
17 21 lapse_rstAck_ave 21 count_syn
18 13 count_rst 29 count_tlsHello
19 14 size_rst 17 lapse_rstAck_ave
20 8 count_ack 16 count_rst
21 9 size_ack 14 size_rst
22 24 size_finAck 13 count_ack
23 23 count_finAck 42 size_ack
24 26 lapse_finAck_ave 8 lapse_finAck_ave
25 41 lapse_encAlert_ave 41 size_finAck
26 16 lapse_rst_ave 9 count_finAck
27 20 lapse_rstAck_min 20 lapse_rst_ave
28 25 lapse_finAck_min 25 lapse_encAlert_ave
29 15 lapse_rst_min 5 lapse_rstAck_min
30 32 lapse_tlsHello_max 15 lapse_finAck_min
31 31 lapse_tlsHello_ave 12 lapse_rst_min
32 11 lapse_ack_ave 4 lapse_app_min
33 3 lapse_app_min 37 lapse_encAlert_min
34 40 lapse_encAlert_min 11 lapse_tlsKey_max
35 5 lapse_app_max 32 lapse_app_ave
36 4 lapse_app_ave 36 lapse_app_max
37 12 lapse_ack_max 3 lapse_ack_max
38 10 lapse_ack_min 40 lapse_tlsHello_min
39 30 lapse_tlsHello_min 31 lapse_tlsKey_ave
40 37 lapse_tlsKey_max 35 lapse_ack_ave
41 36 lapse_tlsKey_ave 30 lapse_ack_min
42 35 lapse_tlsKey_min 10 lapse_tlsKey_min
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(a) Incorrectly classified instances (%)
(b) Detection Rate
(c) False Alarm Rate
Figure 6-11: Stealthy Attack-2 Performance with Naive Bayes classification
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(a) Incorrectly classified instances (%)
(b) Detection Rate
(c) False Alarm Rate
Figure 6-12: Stealthy Attack-2 Performance with Decision Tree classification
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(a) Incorrectly classified instances (%)
(b) Detection Rate
(c) False Alarm Rate
Figure 6-13: Stealthy Attack-2 Performance with JRip classification
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(a) Incorrectly classified instances (%)
(b) Detection Rate
(c) False Alarm Rate
Figure 6-14: Stealthy Attack-2 Performance with Support Vector Machine clas-
sification
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Rate were compared. Three approaches were applied: through visual inspections,
through comparing the best (highest/lowest) performance values, and through
Self Organizing Map-based visualization. The first two approaches, the visual
inspections and comparing the best performance values, analysed Figure 5-10 to
5-13 for DDoS, Figure 6-3 to 6-6 for Stealthy Attack-1, and Figure 6-11 to 6-14
for Stealthy Attack-2 performance results.
First, visual inspections were applied to find a range of numbers of selected
features, to yield a low percentage of incorrectly classified instances. The reason-
ing behind this is that a hypothetical intrusion-detection system would choose
rules that can yield the lowest ’incorrectly classified instances’ value. Figure
6-15 was used to visually choose a number of selected features. The figure com-
bined the incorrectly classified instances (Y-axis) of the 3 attack traffic models
when Information Gain-ranked features were employed. For example, Figure 6-
15.a combines the graphs from Figure 5-10.a for DDoS, Figure 6-3.a for Stealthy
Attack-1, and Figure 6-11.a for Stealthy Attack-2 results. The X-axis represents
the number of features selected. Figure 6-15 helps visualize a range of X-axis
values that yield low Y-axis values
From visually inspecting Figure 6-15.a, a hypothetical intrusion-detection-
system that employed Naïve Bayes would choose 19 selected features or higher
to obtain low Y values. In this regard, Stealthy Attack-2 was found to be the
stealthiest due to its high Y values, followed by Stealthy Attack-1 and DDoS.
A visual inspection on Decision Tree (Figure 6-15.b) also shows that Stealthy
Attack-2 yielded the highest Y values, hence the stealthiest, when a hypothet-
ical intrusion-detection system employed 5 Information Gain-ranked features or
higher. The figure also shows that Stealthy Attack-1 was less stealthy, and DDoS
was the least stealthy.
JRip (Figure 6-15.c) graphs show that between 10 and 17 features can be
selected to yield low Y values. When these features are selected, Stealthy Attack-
2 was the stealthiest (as it showed the highest Y value), followed by DDoS and
Stealthy Attack-1.
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(a) Naïve Bayes (b) Decision Tree
(c) JRip (d) Support Vector Machine
Figure 6-15: Visual inspection to find a range of X-values that yield low incorrectly classified instances values.
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Support Vector Machine (Figure 6-15.d) show otherwise. When 5 or more
features were employed, DDoS was the stealthiest, as it yielded 0.024% incorrectly
classified instances (Figure 5-13). A hypothetical intrusion-detection system can
distinguish the other two attack traffic models, Stealthy Attack-1 and Stealthy
Attack-2, from flash-crowd when 5 or more features were employed.
From visual inspection, it was discussed that Naïve Bayes, Decision Tree, and
JRip show that Stealthy Attack-2 bears the stealthiest traffic among the 3 traffic
models analysed. Support Vector Machines yield otherwise, with DDoS being the
stealthiest.
The second investigation compared the boundary values of the performance
results. The boundary performance values were indicated by the best figure a
classifier measured regardless of the number of features selected, i.e. the farthest
Y value regardless of X. Hence, these were the lowest values of incorrectly clas-
sified instances, the highest values of Detection Rate, and the lowest values of
False Alarm Rate. The comparisons are presented in Figure 6-16 to 6-17.
The incorrectly classified instances (Figure 6-16) showed the higher bars as
stealthier traffic. Hence, Stealthy Attack-2 traffic was the stealthiest when mea-
sured with Naïve Bayes and Decision Tree (Figure 6-16). However, this result
was not uniform across other classifiers tested. JRip showed that DDoS traf-
fic was stealthier than Stealthy Attack-2, as DDoS showed a higher bar than
Stealthy Attack-2. Similarly, JRip showed that Stealthy Attack-2 was stealthier
than Stealthy Attack-1, as the former showed a higher bar than the latter. Sup-
port Vector Machines were able to yield 0% incorrectly classified instances when
classifying the 3 proposed attack traffic models. Hence, it can be concluded that
Support Vector Machines can be applied to identify all three attack traffic models
presented in this study.
The Detection Rate showed the lower bars. Figure 6-17 shows that Stealthy
Attack-2 was the stealthiest among other traffic types as it yielded a low Detection
Rate when Naïve Bayes and Decision Tree classifiers were employed. The other
two classifiers, JRip and Support Vector Machines, were able to yield a 100%
Detection Rate.
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Figure 6-16: Incorrectly classified instances for all 3 attack types
Figure 6-17: Detection Rate performance comparison for all 3 attack types
Figure 6-18: False Alarm Rate performance comparison for all 3 attack types
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The False Alarm Rate showed the higher bars as the stealthier traffic (Figure
6-18). Stealthy Attack-2 was the stealthiest when classified using Naïve Bayes.
However, it was second to DDoS traffic when measured through JRip. Other
classifiers, namely JRip and Support Vector Machine showed a False Alarm Rate
of 0% for all traffic types.
The third traffic comparison analysis was done using Self Organizing Maps, a
machine learning technique that visualize data in clusters. The parameter values
of the machine learning technique are given in Appendix A. For this analysis, four
datasets were generated in this study, i.e. flash-crowd, DDoS, Stealthy Attack-1
and Stealthy Attack-2, were merged, yielding a dataset with 4527 instances. The
Self Organizing Map analysis was run on an Intel Core-i3 machine with a 2 GB
RAM.
The results are shown in Figure 6-19. The X axis shows the classes from the
dataset generated in this study, which are separated by black vertical lines. Each
integer value of X corresponds to an instance in the dataset. The Y axis shows
how the technique assigns the instances from the dataset into one of four clusters.
If the technique produces perfect classification, the graph would show only one
cluster colour Y for each X traffic dataset, i.e.:
∙ Blue for Stealthy Attack-1,
∙ Red for flash-crowd traffic,
∙ Turquoise (greenish-blue) for DDoS, and
∙ Green for Stealthy Attack-2.
However, the graph assigned other colours to three of the four traffic datasets.
For example, Stealthy Attack-1 was not only blue, but also green and turquoise,
indicating how the Self Organizing Map technique incorrectly assigned the blue
traffic in a separate cluster. Similarly, Stealthy Attack-2 traffic was also mistak-
enly classified as other attack traffic. Stealthy Attack-2 cluster was assigned green,
but Self Organizing Map clustered the traffic as green, blue, and turquoise. On
the other hand, all DDoS traffic was distinguished simply as a turquoise cluster.
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Figure 6-19: Cluster visualization using Self Organizing Map
The flash-crowd traffic was labelled as a red cluster. Although Self Organizing
Map showed some flash-crowd instances labelled as DDoS, most flash-crowd in-
stances were categorised in the red cluster. This indicates that Self Organizing
Map was able to accurately distinguish flash-crowd traffic from attack traffic.
While the Self Organizing Map analysis was run on an Intel Core-i3 machine
with a 2 GB RAM, it took more than 10 minutes for Weka to analyse the dataset
with 4527 instances. In this regards, Self Organizing Maps were not suitable for
online environment, where real-time analysis is required to classify traffic.
To conclude, this section presented three approaches to compare the attack
traffic with flash crowd using several machine learning techniques. It could be seen
that Stealthy Attack-2 showed many signs that it was stealthier than Stealthy
Attack-1 and DDoS, particularly when the analysis applied Naïve Bayes and Deci-
sion Tree. Although JRip generated different results, it did not show a consistent
trend given a range of numbers of features selected. Hence, it was difficult to
predefine a set of features where JRip could yield the best performance.
Support Vector Machines can be used as a means to distinguish all of the pro-
posed HTTP/2 attack traffic from flash-crowd. However, it had some drawbacks.
First, certain sets of features selected returned adverse classification results. Sec-
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ond, it took a very long execution time (more than 2 minutes) to run the classifier
compared to the other ones tested, which took less than 1 second to obtain the
classification results. The Support Vector Machine analysis was run on an Intel
Core-i3 machine with a 2 GB RAM. The analysis time length showed that Support
Vector Machines were inappropriate to be used as a real-time intrusion-detection
system.
6.2.3 Conclusion
This section proposed a stealthier attack model through mimicking a different
traffic feature, i.e. the total size of RST-ACK packets observed in a second.
Using the same attack model as previously described, the study proposed two
groups of bots, where one offending group generated attack traffic and another
group mimicked the flash-crowd traffic. The mime group was built using the same
programming library (i.e. curl) as the one used to build the flash-crowd traffic.
The results showed that the Stealthy Attack-2 RST-ACK feature values (i.e. the
size_rstAck feature) overlapped with the same feature values of the flash-crowd
traffic, indicating how the former traffic mimicked the latter. Furthermore, the
Stealthy Attack-2 classification using three classifiers (Naïve Bayes, Decision Tree
and JRip) resulted in stealthier performance measurements than the Stealthy
Attack-1 and DDoS traffic models.
Support Vector Machine classifier was able to separate attack traffic from flash
crowd more accurately than other classifiers. However, it was not appropriate
to be used as a real-time intrusion-detection system, since it took more than 2
minutes to run the analysis on a dataset of 4527 instances. Similarly, although
Self Organizing Map was able to distinguish normal traffic from attack accurately,
it required more than 10 minutes to produce the results which would again be
unacceptable in online environment.
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6.3 Analysis and Discussion
The study has introduced HTTP/2 flash-crowd traffic (Chapter 4) and attack
traffic models (Chapter 5). The flash crowd traffic was generated by having 5200
simulated normal end users simultaneously visiting an HTTP/2 server (Sub-
section 4.4.2); and the attack traffic was obtained by flooding the server with
HTTP/2 window_update packets (Section 5.1). This flood of HTTP/2 packets
could bypass a hypothetical intrusion-detection system that monitored the CPU
and memory consumption of a machine (Section 5.2), and degraded classification
performance to encumber differentiation between attack and flash-crowd traffic
(Section 6.1 to 6.2). It was demonstrated that 2 and 4 bots were able to yield
stealthier traffic than DDoS attacks. Hence, HTTP/2 flood attacks were found
to be more efficient than HTTP/1.1 Request floods that required a substantially
large amount of HTTP packets and bots to incapacitate the server.
This section also discusses the comparison of HTTP/2 flood attack perfor-
mance with that of HTTP/1.1 from other viewpoints. It compares the importance
of certain determining factors to classify traffic (Section 6.3.1) and the classifica-
tion performance when using only the HTTP/1.1 features (Section 6.3.2).
6.3.1 Feature Ranking Comparison with HTTP/1.1 Fea-
tures
Current research on DDoS attack classification explores methods to distinguish
attack traffic from normal or flash-crowd traffic operating in an HTTP/1.1 en-
vironment. In contrast, this study operated in HTTP/2 environment to classify
normal from attack traffic. This section also discusses how the HTTP/1.1 fea-
tures can be ranked differently as distinguishing factors when applied to HTTP/2
traffic.
To make a comparison, the study investigated features that were used for both
HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 traffic analysis. Listing these common features was a
non-trivial task, because the traffic patterns varied significantly. HTTP/1.1 traffic
185
analysis was reliant on unencrypted packets, while HTTP/2 analysis carried out
in this study was applied to encrypted traffic. HTTP/1.1 traffic analysis required
deep packet inspection, where unencrypted HTTP packets such as the content
of HTTP Requests (Jung et al., 2002; Oikonomou & Mirkovic, 2009; Saleh &
Abdul Manaf, 2015; Zhou et al., 2014), its distribution (Bhatia, Mohay, Tickle,
& Ahmed, 2011), or flow (Sachdeva & Kumar, 2014) could be analysed. Similarly,
the number of resources (i.e. files or pages) that clients requested from a server
was one of the features to model flash-crowd traffic (Bhatia, Mohay, Schmidt, &
Tickle, 2012). Again, these solutions relied on unencrypted HTTP data.
As a result, many of the previous methods that inspected HTTP/1.1 traf-
fic were no longer applicable when implemented for encrypted traffic analy-
sis of HTTP/2. This is because encrypted traffic conceals the content of the
application-layer data. Hence, browsing behaviour that depended on HTTP data
and packet flow measurements, and required application-data inspection could
not be analysed through these techniques. Consequently, deep packet inspection
methods and features that relied on certain HTTP/1.1 packet flow observations
as described above could not be applied to analyse encrypted HTTP/2 traffic.
However, certain aspects were adoptable from HTTP/1.1 traffic analysis and
applied to HTTP/2 traffic. Both HTTP protocols required IP headers (explained
on page 15) to deliver client to server HTTP messages. The IP header was not
commonly encrypted in HTTP/2 unless for tunnelling purposes (where client to
server IP headers were encrypted to obscure client-server IP addresses). Hence,
IP header information was valuable analysis. Traditionally, studies observed the
entropy of the IP address and the port number as the distinguishing features to
detect DDoS attacks against HTTP/1.1 services (Kumar, Joshi, & Singh, 2007;
Lakhina et al., 2005). The disadvantage of this solution was that IP address
spoofing, or forging the source IP address, has increasingly been a common prac-
tice adopted by adversaries. Attackers could mimic the statistical properties of
legitimate traffic and bypass detection methods. Therefore, these features alone
are insufficient for categorizing DDoS attack traffic.
A more recent approach (Rahmani et al., 2012) applied statistical components
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of the network headers, i.e. the number of connections and the number of pack-
ets, to define a determining factor using joint-entropy. Joint entropy is a measure
of uncertainty of values from a pair of variables. The method showed high co-
herence between any two factors in a flash-crowd event, while attacks yielded a
deviation from some values that indicated coherency. The study clarified that it
only inspected the IP header field which did not require deep packet inspections.
However, as previously explained, IP header values can be spoofed and the dis-
tribution of the values could be made to mimic flash-crowd properties, making it
harder to distinguish.
The features used in the above HTTP/1.1 DDoS detection methods that in-
spected IP headers could be applied to compare the stealthiness of the HTTP/2
attack traffic proposed in this study. These HTTP/2 features were the count_app
and the count_syn features, representing the two HTTP/1.1 features, i.e. the
number of packets and the number of connections, respectively.
Other than these sets of features used for the study, the HTTP/2 traffic
analysis in this thesis applied machine learning techniques, while the previous
study (Rahmani et al., 2012) used joint-entropy. In this case, the advantage of
using machine learning is that a range of features could be compared and ranked
according to their relevance to detecting and differentiating attack traffic.
The results are presented in Tables 6.5 and 6.6, which summarize the work
presented in from the previous sections. The two HTTP/1.1 traffic features are
shown at the top because they were the most distinguishing factors for distin-
guishing HTTP/1.1 DDoS from flash-crowd traffic. When applied to analyse
HTTP/2 traffic, it can be seen that the count_syn feature (highlighted) deviated
significantly from the top ranked feature. This was true for both Information
Gain (Table 6.5) and Gain Ratio-based feature ranking (Table 6.6).
Furthermore, Tables 6.5 and 6.6 showed that the count_app feature (high-
lighted), remained a highly relevant feature as it was still ranked near the top for
all three HTTP/2 traffic types, i.e. the DDoS, Stealthy Attack-1 and Stealthy
Attack-2. This confirmed that the Denial-of-Service attack demonstrated in this
study was categorized accurately as a flooding-based attack, and the HTTP/2
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Table 6.5: Feature ranks using Information Gain for all 3 attack types
HTTP/1.1
HTTP/2
DDoS Stealthy Attack 1 Stealthy Attack 2
count_app count_app size_rstAck size_tlsKey
count_syn size_ack count_rstAck count_tlsKey
size_syn count_app count_app
count_syn size_tlsKey size_app
size_tlsHello size_tlsHello size_tlsHello
count_tlsHello count_tlsKey size_rstAck
size_app size_app count_rstAck
count_ack count_syn lapse_encAlert_max
count_rstAck size_syn lapse_rstAck_max
size_rstAck count_tlsHello lapse_rst_max
count_encAlert count_encAlert lapse_finAck_max
size_encAlert size_encAlert size_syn
size_tlsKey size_finAck count_syn
Table 6.6: Feature ranks using Gain Ratio for all 3 attack types
HTTP/1.1
HTTP/2
DDoS Stealthy Attack 1 Stealthy Attack 2
count_app count_app size_rstAck size_tlsKey
count_syn count_ack count_rstAck size_app
size_ack size_app count_tlsKey
size_syn size_tlsKey count_app
size_tlsHello count_app lapse_tlsHello_max
count_syn count_tlsKey count_rstAck
count_tlsHello count_syn size_rstAck
size_app size_syn lapse_tlsHello_ave
size_encAlert count_tlsHello lapse_encAlert_max
count_encAlert size_encAlert lapse_rstAck_max
count_rst count_encAlert lapse_rst_max
size_rst size_finAck lapse_finAck_max
size_rstAck count_finAck size_tlsHello
count_rstAck lapse_finAck_max count_encAlert
count_finAck lapse_rstAck_max size_encAlert
size_finAck lapse_finAck_ave size_syn
lapse_ack_min lapse_rstAck_ave count_syn
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server was incapacitated due to a high traffic volume from the attack.
This led to further discussions on the external validity of the outcomes
achieved. Hence, a comparison with other studies was made to justify how the
standard traffic model used in this study, i.e. the synthetically generated flash-
crowd traffic, can be differentiated from real flash-crowd traffic. For example, the
standard traffic used might be too dense because the flash-crowd traffic was gen-
erated using 5,200 clients (Section 4.4.1) while another study used only 80 clients
to generate similar traffic volume (Sachdeva & Kumar, 2014). When the HTTP/2
attack traffic was compared to a network with such low traffic density, the attack
traffic would yield a much higher number of packets and therefore could be easily
distinguishable from flash-crowd. However, the study that used 80 clients also
used simulated data; hence, the low number of clients did not mimic real traffic
accurately.
Currently there is no real HTTP/2 dataset available. The closest publicly
available HTTP/1.1 dataset is the World Cup 98 (WorldCup98 dataset , 1998).
The data from this dataset was based on more than 3,000 client requests generated
per second. Assuming user-browsing time was 15 seconds as in the case of the
normal User Model (Section 4.2 page 97), the number of clients in this dataset
was equal to 45,000. This number was almost 9 times higher than the 5,200
clients used to generate flash-crowd traffic in this study. If real HTTP/2 traffic
characteristics were similar to that, the stealthy traffic proposed in this section
(Section 6.1 and 6.2) would cause the count_app feature to become less relevant.
Therefore, when a machine learning technique is applied to classify flash-crowd
traffic, the stealthy traffic could yield more stealthy properties such as a higher
number of incorrectly classified instances, i.e. false negatives.
6.3.2 Performance Comparison
While the previous section identified features used in HTTP/1.1 as determin-
ing factors for differentiating flash-crowd from DDoS attack traffic, this section
presented how machine learning techniques perform when the traffic was anal-
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Table 6.7: Incorrectly classified instances (%) by machine learning techniques
applied with only HTTP/1.1 features.
Stealthy Attack 1 Stealthy Attack 2
Naïve Bayes 0.2651 0.5189
Decision Tree 0.1687 0.2335
JRip 0.1205 0.2335
Support Vector Machine 0 0.3373
ysed using two HTTP/1.1 features, i.e. the count_app and count_syn features.
Furthermore, it compared the machine learning technique performance analysis
when using the two HTTP/1.1 features (the count_app and count_syn features)
to the 42 HTTP/2 features proposed in this study (Table 3.6). The discussion
also examined the incorrectly classified instances as an evaluation measure.
The machine learning-based analysis results, when using the HTTP/1.1 fea-
tures as determining factors, is shown in Table 6.7. It can be seen that
Stealthy Attack-2 yielded higher percentages of incorrectly classified instances
than Stealthy Attack-1. This was another evidence that Stealthy Attack-2 proved
to be stealthier than Stealthy Attack-1.
The methodologies for comparison of the results with previously presented
attack models (Section 6.1 and 6.2) are shown in Figure 6-20 and 6-21. The for-
mer is a comparison to the Stealthy Attack-1 performance, while the latter is a
comparison to the Stealthy Attack-2 performance. In the two figures, classifica-
tion performance using HTTP/1.1-features from Table 6.7 is shown as a straight
line in all graphs to serve as a baseline value. The baseline value was to visualize
gaps to classification performance results using HTTP/2-features, illustrated in
red and blue in the figures. It can be seen from the figures that the green lines
are higher, away from the X-axis, than the red and blue graphs. This means that
classifying the Stealthy Attack-1 and Stealthy Attack-2 from flash crowd yielded
more incorrectly classified instances when employing HTTP/1.1 features than
when employing the HTTP/2 features proposed in this study (Table 3.6). The
HTTP/2 features yielded better results than the HTTP/1.1 features, when they
were employed by machine learning techniques to distinguish HTTP/2 attack
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traffic from flash crowd traffic.
Another observation drawn from Figures 6-20 and 6-21 is that Stealthy Attack-
2 is stealthier than Stealthy Attack-1. When the green lines – which represent
performance results using HTTP/1.1. features – were set as a baseline, larger
green-red and green-blue gaps are clearly seen on the Stealthy Attack-2 figures
(Figure 6-21). That is, the figures show larger gaps between green-red graphs on
the Stealthy Attack-2 performance (Figure 6-21) than the green-red graphs on the
Stealthy Attack-1 performance (Figure 6-20). Similarly, larger green-blue gaps
can be seen on the Stealthy Attack-2 (Figure 6-21) than the Stealthy Attack-1
(Figure 6-20) performance. Therefore, when a hypothetical intrusion-detection-
system, equipped with a classifier employing HTTP/1.1 features was used to
measure the incorrectly classified instances of the two traffic models proposed in
this section (Section 6.1 and 6.2), Stealthy Attack-2 yielded stealthier traffic than
Stealthy Attack-1.
Two conclusions can be drawn from the analysis and discussions in this section.
First, Stealthy Attack-2 yielded more incorrectly classified instances than Stealthy
Attack-1. The former showed that the count_app and count_syn features were
ranked lower than the latter (Section 6.3.1). These features were the two fea-
tures employed by DDoS detection studies in the literature for HTTP/1.1 traf-
fic. Furthermore, Stealthy Attack-2 yielded high incorrectly classified instances
than Stealthy Attack-1 when analysed with HTTP/1.1 features (Section 6.3.2).
This demonstrates that Stealthy Attack-2 mimicked flash-crowd traffic closer than
Stealthy Attack-1.
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(a) Naïve Bayes (b) Decision Tree
(c) JRip (d) Support Vector Machine
Figure 6-20: A comparison of Stealthy Attack-1 performance when using both HTTP/1.1 features and HTTP/2 features.
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(a) Naïve Bayes (b) Decision Tree
(c) JRip (d) Support Vector Machine
Figure 6-21: A comparison of Stealthy Attack-2 performance when using both HTTP/1.1 features and HTTP/2 features.
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Second, the 42 HTTP/2 features proposed in this study (Table 3.6) were able
to yield better results than the HTTP/1.1 features proposed in the literature, in
distinguishing attack from flash-crowd traffic. This is shown by the larger gaps
between the graphs produced by the Stealthy Attack-2 and Stealthy Attack-1
traffic to the results produced by HTTP/1.1 features (Figure 6-20 and 6-21).
This observation was true in all four cases, i.e. when the analysis used Naïve
Bayes, Decision Tree, JRip, and Support Vector Machines. This demonstrates
that the HTTP/2 features proposed in this study yielded better results than the
HTTP/1.1 features employed in the literature.
6.4 Conclusion
This section introduced two sets of HTTP/2 attack traffic, namely, Stealthy
Attack-1 and Stealthy Attack-2. It was shown that these traffic types were
stealthier than the DDoS traffic presented in the previous chapter. The evalua-
tion presented in the section showed that machine learning techniques performed
poorly when deployed to distinguish attack traffic from flash crowd traffic.
Two groups of bots were introduced to generate attack traffic. A mime group
was assigned to mimic flash-crowd traffic, and an offending group was designed
to generate flooding traffic. Stealthy Attack-1 was modelled to consist of one bot
for each group, yielding a total of two bots to generate traffic that continually
consumed 100% CPU usage on a target server. Stealthy Attack-2 model consisted
of two bots for each group, yielding a total of four bots. These numbers, i.e. two
bots for Stealthy Attack-1 and four bots for Stealthy Attack-2, were significantly
lower than 5200, the number of clients deployed to generate flash-crowd traffic.
Since two to four machines can generate attack traffic, HTTP/2 DDoS attacks can
become more ubiquitous in the future. These can be launched from an attacker’s
place of residence as opposed to traditional DDoS attack methods that required
distributed computers to launch simultaneous attack floods targeting a victim.
Three analyses conducted showed that Stealthy Attack-2 was stealthier
than Stealthy Attack-1. First, machine learning-based classifications employing
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HTTP/2 features proposed in this study (Table 3.6) showed that Stealthy Attack-
2 yielded higher percentages of incorrectly classified instances than Stealthy
Attack-1 (Figure 6-15). A hypothetical intrusion-detection system would per-
form worse when Stealthy Attack-2 traffic model was chosen rather than Stealthy
Attack-1. Second, Stealthy Attack-2 did not reach 0% incorrectly classified in-
stances when analysed with Naïve Bayes, Decision Tree, and JRip (Figure 6-16).
In contrast, Stealthy Attack-1 reached 0% incorrectly classified instances when
analysed with Decision Tree and JRip. Third, Stealthy Attack-2 showed higher
incorrectly classified instances than Stealthy Attack-1 when HTTP/1.1 features
(i.e. count_app and count_syn) were used as distinguishing factors to classify
attack and flash-crowd (Figure 6-20 and 6-21). Thus, a hypothetical intrusion-
detection-system that was equipped with machine learning classifiers analysing
HTTP/1.1 traffic would perform worse when Stealthy Attack-2 traffic model was
chosen rather than Stealthy Attack-1, to generate attack traffic.
Support Vector Machines and Self Organizing Maps can be used to classify
HTTP/2 attack from flash-crowd traffic. Support Vector Machine yielded 0%
incorrectly classified instances (Figure 6-16), 100% Detection Rate (Figure 6-17),
and 0% False Alarm Rate (Figure 6-18) when classifying all three attack models
presented in this study, i.e. DDoS, Stealthy Attack-1, and Stealthy Attack-2.
Similarly, a Self Organizing Map-based visualization (Figure 6-19) showed that
the cluster representing flash-crowd traffic was coloured uniformly, indicating that
the Self Organizing Map accurately clustered normal and attack traffic. However,
both Support Vector Machine and Self Organizing Map took a very long execution
time to produce analysis results. Support Vector Machines spent more than 2
minutes, while Self Organizing Map spent more than 10 minutes when analysing
each of the datasets consisting of between 3,700 to 4,400 instances. The analysis
was run on an Intel Core-i3 with a 2 GB RAM. Therefore, it can be seen that
Support Vector Machines and Self Organizing Maps were not suitable techniques
for real-time intrusion-detection systems.
The study further showed how features used in HTTP/1.1 traffic were not
highly relevant when applied to analyse HTTP/2 traffic. The HTTP/1.1 features
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employed in the literature, i.e. the count_app and the count_syn features, ranked
as less relevant features when they were employed to analyse HTTP/2 traffic
(Table 6.5 and 6.6). The tables showed that the two features were not ranked at
the top of the list. On the other hand, a hypothetical intrusion-detection system
would perform better when it employs HTTP/2 features proposed in this study
(Table 3.6). Figure 6-20 and 6-21 show that graphs representing classification
performance employing HTTP/2 features were lower than the curves representing
classification performance employing HTTP/1.1 features. Thus, the proposed
HTTP/2 features of this study contributed to better classification performance.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are known to disrupt routine Internet services
that modern society benefits from. Detecting and having the ability to prevent
DoS attacks against a web server have been widely studied in the literature. Cur-
rently, research on detection of DoS attacks against web servers as found in the
literature is associated with HTTP/1.1 traffic. The HTTP/1.1 protocol has been
the global web communication standard for nearly two decades, and the new ver-
sion of this standard, namely HTTP/2, was published very recently, i.e. in May
2015. This thesis work investigated, modelled and analysed flooding-based DoS
attacks against HTTP/2 services. The study presented HTTP/2 normal traffic
model (Chapter 4) and various attack models (Chapter 5 and 6), to illustrate the
mechanism adopted by the adversary for launching such attacks against web ser-
vices. In addition, a thorough analysis was performed based on machine learning
techniques so as to differentiate attack traffic from legitimate. A proposal of a
stealthier version of the DoS attack was presented, to encumber the detection
process. The findings reported in this thesis demonstrate how HTTP/2 attack
traffic can be modelled; identify future directions of work to extend the proposed
models; and allow follow-up studies in traffic analysis and identification as active
research areas.
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7.1 Contributions of the Study
The main contributions of this study are outlined as follows:
∙ An HTTP/2 legitimate traffic model was defined and analysed (Chapter 4).
∙ Four HTTP/2 attack traffic models were defined and analysed (Chapter 5
and 6).
∙ HTTP/2 traffic features (Table 3.5) were analysed and ranked based on
known feature ranking techniques.
∙ HTTP/2 normal and attack traffic datasets (Section 4.4.2, 5.2, 6.1, and
6.2).
This study introduced four HTTP/2 DoS attack models, i.e. flooding-based
attacks (Section 5.1), DDoS attacks (Section 5.2), Stealthy Attack-1 (Section 6.1)
and Stealthy Attack-2 (Section 6.2). The first two models, flooding-based and
DDoS, demonstrated how HTTP/2 traffic can be modelled to generate attack
traffic that incapacitates a target machine through sheer traffic intensity. The
traffic generated based on these four defined models caused a target machine to
reach 100% CPU consumption. In addition, the two traffic models were distin-
guishable from legitimate traffic. Machine learning techniques were subsequently
applied to classify the flooding-based and DDoS traffic from legitimate traffic.
Following this, the latter two models, Stealthy Attack-1 and Stealthy Attack-2,
were formulated to impair the performance of machine learning classifiers from
accurately differentiating legitimate from attack traffic. These two traffic mod-
els caused machine learning classifiers to show higher percentages of incorrectly
classified instances, lower Detection Rates, and higher False Alarm Rates. The
four HTTP/2 attack traffic models presented in this thesis were one of the key
contributions of the study.
To show how the latter two attack traffic models (i.e. Stealthy Attack-1 and
Stealthy Attack-2) were classified from normal traffic, this study also presented
an HTTP/2 legitimate traffic model. The legitimate model was subsequently
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extended to generate flash-crowd traffic, i.e. traffic generated by legitimate online
users, where a high number of users causes a web server to exceed its serving
capacity and becomes unresponsive to client requests. The study presented the
legitimate model and the generated flash crowd model in Chapter 4.
The legitimate traffic model was built upon a publicly available log of online
human actions. The log consisted of user activities, or events, with a time stamp
on each event. This allowed the study to represent activities of a normal user
through a state transition model (Section 4.2). Different patterns of user actions,
representing different user behaviours, were represented by the state transition
model. In the study conducted, 21 distinct user behaviours were modelled to
generate legitimate traffic. The normal user model definition is one of the contri-
butions of this study.
This model was applied to generate flash-crowd traffic, i.e. a volume of traffic
that consumed 100% CPU resource of an HTTP/2 web server. The study found
that 5,200 user models were required to operate simultaneously in order to gen-
erate flash-crowd traffic. To characterise the generated flash-crowd traffic, this
study presented distinguishing factors for traffic identification through a set of
network traffic features. Three feature groups were presented, i.e. the count, size,
and lapse features. The count and size features identified the number and the size
of packets per second, respectively. The lapse feature identified the minimum,
average, and maximum time lapse of packets since a TCP connection to transport
packets was established. Each feature was used to describe the characteristics of
different packet types observed in the generated traffic in this study. There were
a total of 42 features presented in Table 3.6. The HTTP/2-feature set is one of
the contributions of this study.
This set of features was applied to characterise the flash-crowd traffic gen-
erated in this study. The characteristics of the flash-crowd traffic are shown in
Table 4.7. The values of these features were employed as the legitimate traffic;
values significantly different from these feature values indicated traffic anomalies.
Hence, the legitimate traffic features were used to identify attack traffic presented
in this study.
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The traffic generated by the first attack model, the flooding-based one, caused
a victim machine to become unresponsive to client requests. This signified that
the attack successfully incapacitated the victim machine. The flooding-based
attack traffic caused a victim machine to show 100% CPU consumption. This
model employed an HTTP/2 packet type, namely, window_update to flood a
target machine.
The second attack model, DDoS model, extended the flooding-based model to
generate stealthy traffic, i.e. a traffic flood that bypassed a hypothetical intrusion-
detection-system that monitored CPU and memory consumption of a victim ma-
chine. The study found that when the window_update payload, i.e. window-
size-increment was set to 16,384, then a flood of 131K window_update packets
sent within 38.5 seconds consumed 50% CPU of a target machine. This CPU load
did not incapacitate a target machine, thereby allowing the traffic to bypass the
hypothetical intrusion-detection system previously described. The DDoS traffic
was generated by four attacking clients, where each client launched 2 attack traf-
fic volumes, based on the above defined models of stealthy traffic. The generated
traffic caused a target machine to consume 100% CPU utilisation. However, the
traffic was distinguished from legitimate traffic. Hence, the study introduced a
third model to investigate how stealthy attacks operate.
The third attack model, Stealthy Attack-1, extended the DDoS model to
camouflage attack traffic characteristics. Two bots were employed to mimic the
count_syn feature values of attack traffic. This feature was the number of TCP
packets with the SYN flag set, observed per second. The traffic was analysed
through employing four machine learning techniques (Naïve Bayes, Decision Tree,
JRip, and Support Vector Machines). The analysis showed that Stealthy Attack-
1 traffic produced more incorrectly classified instances than the DDoS traffic,
suggesting that the Stealthy Attack-1 traffic is stealthier than the DDoS model.
The fourth attack model, Stealthy Attack-2, extended the Stealthy Attack-1
model to demonstrate how stealthier attack traffic can be modelled. Four bots
were employed to mimic the size_rstAck feature values of attack traffic. This
feature defined the size of TCP packets with RST-ACK flag set, observed per
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second. Three machine learning techniques, i.e. Naïve Bayes, Decision Tree
and JRip, showed that Stealthy Attack-2 produced more incorrectly classified
instances than Stealthy Attack-1, suggesting that the former is stealthier than
the latter.
The study further showed how features used in HTTP/1.1 traffic were not
highly relevant when used to analyse HTTP/2 traffic. Instead, the analysis of
the two HTTP/2 stealthy attack traffic models, Stealthy Attack-1 and Stealthy
Attack-2, performed better when the HTTP/2 features (Table 3.6) were used as
the distinguishing factors. Machine learning classifiers (Naïve Bayes, Decision
Tree, JRip, and Support Vector Machines) yielded less percentage of incorrectly
classified instances when applying HTTP/2 features than HTTP/1.1 features.
The study demonstrated that two machine learning techniques, Support Vec-
tor Machines and Self Organizing Maps, were able to distinguish attack and
legitimate traffic with a high degree of accuracy. Support Vector Machines can
classify the two traffic types when at least 5 Information Gain-ranked features
or 13 Gain Ratio-ranked features were selected, yielding 0% incorrectly classified
instances. Self Organizing Maps showed flash-crowd traffic cluster in a colour
code different from other traffic clusters, suggesting that the traffic is successfully
differentiated between the two classes. However, it took more than 2 minutes and
10 minutes, respectively, to run the analysis of Support Vector Machines and Self
Organizing Maps. Hence, these machine learning techniques were not suitable
for real-time applications such as intrusion-detection systems.
The study indicated that DoS attack analysis will remain to be an active re-
search area with the ready-adoption of the HTTP/2 standard. The study demon-
strated that a small number of machines can be designed to produce HTTP/2 DoS
attack traffic. It took only 2 machines to disrupt an HTTP/2 service as opposed
to an estimated number of 45,000 clients required for HTTP/1.1 DDoS attack
traffic generation. The use of more bots, such as 4 bots that the Stealthy Attack-
2 modelled, could camouflage more attack properties with legitimate properties.
Future studies that employ higher number of bots can create further similarities
between attack and normal traffic.
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7.2 Limitations and Future Work
Two limitations are identified in this study. First, the legitimate traffic dataset
was obtained from synthetic data. Further HTTP/2 DoS traffic analysis can ben-
efit from actual HTTP/2 flash-crowd traffic datasets when they become available.
Second, the attack models were based on one of the HTTP/2 frame types, the
window_update packet. Overall there are 10 frame types which can be combined
to produce different traffic patterns. These combinations were outside the scope
of this study and serve as future work.
Synthetically-generated traffic was set as the baseline standard for machine
learning techniques to analyse the four attack traffic models presented in this
study. The legitimate traffic was generated through the implementation of curl, a
programming library that generated HTTP/2 traffic. Real web traffic is produced
by heterogeneous devices and implementations, which altogether create legitimate
traffic patterns. These patterns can show different feature values when compared
to the ones used in this study. Future work in HTTP/2 DoS attack design and
analysis can benefit from actual HTTP/2 flash-crowd traffic.
Another limitation of this study is that only one of 10 HTTP/2 frame types,
i.e. window_update, was exploited to serve as the anatomy of the proposed
attack models. The study observed that a flood of HTTP/2 packets consisted of
other frame types such as ping, data, and settings packets did not successfully
incapacitate a target server. The rest of the frame types were outside the scope
of this study; these are: the headers, priority, rst_stream, push_promise,
go_away and continuation frames. It can be seen that HTTP/2 attack models
were endowed with different techniques than its predecessor, one of which was to
examine how these frame types can be employed. Combinations of these frame
types can produce a range of traffic patterns that have not been studied.
This study has contributed in creating novel, HTTP/2 legitimate and attack
datasets. As Internet-connected devices and its heterogeneity are projected to
increase significantly in the future, research focusing on creating, collecting and
synthesizing current Internet traffic datasets will continue to extend knowledge
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published through this research work. On the other hand, HTTP/2 introduces
new techniques capable of generating various traffic patterns, which have been
shown in this thesis to produce DoS attack traffic of varying characteristics. These
can further create a race amongst state-of-the art HTTP/2 DoS studies in attack
design, analysis, and detection.
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Appendix A
Machine Learning Parameter
Values
A.1 Naïve Bayes
Remark Parameter Value
The preferred number of instances to
process if batch prediction is being
performed
batchSize 100
The number of decimal places to be
used for the output of numbers in the
model
numDecimalPlaces 2
Use kernel estimator for numeric
attributes rather than a normal
distribution
useKernelEstimator false
Use supervised discretization to
convert numeric numeric attributes to
nominal ones
useSupervised
Discretization
false
A.2 Decision Tree
Remark Parameter Value
The preferred number of instances to
process if batch prediction is being
performed
batchSize 100
Whether to use binary splits on
nominal attributes when building the
trees
binarySplits false
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Whether parts are removed that do
not reduce training error
collapseTree true
Pruning confidence factor, smaller
values incur more pruning
confidenceFactor 0.25
If true, the split point is not relocated
to an actual data value
doNotMakeSplitPoint
ActualValue
false
The minimum number of instances per
leaf
minNumObj 2
The number of decimal places to be
used for the output of numbers in the
model
numDecimalPlaces 2
Whether reduced-error pruning is used reducedErrorPruning false
A.3 JRip
Remark Parameter Value
The preferred number of instances to
process if batch prediction is being
performed
batchSize 100
If true, the check for error rate > 50%
is included in stopping criterion
checErrorRate true
The amount of data for pruning folds 3
The minimum total weight of the
instances in a rule
minNo 2
The number of decimal places to be
used for the output of numbers in the
model
numDecimalPlaces 2
The number of optimization runs optimizations 2
The seed used for randomizing the
data
seed 1
Whether pruning is performed usePruning true
A.4 Support Vector Machines
Remark Parameter Value
The type of SVM to use SVMType C-SVC
The preferred number of instances to
process if batch prediction is being
performed
batchSize 100
The cache size in MB cacheSize 40.0
The coefficient to use coef0 0.0
The cost parameter C cost 1.0
The degree of the kernel degree 3
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Whether to turn off automatic
replacement of missing values
doNotReplace
MissingValues
false
The tolerance of the termination
criterion
eps 0.001
The gamma tu use, if - then
1/max_index is used
gamma 0.0
The type of kernel to use kernelType linear
Normalize the data normalize false
The number of decimal places to be
used for the output of numbers in the
model
numDecimalPlaces 2
Whether to generate probability
estimates
probabilityEstimates false
The random number seed to be used seed 1
Whether to use shrinking heuristics shrinking true
The weights to use for the classes weights 1
A.5 Self Organizing Maps
Remark Parameter Value
The number of epochs in convergence
phase
convergenceEpochs 1000
The height of lattice height 2
The initial amount the weights are
updated
learningRate 1.0
Normalize the attributes normalizeAttributes true
The number of epochs in ordering
phase
orderingEpochs 2000
The width of lattice width 2
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